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The role which ideology has played in the formation of 
Russian and American foreign policy was the impetus for this 
project. Soviet-American diplomacy during the period 1941 to 
1946 became the focus of the study after several projects 
pointed to the role that ideology played in the relationship 
between Russia and America during the years 1945 to 1947. After 
discovering the role which ideology played, it became necessary 
to find the origins of such a role, as well as the felt necessity 
by each nation to implement ideology into the formation of its 
policy. The origins of each nation1s ideology led to the 
discovery of traditions in the way each nation conducted its 
foreign relationships. These traditions go beyond ideology, 
although ideology is often a part of the tradition. After a 
close evaluation of each nation's history in the formation of 
foreign relationships, the tradition was identified. It was 
found that Russia, and later the Soviet Union, had a tradition of 
conventional European power politics; its policy during the war 
years was based on its own national interests and maintaining the 
global status quo in its favor. The American tradition was more 
complicated; although interested in preserving the global status 
quo in its favor, the American tradition also involved spreading 
justice and democracy throughout the world, thereby changing the 
status quo. The American tradition also involved convincing the 
American public to accept Washington's foreign policy decisions, 
doing whatever was necessary to gain approval. The American and 
Russian traditions proved to be incompatible during the years of 
the Grand Alliance. Roosevelt tried to bridge the gap between 
the two traditions, but he did not succeed. His successors were 
left with the problem of balancing the power of Europe and 
containing the Soviet Union in a way that was compatible with the 
American tradition. The origins of containment can be found in 
these two traditions and Roosevelt's attempt to bridge the gap 
between Soviet power politics and America's quest to assure its 
national interests through the establishment of democratic 
capitalism.
ii
To mother and father, 
who made it possible
To Steven and Ethel May, 
who kept me going
And to Professor Skinner, 
ray educator
The tradition of all past generations weighs like an Alp upon the 
brain of the living.
—  Karl Marx
18th Brumaire (1852)
Tradition is a great retarding force, the vis inertiae of history,
—  Friedrich Engels
Socialism, Utopian and Scientific (1891)
The effigies and splendors of tradition are not meant to cramp the 
energies or the development of a vigorous and various nation. They 
are not meant to hold in mortmain the proper territory of human 
intelligence and righteous aspiration. They live and teach their 
lessons in our annals, they have their own worshippers and shrines, 
but the earth is not theirs nor the fulness thereof.
—  Lord Roseberry
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PREFACE
Other than the causes of World War I, there has been more 
literature written about the origins of the Cold War than any other 
period in history. The reasons why are as numerous as the writings 
themselves, but three acme readily to my mind. First, the Soviet Union 
and the United States managed to remain allies in fairly good standing 
throughout the war, proving that the two nations had the capacity to 
cooperate when necessary. What broke up the coalition is one source of 
fascination for historians. Secondly, all nations must live with the 
Cold War and its aftermath— the arms race. An understanding of the 
causes of such a precarious situation is instrumental in rectifying or 
neutralizing the conflict. Lastly, the nature of the conflict is often 
thought of as ideological, and Americans have been led to believe that 
the democratic integrity of the United States, indeed the entire globe, 
is at stake if the Soviet Union succeeds in achieving any of its 
goals. For this reason, historians have felt compelled to either 
criticize or condone the foreign policy of America, placing the blame 
on either the United States for being too idealistic, or the Soviet 
Union for allowing its oonmunistic doctrine to justify any means used 
to gain the end— ultimate control of the world, for the good of all 
mankind of course.
The part which ideology has played in the formation of both 
nations' foreign policy has held a fascination for me during my course 
of study. The Soviet Union admits it upholds a certain ideology— the
doctrine of Marxism-Leninism, and claims to proudly base all its 
policies, both foreign and domestic, on the determination to remain 
true to its professed creed and ambition— the establishment of a 
classless, ccnmunistic society. What part has Marxism-Leninism 
actually played in Russia's foreign policy decisions, however, and to 
what extent does the Kremlin simply use the doctrine to mask its true 
motives?
Determining the role ideology has played in the formation of 
America's foreign policy is a bit more difficult. One man did not take 
a distinct philosophy and forge a new nation on its premises, as did 
Lenin. However, America is still a mythological nation to a certain 
extent, the hone of the brave and the land of the free. United States 
policy makers have had to contend with the fable that every action 
America takes is for the sake of justice and liberty; to what extent 
did this idea affect the formation of America's foreign policy goals 
and to what extent has Washington been able to discard such ideals?
The search for the origins of the containment policy as it was 
finally penned in 1947 by Harry S. Truman's Doctrine and George F. 
Kerman's famous "X Article" did not begin with the ideologies of 
America and Russia. By first exploring the part which America's 
ideology played in the Cold War, and then coming to an understanding of 
Stalin's war aims and the reasons behind his goals, it became obvious 
that each nation had a distinct "tradition" in foreign policy, a 
tradition so integral to its decision-making process that it could not 
be avoided or ignored even if the policy makers were aware of its 
existence. Roosevelt was painfully aware of the tradition in American
foreign policy; Truman did not appear to be. Stalin, because he had to 
answer to no one, did not bother to concern himself with anything but 
his goals; indeed, that reality is a part of the Soviet tradition in 
foreign policy.
The paper took several turn-abouts as research proceeded. At 
first, it was thought the period examined would have to extend to 1949. 
It then became obvious that the origins of the policy lay somewhere
between the eighteenth century and Roosevelt's death. It was still
f
important to examine the years between Roosevelt's death and the Truman 
Doctrine, for the origins of containment could be seen in the actions 
and heard in the words of the men who succeeded FDR. The Russian 
tradition began as far back as the ninth century, but the age of 
Russian expansion and the Russian Revolution was the most closely
examined. Consequently, the paper begins with a careful examination of 
how the tradition in each nation's foreign policy evolved, and then 
closely examines the period which planted the seeds of containment. 
The thesis is not about the policy of containment itself, and makes no 
attempt to discuss the actual policy, its consequences or attributes.
The writer felt certain, at first, that George Kennan's role would 
be indispensable. Research found a stumbling block in this premise, 
also. Kennan may have penned the word, but his writings did not 
achieve the kind of policy he wanted. The reason: the American
tradition in foreign policy. With or without Kennan's contribution, 
Russia would have to be contained. Stalin's goals had much to do with 
the Russian tradition, as did the clarity with which he stated them. 
His clarity could not be dealt with in the terms ordained by America's
vii±
tradition in foreign relations.
In the end the author was pleased with the research, for it did 
not prove the ideas first held regarding the matter. Sources relied 
upon were the memoirs of the characters involved, their conversations 
with and about each other. Secondary sources were relied upon to 
establish the traditions in each nation's foreign policy, but chapters 
two and three attempted to dispense with secondary sources and turn to 
the memoirs of the foreign policy makers in each nation.
Chapter One— The Traditions
The Policies
Since the Soviet Union's stormy inception in 1917, the concept of 
a bi-polar world has existed in the foreign policies of America and 
Russia. Each country has wished to see the world molded in its 
respective political system, each claiming its system to be the 
harbinger of world peace and security. The Carmunists boasted of 
socialism as their economic base, maintaining its uniqueness in a world 
exploited by high-finance. America's Republic, however, was certain 
capitalism was the true expression of individualism and freedom.
There is more to the chasm, however, than two opposing political
systems. Ivo J. Lederer made the observation that Russian relations
with the outside world have always been notably unstable, and past
generations have faced their cwn particular problems with Russia.1 As
Cyril E. Black pointed out in one of his essays on Russian foreign
policy objectives, Russia has always been a potential threat to
2Europe's balance of power by sheer size alone. Such a massive area 
could easily achieve world hegemony if it had the necessary strength 
and will. Alexis de Toqueville visited the United States in 1830. His 
observations led him to the conclusion that America and Russia held the 
fate of the globe in their hands, and this was years before oarmunism 
had become a part of the Russian system. Toqueville obviously 
recognized the dormant power latent in both Russia and the United
2
States, nations occupying two of the globe's largest continents, both 
rich in natural and economic resources.
There are at present two great nations in the world 
which seem to tend tcwards the same end, although they 
start frcm different points. I allude to the Russians and 
the Americans....Their starting point is different and 
their courses are not the same, yet each of them appears to 
be marked by t^e will of heaven to sway the destinies of 
half the globe.
Throughout the despairing relationship between the Soviet Union and the 
United States, neither has trusted the other to share the vital 
resources and raw materials necessary to maintain power and hegemony in 
a world which places the utmost importance upon the two. Therefore 
there appears to be two diverse aspects of Soviet and American 
relations, and it is usually difficult to tell which one takes 
precedence when the policies are being made— ideology or the quest for 
economic and political power.
This is why the account of hew the two foremost industrially 
powerful nations on earth came to be adversaries is one of convolusion, 
of economic and national security interests shrouded in ideology and 
masked by noble and lofty ideals. A truly objective eye would soon 
tire of trying to discern the truth of the story, of exactly what 
happened in the years following the Bolshevik Revolution to produce a 
world engaged in Russia's and America's Cold War. The foreign policies 
of these two nations have often been directed against each other and 
there has been little rocm in the past for compromise in their 
dichotcmous systems.
The officially stated foreign policy of the Soviet Union is to 
stop aggressors and ensure the peace and independence of the world,
3
which is constantly being threatened by high-finance capitalists
seeking to exploit weaker nations and hence thwart their liberation
fran the yoke of low wages and poverty. America is the world's biggest
exploiter, "who new plays the role of world policeman aiming to
4strangle any liberation movement in any part of the globe."
Interestingly, there are several American historians who would agree
5with the Soviet assessment of America's foreign policy goals.
It is more difficult to discern a succinct and definitive foreign 
policy for the United States. Unlike the Soviet Union, which touts an 
officially stated foreign policy commensurate with Ccmmunist Party 
rhetoric, American policy has developed gradually over the years 
according to historical dictates. Since World War II it has been not 
only to contain ocmmunism, which threatens the world with censorship, 
totalitarianism, and the curtailment of basic civil and political 
liberties integral to free societies, but also to "change the nature of 
the Soviet System itself."^ America's foreign policy goals have been 
explicitly based on the principle of self-determination for all nations 
ever since 1941 when the Atlantic Charter was penned. American foreign 
policy makers have always felt the political system of the Soviet Union
7to be the antithesis of this principle. In 1985, George Schultz told 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: "American foreign policy is
driven by positive goals— peace, democracy, liberty, and human
Orights...These are not Soviet goals."
Because America's foreign policy is to contain ccmnunism, it is 
essential to understand the development and aims of Russia's foreign
9policy from 1917 to 1941. It was during these years that
4
Marxist-Leninist ideology was forced to succumb to the global realities 
of the 1920's and '30's. Expediency supplanted ideology during this 
time, but it did not become a substitute for it. Furthermore, one can 
never understand the obstinancy of the United States to contain 
communism unless America's perceptions of Soviet foreign policy are 
understood. Perhaps this is why Donald Bishop, author of a two-volume 
study on Soviet foreign policy, wrote that "the decisions of Soviet 
leaders affect us more than the decisions of our cwn people.
The reality of Soviet foreign policy, however, if it can be found,
may be quite different frcm America's perception of it, or what America
claims its perception to be. Moscow officially claims to adhere to the
Marxist dialectic, and believes capitalism's demise is inherent within
the system itself. Therefore, war or territorial aggrandizement is not
necessary to bring down capitalistic nations: they will simply fall.11
In the years directly following Wbrld war II, several American foreign
policy makers discounted the official party-line and instead chose to
12believe ccmnunist expansion to be a goal of the Soviet Union. 
Stalin's stated purpose for wanting to extend his western frontier, to 
protect his badgered nation against future invasion, was not accepted 
either. A crucial question asked by Moscow at the time, is whether the 
United States truly believed Russia was aggressively planning to expand 
its communist ideology to encircle the globe, or if it simply claimed 
to believe that in order to protect its cwn national interests, 
whatever they were, at the cost of Soviet friendship. As Stalin said 
when the Truman Doctrine was issued: "The cry of saving Greece and 
Turkey from the expansion of the so-called 'totalitarian states' is not
5
new. Hitler used to refer to the Bolsheviks when he wanted to open the
13road for his own conquests."
And what of Moscow's perception of American foreign policy? 
Capitalistic encirclement of the globe is scmething to fear if a nation 
is not capitalistic, but is that actually America's intention? The 
Soviet Union does not view containment as a defensive policy; it is 
instead a mask to cover up an offensive policy designed to export 
capitalistic exploitation to all parts of the world in order to achieve 
the optimum amount of economic power possible for the United States."^
If the United States foreign policy of containment was determined 
by imperialistic self-interests as the Soviets claimed, how does one go 
about proving that, especially if American foreign policy makers state 
otherwise? By the same token, if Washington chose to believe Soviet 
foreign policy goals were not what Moscow purported them to be, where 
is the basis for mutual cooperation? There comes a time when truth and 
reality merge with ideology and perception. In fact, it may not be 
possible at all to derive the true motives which formulated the foreign 
policies of the two, newly endowed superpowers in the crucial years, 
1941-1946. All that can be seen are the results.
The key point to remember about each nation's foreign policy is 
that both claimed to be striving for world peace, true democracy and 
egalitarian values. How is it possible both powers could profess to 
offer the only viable political system for attaining these goals when 
the systems were so dichotcmous? The question, like the answer, is 
ambivalent because the truth in this story is not objective, nor can it 
be. It is opaque, obscure, subject to years, even centuries, of
6
historical traditions, circumstances and attitudes. The studies 
undertaken to explore these historical traditions are voluminous, and 
they have their place and importance in assessing what happened to 
produce two foreign policies so much at odds with each other that they 
threaten the peace of the world. More than anything else, an 
understanding of the traditions and circumstances that helped to shape 
these nations' ideologies and ultimately their foreign policies is 
imperative in establishing a rapport and empathy between the two.
The Russian Tradition: "We shall turn to you our alien 
Asiatic snout."
In 1961 Theodore Von Laue wrote an article for a Yale Conference
convened to explore the problems of a century of Russian/Soviet foreign
policy. According to Von Laue, Russia has always felt a compulsion to
compare itself with the West; and the deepest motivation for forming
foreign policy has come from this "evaluation," and not from the
15internal conditions of the state itself. To understand this contest
between Russia and the West, one needs to go back in tin®. Hew far
back is a matter of interpretation and thoroughness. Louis J. Halle's
The Cold War As History goes as far back as the ninth century. Seeing
an abundance of continuity and little change over the centuries, Halle
simplistically states:
Fear, rather than ambition, is the principal reason 
for the organization and expansion of the Russian society.
If all my ancestors for ten centuries had died violent 
deaths at the hands of their neighbors, it is quite likely 
that I would have been brought up frotv̂  ̂chi ldhood to be 
suspicious and hostile tcward my neigbors.
7
This is quite a generalization, and one must be careful not to put too
much credence in pat generalizations that span centuries, for they can
too easily become explanations for complex situations. It is true,
though, that Russia's history has brought about a peculiar xenophobia,
especially of the West.
The single, most pervasive reason for Russia's history to have
17developed as it did was its geography. Over the years historians have
debated Russia's geographical status— was it part of Europe or Asia?
According to historian Robert Byrnes, geographically Russia has always
18been in the West, but she has never been a part of it. To understand 
the logic of his reasoning, it is necessary to go back to the ninth 
century; and although it may seem extreme to traverse ten centuries to 
understand a situation in 1944, Russian history developed differently 
than the West's and the nation became locked into an alien political 
system feared and abhored by the "free" world.
The vast European plain to where the Slavic peoples migrated in 
the eighth century was void of natural, protective boundaries. Tibor 
Szamuely, author of The Russian Tradition, writes that the area was
"worlds apart fran that of western and central Europe, a vast,
19unbroken, unchanging and unending plain." This plain, or the southern 
steppe, is the one region where arable soil can be found on the huge 
Russian landmass. The steppe stretches frcm Kiev south to the Black 
Sea, then moves eastwardly, declining in width as it expands toward 
Siberia. This area of a quarter billion acres is new the center of 
Soviet agriculture.
The Slavs, though, were not to knew the bounty of the steppe until
8
the end of the sixteenth century. Lacking the protection of seas and
mountains, the population residing on the steppe was constantly
subjected to invasion and pillaging by ncmadic tribes seeking to gain
control of the fertile area. Szamuely wrote of the invasions, "of
which the length, intensity and ferocity has no parallel in the annals
20of any other nation." Each invasion sent the Slavs fleeing in fear 
frcm the steppe into the formidable forest of northeastern Europe, near 
the region where a small, insignificant ostrog named Moscow was located 
on the Moskva River. Moscow, well inside the forest's interior, offered 
wonderful protection to an already xenophobic population, conditioned 
by centuries of incursion. It was here that Russia grew 15)— in a bleak 
forest situated on the same latitude as Canada, in a climate barely 
able to support life, far away frcm the thriving cosmopolitan centers 
to the south and west.
The most definitive blew to the steppe would cane frcm the Mongol 
invasion of 1237-1240. Any Slavs remaining on the plain fled 
northward, leaving the rich Ukraine area to the Tartar control of the 
Golden Horde. Their conquest would last 250 years, depriving the Russ, 
as the Slavs were sometimes called, of the light of Western 
advancements as they were being made.
The cultural contributions the Mongols made to the population they 
dominated were, on the other hand, nominal. The Mongols interfered 
little with everyday Russian life. They disliked the confinement of 
the forest and stayed out of it.
How much influence the Mongols had upon the Russ remains a 
controversial issue among historians. Although they interfered little
9
in everyday life, Szamuely writes that "The infiltration of Russian
society by Mongol concepts and practices was a gradual and insidious
21process that covered a long period of time." Nicholas Riasanovsky,
however, stresses that caution must be used when assessing the
Mongolian impact on Russia. Their primary interest was only in
extracting tribute, "and they were perfectly willing to leave the
22Russians to their cwn ways." It is possible over the years that the
Mongols taught the Russ, through example, what was eventually utilized
to threw off the yoke of the Golden Horde: absolute, centralized
autocratic rule and unqualified submission to the state. According to
Szamuely, the Tartars had provided this kind of paradigm to the
23Russians, and they learned it well. One thing is certain: a highly
centralized state and autocratic ruler finally consolidated Russia,
24ending the appanage period and throwing off the Mongol rule.
Whatever its source, the Russian people experienced state
domination and subjugation while the rest of Europe became immersed in
the concepts of the Magna Carta, the contractual partnership
characteristic of the medieval feudal system, and the Reformation of
the sixteenth century. Russian historian Kliuchevsky wrote:
If one thinks of the amount of time and the material 
and spiritual forces consumed in this wearying, painful 
pursuit of the cunning steppe predator, one can hardly ask 
what the people of Eastern Europe were doing while Western 
Europe was achieving its triumphs in industry, commerce, in 
social life, in the arts and the sciences.
Instead of learning of the liberal political systems much of Western 
Europe would adopt in the centuries to ccme, Russia learned of a 
peculiar state social system, where all classes were utilized to serve
10
the state for the purposes of defense against the alien invader.
The Tartar Khans continued to penetrate the northern regions for
centuries, to capture and enslave the population. "Year after year, an
26unending procession of young Russians disappeared into the Crimea." 
Securing the northern region frcm Tartar incursion and closing the 
southern steppe to invaders became a priority of the Russian state well 
into the eighteenth century. Muscovy, in order to cranbat the 
unrelenting invasions, had to become, out of necessity, a highly 
centralized state, well-organized and controlled frcm above. Economic 
resources, what little were left after the Mongol Khanates had 
extracted their purse, had to be collected and utilized for the purpose 
of defeating the Golden Horde. This objective was the only priority, 
turning Russia into a military state. Halle compares this aspect of 
Russia's development with America's:
The United States, expanding over a rich and empty 
continent, could afford the luxury of democratic self-rule, 
of individualism, of free enterprise. The whole Russian 
society, by contrast, had to be organized for continuous
military defense. Its government had to be in a position
of total control, so that it could maneuver freely, and so 
that it could ccmmand the forces necessary |^r the vital
defense of the besieged and embattled society.
Kliuchevsky had this to say: "The Muscovite state, in the name of the
cannon welfare, took into its full control all the energies and
resources of society, leaving no scope for the private interests of
28individuals or of classes."
In 1550, Ivan the Terrible destroyed the large Khanates of Kazan 
and Astrakhan and annexed their territory into Muscovy. This cleared 
the way for Russia to begin expanding into the more fertile lands to
11
the south. Beyond Kazan lay Siberia. Russia began its expansion, but 
according to Halle it was a "peculiar" kind of expansion, done out of 
fear. Without natural boundaries, the only protection was to spread 
out as far as possible, to use space as a defense.
The danger of invasion, however, came not only frcm the south and 
east, but frcm the west as well. In the thirteenth century major 
incursions came frcm Europe. The Holy Crusades brought the Germanic 
Teutonic Knights, a formidable foe who swept eastward into the Baltic 
area. In 1239 the Germans advanced with the Finns as their allies, and 
in 1240 the Swedes invaded. These penetrations were only the beginning 
of a continuous and ominous onslaught frcm the west and northwest. In 
the early part of the seventeenth century Poland invaded, and for two 
years occupied Moscow. The Swedes became involved in this dispute as 
well, and would attack again in the beginning of the eighteenth 
century. Peter the Great finally subdued them in 1709. The invasions 
frcm the west and northwest left a more indelible fear in the Russians 
than had the Mongol occupation. These assaults, more than any other 
single event or circumstance, influenced the development of Russian 
foreign policy in subsequent years.
Cyril Black maintains the Baltic frontier has been the scene of
29Russia's longest and most significant political turmoil. Unprotected 
by natural boundaries, the quest to secure this borderland has spanned 
two centuries and resulted in the bitter circumstances that 
precipitated America's containment policy and the Cold war. In 1709 
Peter the Great mounted a successful campaign to annex the Ukraine into 
the empire. By 1795 the western frontier had been conquered. In 1815
with the defeat of Napoleon Russia moved farther into Poland, and in 
spite of several rebellions the eastern portion of Poland remained a 
part of the Russian empire until World War I. At that time Lenin's 
separate peace with Germany resulted in several heavy losses for the 
young Soviet state, including the entire Ukraine and the Baltic 
region. Although the Treaty of Versailles restored most of the Ukraine 
to the Bolsheviks, it contained many anti-Bolshevik points as well, 
weakening Russia even further and liberating the Baltic frontier. 
Finland was made a separate state, as was Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania. New states were created, carved mostly frcm the destroyed 
Austro-Hungarian and Turkish empires— Hungary, Czechoslovakia and 
Yugoslavia. Bulgaria and Rumania were enlarged. Poland was made a 
sovereign nation, the first time in over 100 years. This created a 
barrier, a series of buffer states, preventing Russia frcm expanding 
and shutting her off frcm the West. The destruction of this 'cordon 
sanitaire' would become the driving principle behind Stalin's diplomacy 
during the Second World War; never again, he vowed, would Germany be 
able to march through those hostile buffer states. Stalin succeeded in 
securing his war aims, and the Russian empire onoe more came to include 
the frontier which borders Western Europe.
Louis Halle is tempted to discuss Russia's expansion in terms of 
geopolitics and a xenophobic fear of the West. This approach is far too 
simple, for imperialistic Russia also extended eastward, into Siberia 
and eventually Japan and Manchuria, using the same imperialistic 
methods practiced by Britain, France and America in the nineteenth 
century.Historian Hugh Seton-Watson writes:
13
The Russian record is neither better nor worse than 
the others. Russian expansion in the Volga valley has its 
parallels in the Spanish reconquista, the absorption of the 
Ukraine in the French absorption of Burgandy and Lorriane, 
and the colonisation of Siberia in the colonisation of 
North America... .Indeed the Russo-Japanese war share with 
the Anglo-Boer war the distinction of more nearly 
approaching the Marxist model of an imperialistic war 
undertake for economic motives than any other example in 
history.
Lenin denounced imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism.
Yet the notion of national self-determination, so integral to the
abolition of imperialistic colonies, became something which the young
Bolsheviks expounded in theory only, not practice. Lenin seemed to
tread the Marxist path with practical feet, and he succumbed to a more
traditional foreign policy which had Russia's best national interests
at heart. He made Joseph Stalin Commissar of Nationalities, and in
1918 Stalin told the Third All-Russian Congress that the principle of
self-determination must be an instrument in the struggle for socialism
and must be subordinated to the principle of socialism. NO national
32republic could be expected to secede frcm the union. Stalin never 
wavered from this approach to Marxist-Leninist foreign policy, creating 
a blatant paradox within the Soviet tradition of foreign policy. It 
was one thing to condemn the West's imperialistic policies and call 
them exploitative; it would be yet another to allow national 
self-determination in the Soviet empire if such a practice threatened 
the power base of the newly-formed U.S.S.R.
This paradox is evident throughout the study of Russian history. 
Denouncement of Western culture and political systems has been 
essential to the survival of this backward nation, so obviously an 
anomaly when compared to Western Europe and the U.S. Yet emulation of
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the West has also been necessary in order for Russia to compete with 
the industrially superior nations of the world. Nowhere is this 
paradox, the 'leitmotif' of Russia, more evident than in the history of 
the Russian revolutionary movement. To modernize in the tradition of 
the West would be a painful and embarrassing admission of the stagnant 
conditions of the culture and society. There were those able to admit 
to such faults, able to rebuke every Russian institution and tradition 
as damnable and not worth saving. Others, though, became adaitant in 
their defense of Russia's uniqueness, seeing it as separate from and 
desirable over the decadent West. In the end this attitude prevailed; 
Russia would not become a liberal, Westernized nation, joining in the 
democracies of Europe; instead it would remain different and apart, as 
it had throughout its history.
The Russian reform movement had a difficult time with this 
dilemma, caught as it was between the best way to change a battered, 
backward nation: imitate those in the West who had already progressed, 
or build on a tradition which already existed. For those who opted for 
the latter, industrialization and the rising new proletariat class were 
quickly changing the character of the mir, the pseudo-ccmnunal farm 
which had been an integral part of medieval Russia. Many in the
revolutionary movement looked upon the mir as virtuous, a phenomenon
that made socialism natural in Russia, setting it off frcm the corrupt 
West. These revolutionaries wanted to deny the industrialization of
their country, which prophesied of the death of the commune. Others
knew industrialization had acme to Russia to stay.
Among these were the Marxists, who accepted modernity and
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technology as positive forces. Although Marx accepted the 
industrialization process the West had undergone, he did not accept the 
way it had all turned out— in favor of the capitalists who exploited 
the working class in their quest for profit. He advocated socialism, a 
society where the working class controlled the means of production and 
hence the profits of industrialization. With all sharing equally in 
the spoils of manufacturing, class rivalry would disappear, to be 
supplanted by ccmnunism. What could be more natural for a nation which 
already had the tradition of the socialistic mir? Furthermore, the 
Marxist theory pegged the West as corrupt and greedy, and this greatly 
appealed to the small band of revolutionaries who extolled their nation 
and resented living in the West's shadow.
Marx provided a way out of the Russian revolutionary dilemma, a 
way to catapult a backward and inferior nation into the modem world 
without adopting the political institutions and culture of the West. 
The class struggle of Marx gave the young revolutionaries a chance to 
embody their fears of the outside world into an ideology which would 
eventually exclude all other political systems from the face of the 
earth; all threats would disappear, utopia would abound— and Russia's 
uniqueness would be preserved.
But the utopia Marx envisioned was subject to historical processes 
which he called the dialectic. Before a classless society could 
prevail, capitalism, industrialization and the proletariat had to be 
firmly established. The working class had to be the largest segment of 
the population, well versed in hew to run a modem, technical society. 
Hew else could the workers wrest control of the means of production and
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over cone the bourgeois capitalists with socialism? Clearly, Russia had 
not evolved to this point; even as late as 1917, it was still 85% 
agrarian. The truly orthodox Marxists like George Plekhanov and Rosa 
Luxemburg adamantly felt that Russia needed to wait, to allow the 
dialectic to take its course.
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, however, did not want to wait. His desire 
for revolution was obsessive, his loathing of the bourgeois capitalists 
unprecedented. The struggle between the worker and the capitalists was 
viewed scientifically by Marx, a logical and necessary development. 
But Lenin attacked the capitalistic elements of the world ferociously. 
One need only read Lenin's cwn words to gain an insight into the fierce 
dedication of the Soviet Union toward an
anti-capitalistic-imperialistic ideology and an ever-present xenophobia 
which pits capitalism against socialism. Written shortly after the 
Bolshevik Revolution, the attitude present in these words, more than 
any other, has been Lenin's legacy to Soviet foreign policy:
The hangers-on and spongers on the bourgeoisie 
described socialism as a uniform routine, monotonous and 
drab barrack system. The lackeys of the moneybags, the 
lickspittles of the exploiters— Messieurs, the bourgeois 
intellectuals— used socialism as a bogey to "frighten the 
people, who, precisely under capitalism, were doomed to 
penal servitude and the barracks, to arduous, moi^tonous 
toil, to a life of dire poverty and semi-stravation.
In 1901-1902, Lenin put forth his doctrine of revolution in "What 
is to be Done?" Feeling as he did that the working class was inadequate 
and too spontaneous, Lenin feared they would fall prey to the influence 
of the bourgeoisie, content with achieving better working conditions 
and materialistic goods. Because the workers could not be trusted to
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turn to socialism on their cwn, an elite party would have to nurse the 
workers along, educating thorn to social consciousness. This elite 
group was an updating of Marx's "Dictatorship of the Proletariat," and 
its concept split the Social Democratic Party into the Mensheviks and 
Bolsheviks, the former being the orthodox Marxists. The party, the 
vanguard of the proletariat, made it possible to 'leapfrog' the
bourgeois revolution which the West had undergone.
Lenin's "What is to be Done" was quite in keeping with the Russian 
spirit. It allowed Russia to modernize and revolutionize, yet the 
process advocated was far removed fron the route the West had taken. 
Lenin's elite vanguard, the party, or, more precisely its Central
Cornu.ttee, produced the same kind of absolutism which had prevailed in 
Russia for centuries. As Rosa Luxumburg argued, there was nothing 
revolutionary about it:
In Lenin's over-anxious desire to establish the
guardianship of an omniscient and omnipotent Central 
Committee.. .we recognize the symptom of the same 
subjectivism that has already played more than one trick on 
socialist thinking in Russia... .Knocked to the ground, 
almost reduced to dust by Russian absolutism, the 'ego' 
takes revenge by turning to revolutionary activity. In the 
shape of a ccnmittee of conspirators, in the name of a 
non-existent Will of the People, it seats itself on a kind 
of throne and proclaims it is all-powerful. But the 
'object' proves to be the stronger. The knout is
triumphant, for tsaris^might seems to be the 'legitimate' 
expression of history.
"What is to -be Done" was written in 1902, when the possibility of 
revolution was an unrealistic dream in the hearts of a very few. By 
1917, however, World War I had drastically altered the internal 
situation within Russia. Lenin recognized the war as an opportunity— a 
chance to bring revolution to the world, with Russia the vanguard.
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Calling World War I an imperialistic, capitalistic war, Lenin's premise
of peace to a weary, hungry population gained the Bolsheviks the votes
they needed in the Soviet to wrest power from a dying provisional
government. These war cries were anti-Western, and Von Laue writes how
the war was the turning point in Russian foreign relations: it would be
the last humiliation suffered at the hands of the West for the backward 
35Russian nation. The Bolshevik Revolution was a "breakthrough of the
36deepest amibitions of the Russian ego," Von Laue wrote. Rosa
Luxumburg would have agreed. According to Von Laue, with the
Bolshevik's publication of the secret treaties connected with the war,
the repudiation of the Tsar's war debts, and the decision to conclude a
separate peace with Germany, the break with the West was final and 
37conclusive. It was done with hostility and no regrets, as Lenin's cwn
words demonstrate in the following excerpt, taken frcm "Imperialism,
the Highest Stage of Capitalism," written in 1917:
The tens of millions of dead and maimed left by the
war— a war to decide whether the British or German group of 
financial plunderers is to receive the most booty— and 
those "peace treaties," are with unprecedented rapidity 
opening the eyes of the millions and tens of millions of 
people who are downtrodden, oppressed, deceived and duped 
by the bourgeoisie. Thus out of the universal ruin caused 
by war a world-wide revolutionary crisis is arising which, 
hcwever prolonged and arduous its stages ma^ be, cannot end 
otherwise than in a proletarian revolution.
Lenin planted the seeds for a bipolar world in these words. Writing in
answer to an indignant West that was angered over Lenin's decision to
make a separate peace with Germany, poet Aleksandr Blok told the
39Europeans: "We shall turn to you our Asiatic snout!"
Lenin's "Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism," is the
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first official treatise written on Soviet foreign policy. It pits the 
socialist system against capitalism, branding the latter inferior and 
bound to ruin in time. Written in early 1917, the theoretical work 
damned the capitalistic states as warmongers. Colonialism was at its 
peak in the early decades of the twentieth century. With the world 
completely divided into economic spheres of influence, Lenin wrote that 
the only recourse left to the capitalistic nations was to repartition 
their spheres through war. Lenin's anti-capitalistic doctrine, 
however, could not be translated into state policy— the new ocmmunist 
nation was simply too weak. The Soviet leader would have liked to 
sever all relations with the West and infiltrate its bourgeois systems 
with cotrnrunistic propaganda and party leaders. With the world's 
workers so war-weary, instigating a revolution would be easy. It soon 
became evident, however, that Russia could not afford to abandon the 
more affluent West.
There was no world-wide socialist revolution, and by 20 January
1918, Lenin knew he could not count on Europe to help out with the
consolidation of his own revolution in Russia. Addressing the party an
the question of a separate peace with Germany, Lenin wrote that "a
certain amount of tine, not less than several months at least, will be
necessary, during which the hands of the Socialist Government must be
absolutely free for the job of vanquishing the bourgeoisie in our own 
40country first..." In a speech delivered 14 May 1918, Lenin spoke of 
the hostility of the capitalistic nations, which he was store would ccme 
against the new Soviet state once they no longer had the war to occupy 
their tine: "...our Socialist Republic remains, for the tine being, an
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41oasis in the middle of a raging sea of imperialist rapacity."
The world situation had not turned out the way Lenin and the
Bolsheviks had hoped; and there was nothing left to do but change
course, try to coexist, in a world correctly perceived as hostile by a
small band of revolutionaries who had wanted it that way. Now, it was
42time to "retreat," as Lenin called it. Lenin recognized what the
orthodox Marxists had said all along: Russia had not been ready for a
socialist revolution— the industrial base had been too small, the
agrarian population too large. This realization marked for the
Bolsheviks a grave and unpleasant departure in foreign relations, and
the beginning of the concept of "socialism in one country."
Lenin's post-1917 policy in foreign relations is based on this
recognition. He judiciously advocated cooperating with the
capitalistic nations simply because he needed them. Practicality was
one of Lenin's virutes, as well as a willingness to do whatever was
necessary to save his revolution. Lenin's foreign policy became one of
expediency. In December 1920 he wrote:
While we stand alone and the capitalist world is 
strong, our foreign policy consists on the one hand, in our 
having to utilise disagreements (to vanquish all the 
imperialist powers would, of course, be a most pleasant 
thing, but for a fairly long time we shall not be in a 
position to do so. . . On the other hand, our existence 
depends on the preserj^p of radical differences between the 
imperialist powers...
Lenin was most concerned with aligning Russia with Western nations in 
order to keep them from coming against the Soviet state, beginning with 
Germany, which had already been ostracized by the West as a result of 
World war I. Lenin admitted the "concessions" to the capitalists were
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degrading to a nation so proud of its socialist revolution, the one
event which had set it apart frcm the West. Yet it was, at the time,
the only way. "It is our task," Lenin wrote, "to secure for Russia the
necessary machinery and funds for the restoration of the economy; when
we have obtained that, we shall stand so firmly on our am  feet that no
44capitalist enemies can overawe us."
Stalin continued in this mindset— setting out to make Russia so
strong no nation, capitalistic or otherwise, could consume it. It is
interesting, and very important to remember, how clearly these terms
were presented as rapproachment was negotiated between the West and the
Soviets in the years following the revolution. As Adam Ulam pointed
out, Russia entered into the community of nations on her own terms— as
the world-wide center for social revolution, dedicated to the
45destruction of capitalism. As the Western nations began formal
recognition of the Soviet Union, beginning with England in 1922, and as
trade opened up, there was never any pretense on the part of Russia as
to just what its ambitions entailed.
Ulam wrote that the Treaty of Brest-Litvosk marked the end of the
age of innocence for the young Bolsheviks: "They went into the
negotiations as world revolutionaries; they emerged as men solicitious
46mainly about their own state and pcwer." To the present day the
Soviet state's insistence that the U.S.S.R. is a peaoeful nation is
based on the Treaty of Brest-Litvosk and the Bolsheviks' futile attempts
47in late 1917 to negotiate a peace with the belligerents. Their 
assertion is quite right; but it was the failure of the world 
revolution which motivated the Soviet state to adopt a policy of
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co-existence with the bourgeois enemy. This is not denied by the
officially stated foreign policy of the Soviet Union. Nikolai V.
Sivachev, co-author of the Moscow publication, Russia and the United
States, explained how Lenin's foreign policy put forth the notion that
the Soviet Union must peacefully coexist, as revolution in other
nations might not happen for quite seine time. "This has been our
48foreign policy ever since," wrote Sivachev. Other nations have not
wanted to co-exist with Russia, maintains Sivachev, because they think
the Soviet Union is stirring up world revolution and sedition within
their political parties.
The fundamental problem in foreign policy for the 
Soviet nation has been to consolidate the victory of 
Socialism, but our chief foreign policy goal has nothing to 
do with stirring up "world revolution"... Revolution 
results in the contradictions of cap^t^lism and is not 
something introduced frcm the outside.
This is a strange statement, indeed, caning fran a country whose 
revolution was not borne fran the "inner contradictions of capitalism" 
at all.
The Russian Revolution was borne frcm a desire to modernize, to 
transform a backward and corrupt nation— but in a way that was 
different frcm the West and peculiar to Russia alone. The insistence 
that Russia be different was because Russia was different, not a part 
of Western Europe in the ideological sense. The nationalistic pride in 
the Russian tradition, the Russian ego of which Lenin was such an 
example, saw no reason to adopt Western institutions or doctrines for a 
nation which felt it had its own contribution to make to the modem 
world. Ironically, the system Russia finally did adopt to help
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catapult it into the modem world came frcm the West. Yet Marxism was
the antipathy of the Western society which the triumphant Russian
revolutionaries had grown to abhor. For this reason it was acceptable
to embrace Marxism. The acceptance of Marx demonstrates so well the
'leitmotif' of Russian history, the resentment of the West eclisped by
a dependency on it.
The Russian Revolution occurred when the tides of history were
changing; indeed, the revolution happened in part because of these
tumultuous times. Part of what was changing so drastically was Europe.
World War I had destroyed the European empires, both physically and
ideologically. NO longer would Europe be the vanguard of the world,
the center of ocnmerce, the determiner of global politics. Something
new was afoot, stirring in the imagination of humanity.
Lenin had issued a challenge to the Western world which would not
go unheeded. In the eyes of Woodrow Wilson, the very backbone of
America stood on the chopping block: capitalism and the free enterprise
system. He felt compelled to address Lenin's denouncement of the
Western world with his own utopia, and both Wilson and Lenin purported
to be the bearers of a new order superior to "old-world
Europeanism"— with its spheres of influence and secret diplcmacy.
Lenin and Wilson, Russia and America, were beginning to fulfill the
prophecy made by Toqueville so long ago. Unfortunately their spiritual
50ideas were in conflict, carpeting for the loyalties of the world.
The American Tradition: "We have it
in our power to begin the world over again."
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According to the thesis of Robert Dalleck, author of The American
Style of Foreign Policy, Wilson's acceptance of Lenin's challenge was
very much in keeping with an established American attitude toward the
51world and the role America was to play in foreign affairs. Dalleck 
saw America's participation in foreign affairs before 1945 as erratic, 
an extension of domestic policy and emotions brought about by the need 
for reform and a firm assurance that democracy will always be a part of 
American life. Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, written in 1918 to 
guide the world into peace without power politics, were the conscience 
of America speaking; but they had little to do . with the reality of
world politics or the situation in which the world found itself in
521917.
When discussing the American tradition, however, one must be very
careful to make a distinction between the opinion of the American
people as a collective body and the attitude of the foreign policy
makers themselves. Unlike a despotic Russian or Soviet leader, an
American president has to take public sentiment into account while
still making decisions in the best national interest. While it may be
true that the Fourteen Points had little to do with the reality of the
world situation in 1917, Wilson's decision to enter World War I, when
it was finally made, was based on very hard-core realism. In spite of
a pretense to fight the war for universalist goals, the reality of the
situation shewed Germany about to upset the balance of European power,
thereby threatening United States interests and security. Wilson knew
this; and he knew he had to restore Europe to a balance favorable to
53America's economic and political goals. No doubt he believed in the
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League of Nations: it was the best political system capable of assuring
America's continued growth and pcwer in a precarious world.
A careful study of American foreign policy will expose many
myths. Isolationism, for one, has never really existed as an official
foreign policy, although the American people may have perceived it as
such throughout the years. America has tried to remain independent of
European affairs, and to do so was sound advice offered by George
54Washington in his Farewell Address. Our independence, though, was
only possible as long as Europe remained politically balanced and free
frcm domination frcm any one force. An aggressor nation threatened the
freedcm of the seas as well as ocmnerce and economic prosperity for
all, putting America's national interests at risk. Such a situation
would never be tolerated, nor was it. Ultimately, the United States
pursued a policy of involvement with Europe whenever the circumstances
55threatened world stability. It did, however, often have a difficult
time convincing the American public that such a threat was detrimental
to United States' interests, both political and economic.
According to Felix Gilbert, author of To the Farewell Address:
Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy, the reason for such difficulty
lies in America's early history. Like Russia, the United States also
has a past that has nurtured its outlook of the world. Frcm its
inception, there has been a contradiction inherent in this outlook,
largely based on the two main reasons why Europeans moved to the North
56American continent in the first place. One reason was materialistic, 
to seek financial reward and gain; the other was spiritual, to 
establish a more perfect society than the warring Europe that was left
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behind. The two motives were contentious, as were the policies needed
to attain such goals. Financial gain necessarily required trade and
relations with the Continent; creating a different kind of world,
however, called for close scrutiny of the Old World and separation frcm 
57it. These two goals, the one material and the other spiritual, are an 
integral part of the American personality. Over the years they have 
resulted in foreign policy problems which the United States has never 
totally solved.
The problems exist mainly because America's policy makers have
never been able to separate the two goals, or to honestly prioritize
one over the other. Instead, they have pursued economic goals, or
goals of national self-interest,- under the guise of pursuing a better
world for mankind. Often, the two were thought to be the same. Thcmas
Paine thought so. "We have it in our power to begin the world over
again," he wrote in Carmon Sense, the pamphlet most historians agree is
exclusively responsible for convincing the colonies to seek
independence frcm Britain. The new world he envisioned, though,
58included free ports to serve the ocmmercial interests of all nations. 
America was to take the lead in establishing these free ports. The 
insular position of the North American continent was ideal for such a 
revolutionary concept. Renunciation of all foreign political alliances 
was necessary in order to establish such free and unbiased trade. Yet 
in 1776, protection by Britain's maritime fleet was needed to protect 
the open seas, something Paine did not seem to consider. A threat to 
Europe' s balance of power became a threat to Britain' s maritime 
power— and a threat to the open seas meant a threat to America's vision
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of a new, more spiritual world.
As America's enonorny grew and prospered, it is easy to see why the
two goals became so entangled. Alexander Hamilton wrote George
Washington's Farewell Address. It called for a continuance of all trade
59relations, and an avoidance of alliances — but the two were often in 
contention: commercial interests were threatened by political
alliances. This policy was further complicated when Washington imposed 
a moral obligation upon this country to be an example to the rest of 
the world of justice, enlightenment and virtue. The "exaltation" of
America's station was penned from the beginning, and this superiority 
has stuck:
Observe good faith and justice toward all nations. 
Cultivate peace and harmony...It will be worthy of a free, 
enlightened and at no distant period of a great nation to 
give mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a 
people always guided by an exalted justice and 
benevolence.
James Monroe recognized the impracticality of attempting to follow
a foreign policy which encouraged international trade while
discouraging political alliances. The Monroe Doctrine, written 24
years after Washington's address, made it clear the United States would
not condone or support any interference frcm European pcwers to
colonize "any portion of this hemisphere."^ While the doctrine was
defensive and lacked military support at the time, it was characterized
as "the best guardian of a nation with a great continental expansion 
62before it..." by scholar George Dangerfield. He also claimed it
committed the m i  ted States to be a leader in world politics, premising 
to stand by any country in this hemisphere seeking independence. Such
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a doctrine would assure the economic, political and ideological
supremacy of America in its 1 sphere of influence', even though the
American people disliked the term. Britain’s maritime hegemony, by the
way, is what made the Monroe Doctrine possible, another reason why the
United States would have to involve itself in European affairs if the
63situation called for it. By 1823 Europe's future was America's
future, regardless of any implied policy that the U.S. should not
become entangled in political relationships.
The Spanish-American war tested the Monroe Doctrine. The American
people went to war to achieve Cuban independence from the Spanish
'brutes'; they equated the situation with their own quest for
independence, and the war had a romantic impact on the nation.
Acquiring the Philippines, however, was not part of the original war
aims for which Americans perceived the war was being fought, nor was
the blatant aquisition of Hawaii and Puerto Rico. A debate within the
Senate broke out as a result of America's new imperialistic course in
foreign affairs. The main tenet of the debate used by pro-imperialists
promulgated the theory of the white man's burden, giving full
responsibility to the civilized, Christian world to educate the rest of
the world's heathen peoples. These shades of Social Darwinism were
destined to become a part of America' s foreign policy as it was
officially stated. They would show up in Wilson's war aims, Truman's
64Doctrine, and John P. Kennedy's inaugural address.
While the debate ensued, the question of overseas economic 
expansion was being egged an by the Industrial Revolution. America's 
'other side', the quest for financial gain, was exposed by the
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Spanish-American War. Worried that the United States economy would
stagnate if it was not expanded, industrialists used the debate over
imperialism to develop a policy of open economic trade, one of Thomas
Paine's principles. Secretary of State John Hay's Open Door Notes of
1899 and 1900 proposed that all nations have an equal opportunity for
trade with China. Nervous that China's apparent weakness would be taken
advantage of by Russia, Japan and France, which were beginning to
establish spheres of influence throughout the area, the United States
sought an open trade market for all nations regarding China.
Businessmen greeted the new expansionist policy positively. And
ideological purists like William Jennings Bryan were also pleased. Not
only did it mean more for the economy, but America was doing its part
to preserve and foster the independence of others, as stated it should
in the Monroe Doctrine.
The Open Door Notes embodied the ideology of what Brook Adams
65called "America's economic supremacy," while establishing for America
conditions to extend the "American system throughout the world without
66the embarrassment and inefficiency of traditional colonialism."
William Appleman Williams concludes the Open Door Policy was a
manifestation of America's "desire to reform the world in its own 
67image." What had apparently happened was an odd fusion of ideology 
and economic imperialism, the same two goals which had been present 
since the founding of the nation. While very concerned about Russia's 
and Japan's influence in China, our cwn influence in the Philippines 
and Hawaii was justified by a so-called need to protect that part of 
the world until democracy could flourish. America's now easy access to
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Chinese ports was assured by its occupation of territories in these
parts of the world. Rather than call a spade a spade, United States
policy chose to claim it was making the world safe for democracy.
Williams claims the definition of that nebulous phrase meant "the world
was to be made safe for democracy a 11 ' americaine, with all that implied
economically, politically and socially."
The world could not be made safe for democracy "a'l'americaine,"
however, if the Bolsheviks were making their cwn proclamation to be the
bulwark of an even purer democracy an the other side of the world.
According to A m o  J. Mayer, author of Political Origins of the New
Diplomacy, both Lenin and Wilson were "champion revolutionists of the 
69new age," one which wanted to do away with the old, European
diplomacy and balance of pcwer politics. Each leader's policy to
attain such a goal was not without its irony, hcwever.
Wilson wanted a dissolution of autocratic pcwer throughout Europe
and the world, and the establishment of democracy in its place. But
the Bolshevik solution to despotism "would render her economy useless 
70to mankind." This paradox in American foreign policy, the two-edged 
sword of capitalism and democracy, became apparent with Wilson's 
opposition to the Bolsheviks. Soviet pcwer was not conducive to 
American economic and political growth and the attainment of power, 
regardless of its stated ideology to uphold democracy and do away with 
the exploitation of the working class. This is why, according to 
Williams, the birth of America's policy to contain the Soviet Union 
actually began in 1918 with the "decision to promote tendencies which 
must eventually find their outlet in either the breakup or the
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mellowing of Soviet pcwer." 71 Gabriel and Joyce Kolko believe this 
same paradox is the context for undestanding the post-World War II 
situation as well. According to the Kolkos, a Soviet-American 
ideological rivalry was not the issue in the years 1945 through 1947 
when policy was formed. What had happened was America's failure to
reform the world economically, one of the United States' major war
72aims. If the above thesis is plausible, Stalin's occupation of 
Eastern Europe and the Balkans was not acceptable to such a goal, 
anymore than Lenin's Russia had been with its shocking denouncement of 
capitalism.
Whether or not America made its foreign policy decisions in the 
interests of economic growth and power or in the interests of securing 
liberty and justice for all people, is probably not disoemable. If 
the United States perceived it was saving the world for democracy's 
sake, all other motives would simply fade away. The Bolsheviks, 
however, were convinced of America's imperialistic motives, not their 
esoteric ones, and this conviction led to a policy which tolerated the 
United States only to the point needed to gain Soviet national 
interests. Yet the Bolsheviks, and later the Communists, were just as 
determined to secure their cwn interests as were the Americans, even if 
it meant compromising the socialistic principles of Marx. They proved 
this point in the 1920's and 30's when Stalin pursued a policy of 
rapprochement with the bourgeois, capitalistic states, England and 
America. The alliance Stalin forged with Hitler, a known enemy, in 
1939, also proved this point. Stalin made this pragmatic neve to buy 
time and gain access to Russia's western border which had been lost as
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a result of World War I. The paradox inherent in both nations' foreign 
policy was this willingness to sacrifice democracy, either socialistic 
or capitalistic, on the altar of self-interests, regardless of what 
those interests entailed. The Soviets, hcwever, did so without 
pretext; Washington, on the other hand, could not.
The American people never fully understood this. Except during 
the years of the Grand Alliance, the image they had of the Soviet 
Union, regardless of its validity or falsity, was threatening to their 
perceived mission of the United States: establishing a new and better 
world order. United States foreign policy makers were concerned with 
both of America's missions, democractic and economic. The democratic 
mission endeavored to establish a world unlike any other; economically, 
the world should be as free, giving America every opportunity to grew 
and propser. As put forth by founding fathers Thomas Paine and George 
Washington, as well as James Monroe, the American way provided a 
suitable paradigm for the rest of the world to follow. American 
foreign policy became based on this role. Both Wilson and Roosevelt 
sought to establish new world orders. The American people fully 
supported these pursuits— they were an integral part of tradition.
The Reality of the Events
In the world of pcwer politics, however, motives which shape 
foreign policy pale beside actions and their ensuing results. One can 
debate what Stalin's motives were for wanting to establish Soviet 
hegemony in Poland and Eastern Europe; and the true impetus for issuing
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the Truman Doctrine is still being debated. George Kerman's assessment 
of the driving force behind Soviet foreign policy is fascinating, but 
one will never be able to do more than speculate over the impact it had 
an Washington's policy-making as it began to unfold in the years 
following the war. Washington discussed the reasons why Stalin 
insisted on securing friendly governments in the states he had 
liberated at the end of the war, but the bottom issue was that he was 
there, a perceived threat to the balance of power in that region of the 
world. It is when the reaction Moscow had to the Truman Doctrine is 
evaluated that the reality of the situation becomes apparent. The 
world became divided, precarious; the two allies became enemies; and 
World war II, like its predecessor, had failed to create a stable 
environment for future generations.
The foreign policy traditions of Russia and the United States had 
considerable bearing on the formulation of policy, as did the attitudes 
each nation had regarding the other throughout the history prior to the 
outbreak of World War II. The events of the situation, hcwever, 
determined the eventual outcome: in 1941 Russia and America were 
allies, joined in a common cause, pledged to rid the world of evil and 
ensure a lasting peace once the enemy had been destroyed; by 1944 the 
alliance had fragmented; and in 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization had been formed to the exclusion of the Western allies' 
onoe-friend-tumed-foe, Russia. It was between the years 1944 and 1947 
that America's containment policy gradually developed; but John Gaddis, 
author of several books on containment, believes there was containment 
of Russia before Truman ever elucidated his doctrine, before George
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Kerman sent his long telegram, before the war even ended.
According to Gaddis, containing the Russians had been on Franklin
Delano Roosevelt's mind as early as 1941— as well as on the mind of W.
73Averell Harriman, United States ambassador in Moscow since 1943.
Roosevelt had not forgotten recent relations with Russia had been
tenuous, and he was not fond of ccmnunism. Yet like Churchill, he knew
74the necessity of forging an alliance with "the devil"; and frcm the
first Roosevelt exhibited a stubbomess to follow the only policy he
believed possible to assure a postwar peace with Stalin and Moscow.
Roosevelt gambled he could convince Stalin of the West's sincerity and
friendship, thereby assuring Stalin's participation in the United
Nations, ending once and for all the traditional European concept of a
balance of power keeping the peace. If Stalin confidently believed he
could rely an the United Nations to keep the peace, Roosevelt felt
certain he would abandon the urgently-felt need to expand Russia's
borders. Although Roosevelt prepared for the loss of the Baltic states
and portions of Eastern Europe to Stalin, he hoped such a situation
could be averted. Roosevelt actually wanted to 'change' Stalin,
convince him that a concept of collective security would keep peace far
75better than a system of buffer states. Roosevelt took for granted
that Stalin's driving motive behind his war aims was fear— of future
76invasions as well as a hostile capitalistic world. Roosevelt may have 
assumed too much. In spite of pleadings frcm his advisors and 
Churchill, Roosevelt refused to discuss the territorial war aims Stalin 
had put forth very early in the war, even before the united States had 
entered.
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But Stalin made no secret of what he expected to gain from the 
77war, and Britain was prepared to give him what he demanded in order
to safeguard the alliance and the continuance of a maximum war effort
78fran the Red Army. Churchill and Stalin privately discussed postwar
territorial gains, Churchill being just as eager as Stalin to assume
79hegemony in certain parts of the world.
Roosevelt, hcwever, could not publicly and officially acquiesce to
territorial aggrandizement of any kind because it so violated the
80Atlantic Charter, to which Moscow supposedly subscribed. Ivan Maisky,
hcwever, the Russian ambassador to England during the war years,
carefully made Soviet acceptance of the charter conditional and
open-ended. Furthermore, Roosevelt felt certain he could not present
to the American people a Europe which had been carved up into innocuous
spheres of influence.
Throughout the war years, America insisted an pushing democratic
principles upon its allies. Keeping true to its traditions in foreign
policy, nebulous goals had to be a part of the Grand Alliance's war
aims, not goals to reestablish the European balance of pcwer. Although
Moscow agreed to such aims only equivocally, the American people soon
came to equate Stalin with "Uncle Joe," believing a new Soviet Russia
81was their partner in saving the world fran totalitarian evil. This 
misperception was not Stalin's doing, nor did he perpetuate such a 
myth.
It is understandable, hcwever, why Roosevelt felt compelled to 
give this impression to the American people, and why they were so 
easily convinced. It would prove far easier to forge a lasting peace
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with Stalin after the war if the public held a positive view of its
Russian ally. Because of the paradox so inherent in the American
tradition, the peculiar tendency to believe wars are fought for the
purpose of liberty and democracy instead of the more practical reasons
of national self-interests, American policy makers have often had to
hide the truth frcm the public. The vagueness of such abstract motives
is much easier to defend to the American people than power politics.
Following World War II Americans finally had to admit to the necessity
of becoming involved in European affairs, but the European concepts of
'balance of pcwer' and 'spheres of influence' have traditionally been
abhored by a large majority of Americans. As Hans J. Morgenthau put it,
if the United States could no longer shut itself off from a world
infected with pcwer politics, it had to decontaminate the world frcm
82that infection in order to make it safe to enter. Perhaps this is why 
such a paradox exists in the American tradition of foreign policy. 
Remembering their ancestors who had fled the Continent's imperialistic 
wars of conquests, Americans wanted nothing to do with wars being 
fought for territorial gains or national self-interests. Stalin, 
hcwever, did not sacrifice twenty million Russians for democracy's 
sake— he wanted concrete spoils of war.
Franklin Roosevelt's war strategy failed: Stalin had not been 
convinced to abandon a buffer zone on Russia's western border. Worse, 
Stalin had moved into Eastern Europe and the Balkans. The situation 
Roosevelt hoped to avert had ccrne to pass, a situation for which the 
American people and the foreign policy makers were totally unprepared. 
Rather than admit that it was a mistake not to reach a practical
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agreement regarding Stalin's post-war territorial aims sooner, 
Washington chose instead to accuse Mosccw of breaking its pledge to 
establish America's concept of democracy in the post-war world, a 
pledge that had been made in equivocal, obscure language. Because of 
the American tradition, United States policy makers could not honestly 
admit they wanted to restore the European balance of pcwer in order to 
secure vital interests in a strategic part of the world. It had to 
became a matter of restoring democracy, a cause to which the American 
people— and Congress— could rally.
For a large despotic state that has never kncwn Western liberalism 
or republicanism, concepts of self-determination and free elections 
were nominal at best. With a history of invasion in a land unprotected 
by natural borders, securing national interests had been a part of 
Russian foreign policy since the Moskovite princes first consolidated 
their pcwer in the dark northern forests surrounding present-day 
Moscow. With a tradition quite unlike the United States, which settled 
a vast, relatively unpopulated continent founded on the principles of 
the Enlightenment, Russia has had to contend with the pcwer and 
supremacy of various European nations throughout the centuries; 
therefore, it learned a tradition of conventional European power 
politics.
The Russian tradition in foreign policy, and later the Soviet 
tradition, sought to secure its national interests. Regardless of 
Marxist-Leninist ideology, these interests always came first. Unlike 
Washington, which often felt it necessary to mask its state interests 
behind lofty ideals, Mosccw offered no apologies for its amibitions
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during World War II. Stalin laid his war aims clearly on the bargaining 
table, and he expected to be compensated for his nation's war efforts.
Over the centuries Russia came to fear and resent the West, and 
this xenophobia helped to determine its foreign policy. At the same 
time it always realized its need for the West's technology in order to 
compete in the European world of power and politics. It is not 
surprising that, years later, this enigma would be present, haunting 
the proceedings at Yalta and Potsdam. Equivocal terms like 
'self-determination' and 'democracy' are open to interpretation; and 
when it came to settling the aims of World War II, their importance and 
meaning were altogether different in the democratic West than in the 
dictatorial Soviet Union. Still, in the Russian tradition, Stalin 
realized his need for America's powerful economic assistance in the 
post-war world, providing American policy makers with a lever they 
never used. Instead, the post-war settlement ended in territorial 
augmentation and the need for containment instead of a mutual 
consideration for the differences and degrees inherent in individual 
societies and civilization as a whole.
To those of us who must ask why, the answer lies in the traditions 
of each nations1 foreign policy— the quest for power. The policy of 
containment originated in the debris left behind frcm Roosevelt's 
failed war strategy and the inability to formulate a policy to deal 
with Stalin's demands for territorial security. As the power vacuum 
created by four years of war began to fill up with Red troops, 
Washington realized it would not be able to control Stalin or the 
post-war world the way Roosevelt had envisioned— or the way they
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Chapter Two— The Crucial Years: 1941-1945
The historical traditions of Soviet and American foreign policy
stayed on a collision course throughout the years of the Grand
Alliance. In the wisdom of hindsight, both Eastern and Western
historians have concluded how the 'marriage de convenience' was
destined for divorce once the destruction of Hitler's legions was
assured.1 Russian tradition dictated serving national self-interests
through territorial acquisition. Stalin made it clear early in the war
that he wanted those interests secured. Americans, on the other hand,
claimed their ambitions lay with what Herbert Feis called "the power of
2principle," the principle being that of national self-determination.
The incompatibility of American principles with Stalin's war aims 
became a well-kept secret throughout the war. Franklin Roosevelt was 
well aware of the conflict; the American people were not. Furthermore, 
only seme of FDR's colleagues were aware of Stalin's war diplomacy; 
others, like Harry Truman, remained tragically ignorant of what had 
transpired between the coalition during the war years.
The negotiations, however, had to be clear to those present. 
Roosevelt pursued a war strategy involving risks. By putting off 
Stalin's demands for early settlement of the post-war "organisation for 
peace,"-by offering him a European front in 1942, Roosevelt hoped to 
buy the time needed to convince Stalin that his new world order was an 
efficient, peace-keeping mechanism for all, even the Soviets. Economic 
sanctions necessary for reconstruction would be offered in the interim, 
convincing Stalin not only of America's trustworthiness, but also of
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its sincere desire for an economically strong Russia to take its place 
in the world ccmmunity of nations. Using these tactics, Roosevelt 
hoped ultimately to prove the inefficiency of spheres of influence to 
either world peace or international trade. Woodrow Wilson had failed 
to convince Europe of this in 1918; like Wilson, though, Roosevelt had 
confidence in his own ability to influence and change.
There are revisionists who argue that America's "carmunity of
nations" included only those countries which supported Western,
liberal-style democracy and capitalistic enterprise, the two being part
3of the same package. It is not clear if Roosevelt felt this way or 
not. Clearly, his vision for the post-war world included capitalism 
and democratic liberalism, but he also philosophically believed that 
Russia, like other totalitarian states, would lose its despotic nature 
if allowed to participate in the world on an equal basis without fear 
of reprisal. More an internationalist than even Wilson, Roosevelt 
became determined not to repeat the mistake of ostracizing the Soviet 
Union frcm the West. He realized full well any peace without Russia was 
only pseudo-peace. If America was truly to realize its economic and 
political aspirations, the Soviet Union could not be an enemy, 
competing for the same raw materials, threatening world stability. If 
international law was to be America's pathway to an Open Door in trade 
and world-wide democracy, the Soviet Union would have to became a 
cooperating nation eventually.
Not all of Roosevelt's advisors shared his vision. Truman, 
ignorant of what FDR tried to accomplish, was not going to allow the 
Russsians to freely participate in the "ccnmunity" under their own
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4terms. It is also possible that Truman, even if he had understood 
Roosevelt's, intentions, would not have adhered to them. Stalin's 
insistence that he acquire hegemony in the Balkans and a sphere of 
influence in Iran started to greatly disturb Roosevelt before his 
death. Truman could not allow Stalin to succeed in these quests, any 
more than Roosevelt could or would have.
The truth is, FDR's war strategy was never tried. It is quite
possible it could have succeeded if given a proper chance. Instead,
Stalin continued to pursue his war aims throughout the negotiations
while Roosevelt's were never practiced. Stalin received what he asked
for by default alone; Roosevelt never offered the Soviet statesman the
incentives needed to convince him it was in his own best interests to
follow, or at least consider, FDR's peace plan. The concrete
proposals, the bulwark of Roosevelt's strategy, never came: the second
front materialized two years after it had been premised, and FDR never
offered a substantial post-war loan. FDR's successors avoided all
offers of a loan after his death. Roosevelt chose to procrastinate for
reasons not fully known, opting instead to lead Stalin to believe he
could have what he wanted. Historian Lloyd C. Gardner wrote:
"Searching for an answer to this phase of the strategy of postponement
5is a frustrating task."
Authorities like Norman A. Graebner and Herbert Feis, who believe 
Russia would never have accepted a world based on the principle of 
self-determination,6 do not account for Roosevelt's failed strategy. 
There is no way to knew the difference the second front would have made 
if promptly delivered. All evidence points to an enormous difference,
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in attitudes alone. In history, however, there are no ifs. Graebner
criticized Roosevelt's strategy: assuming Russia would accept a world
order utilizing the principle of national self-determination "expected
7too much denial of that country's historic problems and ambitions"; 
and, one might add, of its tradition in foreign policy. Likewise, to 
expect the United States to aquiesce while Stalin divided up Europe 
denied the American tradition.
As the events unfolded in the years beginning with 1941, it is 
important to remember both Stalin and Roosevelt pursued policies very 
much in keeping with the traditions inherent in each nation' s own 
foreign relationships. Stalin's war aims, clearly laid on the 
bargaining table from the beginning, simply followed a policy of 
conventional balance-of-power, making sure Moscow would not be excluded 
frcm the post-war world by Western nations which had shown little 
tolerance in the past for Russian power. Roosevelt had a more 
difficult rcw to hoe, trying as he did to appease both the American 
people and the Soviet dictator so he could create a new world order. 
Both Moscow and Washington knew of America' s and Russia' s emerging 
superpower status; the post-war world would have to be shared. Both 
were equally aware of the distrust and apprehension lying dormant 
underneath the semblance of coalition and alliance. The difference in 
these traditions cannot be denied; their failure to converge at seme 




To the vast relief of Winston Churchill, Adolph Hitler marched
east on 22 June 1941, invading the Soviet Union, thereby giving Britain
one lone ally in all of Europe. Churchill alluded to Stalin as the
devil in Parliament, and Stalin as well felt he had little choice of 
8allies. Engaging Germany in a two front war, however, would be the 
only salvation for Europe as well as Russia. So East and West came 
together to fight the center; hew the center would be divided upon its 
defeat was a natural problem, a dilemma facing all the victors at the 
war's end.
Stalin began thinking of such problems as early as 1939 when he 
signed the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact. If that seems premature, it 
is wise to remember America as well considered the post-war world 
before it even entered the fighting! In August 1941, with the 
formation of the Atlantic Charter, a vague dissertation proclaiming the 
right of all nations to determine their own political destiny, 
America's post-war interests had been initiated. Unfortunately, the 
Charter could do little more than suggest a way to peace; its obscure 
wording, quite open to interpretation, carried no enforcement 
provisions. Churchill admitted it could serve only as "a guiding
9star," not a law. Each nation, remembering the chaos resulting frcm 
the last war's peace-making process, began looking out for its own 
self-interests by formulating policies to oversee the post-World war II 
world. Stalin admitted it quite openly and developed his foreign 
policy accordingly. Unfortunately his policy, laced as it was with 
suspicion and precaution, afforded very few ocnprcmises.
The suspicion, b o m  in the past, was bound to influence the
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diplomacy of the Grand Alliance, brought together for the sole purpose 
of stopping Hitler. To the Russian mind, the feelings of suspicion were 
confirmed during Hitler's rise to power. The Soviet Union futilely 
appealed to the League of Nations for collective security to stop 
Hitler. The West practiced the foolish policy of appeasement to 
extremes, and Hitler marched closer east, toward Russia. Through 
several remarks made by people like Britain's Prime Minister Stanley 
Baldwin, the Western leaders made it known that war between fascism and 
ccnntunism would delight then. "If there is any fighting in Europe to 
be done," Baldwin told Churchill in 1936, "I should like to see the 
Bolsheviks and Nazis doing it. Frightened of the impending war, 
needing more time, Stalin entered into a non-aggression pact with 
Hitler in 1939. It was a shrewd move, giving Stalin the time he 
needed, allowing him to regain access to a geopolitically significant 
portion of the Russian expire lost after World War I. It also displayed 
within Stalin a diplomatic talent that would cone to haunt the Grand 
Alliance. In exchange for neutrality, the USSR received a free hand in 
Poland and the Baltic States. Russia took back Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania, and incorporated Bessarabia and northern Bukovina into the 
empire.
The West thought the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression agreement, called 
the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, to be one of the most cold-blooded acts in 
history, the cause of World War II. The Soviets believed the West had 
steered Hitler in their direction, wishing for their destruction as 
they always had. Distrust of the Allies dictated how Stalin would 
formulate his war aims and policies. Two main fears haunted Stalin as
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he entered into alliance with the West, and both reflected his
distrust. Stalin feared that a separate peace between Germany and the
Allies would leave him to fight Hitler alone. He also feared the
Allies would remain inactive, forcing his Red Army to bear the brunt of
the war while Germany and Russia "mutually exhaust themselves."̂
Philip Mosley wrote how, in 1941, the Soviet leaders fully expected
Britain and the United States to sit idly by while Hitler ran over the
Soviet Union. The prompt support of financial aid Russia received fron
America, known as Lend-Lease, did not shake its fear of "capitalist 
12encirclement."
Stalin formulated three main war aims based on these fears, and
13these goals became the backbone of his foreign policy during the war.
The first intended to prevent a separate peace at all costs, and this
meant keeping the coalition intact and friendly as long as Hitler's
armies rolled. For this reason as well as to strengthen his cwn
regime, Stalin defined World War II as the Great Patriotic War, fought
for the motherland. It was as well a great war for the liberation of
14"the people of Europe and America...for democratic liberties."
The tactic worked indubitably well, cementing the Russian people 
together in this cause, laying to rest allied fears of Stalin's 
totalitarian methods. The day Hitler attacked Russia, Churchill 
loyally declared, "This is no class war,""^ and Stalin's speeches began 
to reflect this mood. In 1943 he dissolved the Canintem, his 
"political contribution to the coherence of the Grand Alliance."1**
Stalin's second goal sought allied recognition of the territories 
Russia acquired frcm the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and the preservation
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of those territories for Russia following the war. Stalin claimed the
lands annexed in 1939 were both ethnographically and culturally
Russian, remembering that the Versailles treaty had taken than frcm the
Soviet empire. Stalin furthermore wanted the eastern border of Poland
moved farther west, along what was known as the Curzon Line, an
imaginary border proposed by Lord Curzon at the Paris Peace Conference
in 1918, allowing for the annexation of more Polish territory into
Russia. Poland was also to acquire territory from East Prussia, and the
17Rhineland was to be separated frcm Prussia.
The third aim proved the most taxing, draining the allies of any
advantage they might have had at the conference table and becoming a
bitter point of contention for Stalin and the Soviet people: opening a
second front in Europe. Stalin wanted allied troops to cross the
English channel, caning into Europe frcm the West, drawing Hitler off
Russia's frontline. The second front assured Russia it would not fight
this war alone. It also guaranteed Stalin that his Allies would not
allcw the war to weaken Russia to the point where the West could
manipulate it in the post-war world.
At the Eighteenth Party Congress Stalin caustically remarked that,
once the belligerents were weak and exhausted, the imperialistic
nations would "appear on the scene with fresh strength, to appear, of
course, - 'in the interests of peace', and to dictate conditions to the
18enfeebled belligerents...Cheap and easy!" Moscow took the necessary
steps to prevent such domination. Stalin, whose Red Army provided the
main source of manpower against Germany in the early years of the war,
19and sane will argue throughout the war, would make certain that
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Russia was not cut out of the peace this time.
So Moscow remained on guard throughout the years of the Grand 
Alliance for any signs that its allies were out to exhaust the Red Army 
so they could reap the rewards of victory. The late delivery of the 
second front confirmed these suspicions. "Britain and the USA dragged 
the war out in order to weaken the USSR, " reads the official Soviet 
account of the war years. What follows is worth quoting in full;
In Britain and the USA seme of the leaders did not 
think it necessary to conceal designs of this sort. They 
wanted the USSR to fight Germany single-handed so that the 
two countries would bleed themselves white. Plans of this 
nature were cynically expounded by US Senator Harry S. 
Truman, who later became President of the USA. "If we see 
that Germany is winning," he said, "we ought to help Russia 
and if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany and that 
way let them kill as many as possible. In Britain, similar 
ideas were propounded by Jî in Moore-Brabazon, then Minister 
of Aircraft production, v
The front was delivered way past the point when it oould have convinced 
Stalin that statements like the above were untrue.
The history of the second front is a curious one. Ivan Maisky’s
memoirs speak of the front as the "main problem dominating all 
21others." Stalin needed reassurance of his allies' trustworthiness; to 
this Moscow's History of Soviet Foreign Policy readily admits;
First and foremost, Soviet diplomacy had to make sure 
that the bourgeois states already fighting Germany and 
Italy would be core reliable allies of the USSR. To this end 
it was necessary to form and consolidate a coalition of 
states fighting Nazi Germany 2̂ nd open a second front in 
Europe as quickly as possible.
As early as 1941 Stalin began intimating to the Western allies as 
well as to his own people the need for a second front. On 18 July
1941, less than one month after Hitler's invasion, Churchill received
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(xmmunication frcm Stalin, asking for a second front.
It seems to me, furthermore, that the military 
position of the Soviet Union, and by the same token that of 
Great Britain, would improve substantially if a front were 
established against Hitler in the West (Northern France) 
and the North (the Arctic)... Until understanding is 
reached on these.. .points, not only will there be no 
clarity in Anglo/Soviet relations, but- if we are to speak 
frankly, there will be no mutual trust.
Churchill, however, continued to assure Stalin in the first five and a
half months of their alliance of the logistical impossibility for a
25European front at this time. Stalin's intimations grew insistent but
Churchill maintained that Moscow's unrelenting demands for a European
26front reflected a "monotonous disregard for.. .physical facts." The 
following excerpt frcm a speech delivered by Stalin in 1941 on the 
twenty-fourth anniversary of the October Revolution, however, clearly 
illustrates his interpretation of the "physical facts":
One of the reasons for the setbacks of the Red army 
consists in the absence of a second front in Europe...It is 
a fact that there are no armies of Great Britain or the 
United States an the European Continent at present which 
are waging war against the German fascist troops...
The situation new is such that our country is waging 
the w|^ of liberation alone without anyone's military 
aid...
The first Anglo/Russian mutual war-time assistance pact signed on 
12 July 1941 lacked any mention of a second front or post-war 
settlements. Stalin wanted both, at the earliest possible date. He 
presented a draft of treaties to Britain's Foreign Secretary Anthony 
Eden on 16 December 1941. The first treaty provided for mutual 
assistance both during and after the war. The second clearly 
established the Soviet vision of the "post-war organisation of
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28peace." The treaty called for:
.. .the restoration of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and 
Greece in their pre-war frontiers, and also the transfer to 
Poland of East Prussia. The treaty furthermore recognised 
the 1941 frontiers of the USSR (i.e. including in it 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Western Ukraine and Western 
Byelorussia), and the right of Britain to have bases 
necessary for her 2^ecurity in France, Belgium, Holland, 
Denmark and Norway.
Eden felt the treaties could be negotiated, but he reserved the right
to make modifications. Stalin made a third request, however, which
surprised even Maisky and was flatly refused by Eden: immediate
recognition by the British of Russia's 1939 territorial acquisitions.
Britain had gone to war to defend Poland, though; it would have been
unrealistic to expect Eden to give it away here.
The reason Eden gave for Britain's refusal surprised and angered
Stalin. Explaining that territorial changes were not to be decided on
during the course of the war, Eden told Stalin that "under the Atlantic
Charter we have pledged ourselves to take into account the wishes of 
30the inhabitants." An incredulous Stalin replied:
Why does the restoration of our frontiers ocme into 
conflict with the Atlantic Charter...I thought that the 
Atlantic Charter was directed against those people who were 
trying to establish world dominion. It new looks ̂ s if the 
Atlantic Charter was directed against the U.S.S.R.
The British cabinet voiced mixed emotions concerning Soviet
demands. Always more pragmatic than the quixotic Americans, many felt
Russia had earned the right to keep its 1939 borders. The London Times
felt the boundaries "were in no way incompatible with the security of
Europe, which the framework of the Atlantic charter sought to 
32insure." Fearing for the Alliance, well aware of the enormous part
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Russia still had to play to defeat Hitler, Churchill relented. On 7 
March 1942 he wrote to Roosevelt, pleading Stalin's case to recognize 
Soviet borders.
Roosevelt, with the support of Secretary of State Cordell Hull,
held firm in his conviction not to grant any territorial changes. Hull
was concerned with Polish-American pressure, which insisted on a free
33Poland after the war. The President showed more concern for the
principles and causes of the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations,
his vision for post-war peace.
In May 1942 Stalin sent Molotov to London for final approval of
the draft treaties and recognition of the 1941 boundaries. As sharp
debate continued between English and Americans regarding the
recognition of Soviet borders, Roosevelt intervened with an offer of
his own. He sent Stalin a letter on 12 April 1942 inviting Molotov to
Washington directly after his London visit to discuss "a very important
military proposal involving the utilisation of our armed forces in a
34manner to relieve your critical Western front." It was an astute 
diplomatic maneuver on FDR's part.
The evening of 24 May John Winant, US ambassador to Great Britain, 
entered into a discussion with Molotov at a reception in London. He 
expressed great interest in a second front, engaging Molotov in an 
extended conversation on the matter. Molotov signed the mutual 
aid-assistanoe treaty with England two days later: there was no mention 
of borders whatsoever. The diversionary tactic of the second front had 
worked.^
Molotov's visit to Washington confirmed the second front, with
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little roan for interpretation or misunderstanding. Molotov asked
point blank if the intention was to launch a European front sometime in
1942. The following account cones straight frcm the State Department:
The President then put to General Marshall the query 
whether developments were clear enough so that we could say 
to Mr. Stalin that we are preparing a second front. "Yes," 
replied the General. The President then authorized Mr. 
Molotov to inform Mr. Staling that we expect the formation 
of a second front this year.
Churchill, as usual, showed much more caution, stating in an
"aide-memoire" that the feasibility of the plan would be more evident 
37as it unfolded. Each time Stalin accused the Allies of breaking their 
premise, Churchill would recall the postcript he had handed to Molotov 
in London an his return trip fran Washington that spring. Averell
Harriman as well reiterated to Stalin that no premises had been
, , 38broken.
In Moscow's assessment, however, the premise had been made and the 
date pronounced. More like a sentence than a promise, the second front 
stood at the threshold of relations between the Big Three. It had been 
offered in place of the Anglo/Russian treaty, an understanding that 
Stalin would keep quiet regarding the recognition of Soviet boundaries 
in exchange for a cross-channel invasion. That its untimely 
deliverance only confirmed Mosocw's worst misgivings was the most 
pronounced tragedy of the Grand Alliance.
Soviet accounts of the failure to produce the front "as premised" 
reek with damning accusations. Maisky's diary entry of 15 February 
1942 accuses the British of allowing the opening of the second front 
only if it looked like the Red Army would get to Berlin first. Later,
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Maisky wrote how right he was in his earlier assumptions:
...even at that early period of the Great Patriotic 
War I had no illusions as to the true inclinations and 
calculations of the British government. What followed only 
confirmed the accuracy of my assessment of the situation.
In particular, the Second Front in France opened only when 
the British and the Americans found themselves faced with 
the real 'threat' that the Soviet armed forces would get to 
Berlin before they did.
It is quite possible, though, that the West's intentions were not
honorable. Certainly Churchill had no qualms about sacrificing Russian
40troops for British troops. He argued stubbornly against the front,
41fearing the channel would become a "bloodbath," favoring a safer
route for his troops through French Northwest Africa in conjunction
42with an advance westward across the desert toward Tripoli. American
war policy also aimed at giving up as few men as possible, and on this
fateful note Churchill managed to convince FDR of the unsoundness of a
43cross-channel invasion in 1942.
Evidence proves, however, that Roosevelt premised the front in
good faith with every intention of delivering it in 1942. Preparation
for the front, code-named SLEDGEHAMMER, began inmediatley after Molotov
44left Washington in May 1942. At a London Conference on 20 July, where 
the future of the front was ultimately decided, America's delegation 
argued for Russia and the fate of the Red Army if American and British 
ground -forces failed to land in Europe before the end of 1942. 
Roosevelt wrote the following in a memorandum to Hopkins, instructing 
him on how to proceed with negotiations at the conference:
In regard to 1942, you will carefully investigate the 
possiblity of executing SLEDGEHAMMER. Such an operation 
would definitely sustain Russia this year. It might be the 
turning point which would save Russia this year.
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SLEDGEHAMMER is of such grave importance that every reason 
calls for its accomplishment. You should strongly urge 
immediate all-out preparation for it, that it be pushed 
with the utmost vigor, and that it be executed whether or 
not Russian collapse be cones iirminent. In the event 
Russian collaspe becones probable SLEDGEHAMMER becomes not 
merely advisable but imperative. The principal objective 
of SLEDGEHAMMER is the positive diversion of German Air 
Forces frcm the Russian front.
It is difficult to believe such conviction could have been swayed. Yet
Churchill ostentatiously refused support for the front, and FDR agreed
with Marshall's and Hopkins' final assessment of the fateful situation:
".. .mere acquiescence on the part of the British was not sufficient for
46carrying out plans of this magnitude."
Regardless of Roosevelt's good intentions, they oould not be a
substitute for actions. Moscow, well aware that the failure to put
47SLEDGEHAMMER into operation lay with the British, directed its anger 
toward both Allies. Stalin spoke to his people about the absence of a 
second front on the twenty-fifth anniversary of the October Revolution, 
1942:
Our Allies cannot fail to realize that since France
has been put out of action, the absence of a second front
against Fascist Germany may end badly for all the
freedom-loving countries, including the Allies
themselves.
To the Soviet nation the front became all-important, an instrument of 
accountability needed to solidify the coalition. The failure to 
provide a European front early in the war greatly hindered the chances 
for a successful post-war peace settlement between the Big Three. What 
is most curious about the whole affair is Washington's obvious 
cognizance of the delicate situation. Hull's memoirs recorded an 
observation made by Ambassador Winant in December 1941:"'Russia,'
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Winant reported, ' was suspicious that the British and ourselves aimed
49at excluding her frcm the peace and postwar settlement...'"
Stalin's demands for territorial acquisition had posed too great a
hazard to Roosevelt's concept of the future post-war world. The ideal
of self-determination, embodied in the Atlantic Charter, became the
crusading spirit of World War II; the United Nations symbolized hope
for the American people and the West in general. Both FDR and Cordell
Hull felt great relief when Stalin relented and signed the Anglo treaty
with no mention of borders or territories.^0 Failure to deliver the
front in 1942, however, gave Moscow ample reason to distrust its
Allies; and neither the Atlantic Charter nor the United Nations offered
anything to meet the immediate needs or interests of the Kremlin.
Stalin was not about to compromise his war aims to allies he suspected
for a dream he did not share. Robert Sherwood, writing in 1948,
dismissed the issue of the second front. "The debate about the Second
Front will probably continue for as long as any. of the immediate
participants in it shall live, and after that all that will matter is
that it actually happened precisely when it did and new world history 
51was made." Sherwood's prediction that the late delivery of the second 
front would be forgotten in the more monumental history to follow could 
not have been more wrong.
Roosevelt's War Aims: "We leave here, friends in fact, in 
spirit and in purpose."
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The Atlantic Charter, signed by Britain and America on 14 August
1941, secured in words Thanas Paine's vision for America: complete
political sovereignty for all nations, endowing thorn with a
capitalistic freedom "to traverse the high seas and oceans without
hindrance." The Charter embodied the tradition of the Open Door and
the necessary political freedom needed to pursue such a policy. The
fourth point of the Charter called on the signatories "to further the
enjoyment by all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of
access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the
52world which are needed for their economic prosperity."
Clearly regarded by Roosevelt as a principle rather than a binding 
53law, the Charter offered little guidance in solving the pressing
conflicts which faced the coalition throughout the war years. "It is
not a code of law frcm which detailed answers to every question can be
distilled by painstaking analysis of its words and phrases," Cordell
Hull said in a radio adress delievered 9 April 1944. "What is
fundamental," he concluded, "are the objectives of the Charter and the
54determination to achieve them."
Unfortunately, neither Stalin nor Churchill shared FDR's 
dedication and enthusiasm to the rhetorical principles of the Atlantic 
Charter. The nebulous document was America' s dream, and both statesmen 
at one point or another clarified their acceptance of its lofty 
ideals. Its main objective, calling for the "respect of all peoples to 
choose the form of government raider which they live," rendered 
England's imperial possessions obsolete. An embarrassed Churchill 
explained to the House of Carmens that the Charter applied only to
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those nations "new under the Nazi yoke, and the principles governing
any alteration in their territorial boundaries....So that is quite a
separate problem frcm the progressive evolution of self-governing
institutions in the regions, and people which owe their allegiance to
55the British Crown."
The Soviets as well voiced skepticism of the Charter's ability to 
provide concrete guidelines in the post-war world. Ivan Maisky signed 
the Charter in London on 24 September 1941, yet he qualified the degree 
to which the Soviets would adhere to its precepts:
Considering that the practical application of these 
principles will necessarily adapt itself to the 
circumstances, needs, and historic peculiarities of 
particular countries, the Soviet government can state that 
a consistent application of these principles will secure 
the most energetic support on the flart of the government 
and the peoples of the Soviet Union.
That the "circumstances, needs and peculiarities" of certain countries, 
especially Poland in its relationship to Russia, was interpreted 
differently by the Allies than by Moscow should have cone as no 
surprise to the West, yet it did time and time again. According to 
historian Walter LaFeber, Moscow's qualifying acceptance
clearly indicated that the Soviets had no intention of 
allowing the history of 1919-1939 to repeat itself; if they 
could gather the requisite power, Eastern Europe and 
particularly Poland, across which German armies had invaded 
Russia twice in less than twenty-five years, would come 
under de facto Soviet control.
Regardless of its inability to appease Stalin's territorial war 
aims, Roosevelt's war diplomacy still focused on establishing a 
universal court of justice based on the principles of the Atlantic 
Charter; his vision included China, America, Russia and Great Britain
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policing the world. Only those nations with power had the ability to
check aggressors and influence smaller countries. The President hoped
the peace-keeping organization would provide a viable substitute to
Stalin's security demands. Roosevelt wanted to believe America's
political and economic institutions would be an acceptable alternative
to the present world order based on spheres of influence and power
politics, yet there was no evidence at the time that the world was
ready for, or even wanting of, such an order.
William Appleman Williams saw real continuity between Woodrow
Wilson' s attempt to turn the Progressive reform movement into a viable
program for the entire world and Roosevelt's attempt to change the New
Deal into a new world order. In order to sustain American style
democracy and prosperity, Williams maintained, it is always necessary
to expand markets. "For these traditional reasons the United States
declined...even to discuss the Soviet Union's bid to settle postwar 
58boundaries." The Soviet Union certainly viewed Washington's refusal
to settle post-war European territories as evidence that American
policy-makers "planned to use the war as a means of spreading their
influence to as many countries as possible... They wanted to see the
59postwar world ruled by themselves." The refusal to discuss Moscow's 
war aims, followed by the August 1942 revelation that the second front 
would not ocme after all, reinforced Russia's traditional fears of 
foreign and capitalistic encroachment.^
The President did place a proportionate amount of emphasis on 
Antierica's economic needs, and what those needs would be after the war. 
The American tradition, though, does not really separate democracy frcm
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capitalism; nor did Roosevelt. Secretary Hull, as chairperson, stated 
this tradition to the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy in 
1942, hoping perhaps to make such rhetoric official policy.
Liberty is more than a matter of political rights, 
indispensible as these rights are. In our own country we 
have learned frcm bitter experiences that to be truly free, 
men must have, as well, economic freedom and economic 
security— the assurance for all alike of ai^opportunity to 
work as free men in the company of free men.
Such an atmosphere excluded the Soviet Union, and Hull felt explicitly
62the post-war world held no room for a socialistic economic system.
Roosevelt did not feel quite as strongly as Hull on this point. 
He certainly wanted to change the Soviet system, and he had a sincere 
desire to have the rest of the world partake of an "opportunity to work 
as free men.” But while it may be true that the Open Door best suited 
American interests, Roosevelt and Hull sincerely believed such a world 
was best suited to all. Even Britain's system did not properly 
conform, as evidenced in the following poignant conversation between 
Churchill and Roosevelt, which took place just prior to the signing of 
the Atlantic Charter. The dialogue was recorded by Roosevelt's son, 
Elliott, and Roosevelt began the conversation.
"Of course, he remarked, with a sly sort of 
assurance, "of course, after the war, one of the 
preconditions of any lasting peace will have to be the 
greatest possible freedom of trade...
Churchill's neck reddened and he crouched foward.
"Mr. President, England does not propose for a mcment to 
lose its favored position among the British Dominions. The 
trade that has made England great shall continue...
"The peace, said Father firmly, "cannot include any 
continued despotism. The structure of the peace demands 
and will get equality of peoples. Equality involves the 
utmost freedom of competitive trade. Will anyone suggest 
that Germany's attempt to dominate trade ixv^central Europe 
was not a major contributing factor to war?"
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Roosevelt cannot be faulted for trying to convince Stalin that 
such a universal trade system would be beneficial to all nations, even 
the outcast Soviet Union. Stalin would have been difficult to persuade 
even in the best of circumstances, given the element of mistrust 
already present when the coalition formed. Perhaps a more timely 
delivery of the second front would have been a strong, convincing 
factor.
As Stalin's nation continued to be hainnered and beseiged by German 
forces, however, the need for post-war reconstruction entered Soviet 
thinking. Moscow's war aims became even more important, for expanded 
borders meant greater resources. Unfortunately, Moscow's growing 
concern to address the issues net only with frustration. Stalin's 
demands for border recognition were put off to the peace conference at 
the war's end, giving Roosevelt time to push his plans, hoping all the 
while that Stalin's war aims would dissolve into a new found enthusiasm 
for the world peace-keeping orgainization. With his Allies unwilling 
to discuss war spoils at all, either in monetary or territorial terms, 
Stalin's only choice was to accept the new American world order or 
pursue the goals he believed offered real security. As the war raged 
on and Stalin continued to stand firm in his initial demands, the 
relationship of the Big Three deteriorated. Stalin's unwillingness to 
let a world court provide for his nation's security became more obvious 
with the passing of each carmunique between the Big Three.
The Grand Alliance; One in Fact...Three in Purpose
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By November 1943, Stalin was in a superior position. The victory
at Stalingrad in the winter of 1942-43, featuring the valiant Red Army,
had determined the Germans would eventually be defeated. In contrast,
the Allied armies were "mired in Italy in a theater of war which could
64not compare in scope or casualties to the huge Russian front." 
Qnbarrassed and feeling somewhat guilty, neither Roosevelt nor 
Churchill had the stamina to deny Stalin the requests he felt he 
deserved. At this point in the war the West needed the Red Army, which 
was busy rolling back German troops from "the dangerous opening of the
/ r e
German front between Stalingrad and the Caspian Sea." By the time of
the first official meeting of the coalition, held in Teheran from 27
November to 1 December 1943, Stalin felt confident: the conference
would be overshadowed by the broken premise of the second front. When
Churchill wrote to Stalin in July 1942 announcing there would be no
cross channel invasion, Stalin replied with candor:
As to... opening a second front in Europe, I fear the 
matter is taking an improper turn. In view of the 
situation of the Soviet-German front, I state more 
emphatically that the Soviet Government cannot tc^erate the 
second front in Europe being postponed till 1943.
Yet Stalin would have to tolerate it, for the front would not be opened 
in 1943, either.
The main topic at Teheran involved the necessary military 
considerations needed for opening the second front. Churchill, still 
opposed to a cross channel invasion, feared more for his land army than 
anything else, knowing that a crushing defeat at Normandy would only 
facilitate Hitler. Roosevelt had allowed Churchill to convince him of 
this for almost two years, but at Teheran he firmly agreed with Stalin:
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"Operation Overlord" would oonmence the following May, 1944. Stalin 
67was thrilled. It became clear to all that the front would become a
reality, thanks to Roosevelt's insistence.
Roosevelt and Stalin had a rapport that did not include Churchill,
and it is possible the issue of the front had much to do with
establishing this understanding. Roosevelt, always willing to meet
Stalin more than halfway, felt with conviction that he would have to be
the more conciliatory of the two if his peacemaking organization was
to triumph. He knew post-war peace could not be kept without Moscow's
cooperation. Nowhere is this conviction more evident than in the
discussions held at Teheran regarding Poland. Poland's fate was decided
at Teheran: Stalin would have a free and open hand in Poland, and
68Eastern Europe as well.
Sane historians believe the Polish problem to be the nemesis of 
the coalition, lurking in every discussion and ocmpranise. Others 
believe the same to be true of Germany, which the Soviet Union expected 
to pay dearly for the destruction of its hone land. The thrust of the 
Polish problem cane frcm the Polish government-in-exile, which Britain 
had harbored since Hitler's 1939 invasion. The invasion of Poland 
ended the West's policy of appeasement, sending Britain and France into 
war against Germany. Churchill, constantly under pressure to secure a 
Poland free of Soviet influence, found himself in a difficult mediating 
position between Moscow and the London Poles. Stalin correctly surmised 
the hostility of the govemment-in-exile, and he tenaciously refused to 
accept an "unfriendly" government on his border.
Roosevelt cared only that the Polish government be representative
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of the people; this would please his home crowd. Roosevelt hoped 
public opinion and gestures of good will would ultimately convince 
Stalin to allow self-determination in the buffer states. In 1943, 
though, Roosevelt held no illusions regarding Stalin's feelings about 
spheres of influence. A personal ccxrmunique from U.S. Soviet 
Ambassador Averell Harriman to FDR written in October 1943 during the 
Moscow Conference demonstrates Roosevelt's awareness of Stalin's 
post-war ambitions. Three difficulties stood out in Harriman's mind: 
1) the Soviet Union's firm stand on the position taken for recognition 
of their 1939 border; 2) their intention to be very tough on Germany; 
and 3) the Polish situation. Harriman also called attention to 
Washington's reluctance to discuss Stalin's post-war aims, and hew that 
approach had so far misled the Soviets:
Although Soviet territorial questions were never 
raised...it can only be inferred that the Soviet Government 
expects to stand firmly on the position they have already 
taken in regard to their 1941 borders. I believe they have 
the impression that this has been tacitly accepted by the 
British, and the fact that we did not bring up the issue 
may have given then the impressi^ that we would not raise 
serious objections in the future.
This, however, is exactly the impression Roosevelt wished to convey.
Roosevelt and his advisors agreed there was little anyone could do 
short of war to prevent Stalin from taking back the territory he 
believed rightfully belonged to him. Roosevelt was not about to go to 
war for the self-determination of Eastern Europe, regardless of what 
the Atlantic Charter had to say.^ This might create a dilemma for the 
American people, but cooperation with the Soviet Union for the 
remainder of the war and in the post-war world dominated Roosevelt's
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thinking at this time. A discussion the President had with Anthony
Eden in March 1943 revealed as much. Harry Hopkins recorded the
conversation :
The President said that, after all, the big powers 
would have to decide what Poland should have and that he, 
the President, did not intend to go to the Peace Conference 
and bargain with Poland or other small states; as far as 
Poland is concerned, the important thing is to set î -jup in 
a way that will help maintain the peace of the world.
The President's attitude became evident in a secret conversation
Roosevelt held with Stalin on 1 December. At the meeting, Roosevelt
explained to Stalin the importance of public opinion in American
politics :
He added that there were in the United States frcm six 
to seven million Americans of Polish extraction, and as a 
practical man, he did not wish to lose their vote. He said 
he personally agreed with the views of Marshall Stalin as 
to the necessity of the restoration of a Polish state...He 
hoped, however, that the Marshall would understand that for 
political reasons outlined above, he could not participate 
in any decision here in Teheran or even next winter.
The conversation continued, and the question of self-determination
among states was discussed. Roosevelt explained to Stalin, very
patiently, as one would to a child, hew "he thought that world opinion
would want seme expression of the will of the people, perhaps not
immediately after their re-occupaticn by Soviet forces, but scroe 
73day..." Stalin's reply was not child-like, but clever and accusatory:
The Marshall replied that the three Baltic republics 
had no autonomy under the last Czar who had been an ally of 
Great Britain and the United States, but that no one had 
raised the question of public opinion, and he did not quite 
see why it was being raised now. The President replied 
that the truth of the matter was that the public neither 
knew nor understood. Marshall Stalin answered that they 
should be informed and sane propaganda work be done. He 
added that as to the expression of the will of the people, 
there would be lots of opportunities for that to be done in
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accordance with the Soviet constitution but that he could 
not agree to any form of international control.
This apparently satisfied the President, even in lieu of the character
of the Soviet constitution. It is easy to understand why Stalin left
Teheran with the impression that the United States would not oppose any
territorial changes he wanted. It is the job of the historian to
interpret words, and although it can never be known exactly what Stalin
75thought about this "peculiar conversation" or of Roosevelt's exact
intentions, the words themselves are vague and do not connote a
definite policy. On such words the future of Europe became
precariously decided.
Brief discussions concerning Germany also transpired at Teheran.
Stalin wanted complete dismemberment, as did Roosevelt. Churchill
hesitated. Remembering Versailles, he knew the consequences of
upsetting the status quo by totally debilitating a nation. The three
discussed a few plans for carving up Germany and demilitarizing the
nation, but settled nothing. Stalin, adamant about retribution for
Germany's past sins, related this issue directly to the Polish
problem. The weaker was Germany, the less chance it would rise again.
Stalin made it clear at Teheran that he would conduct all future
diplomacy toward one aim: Germany would never again pass through the
Polish corridor. Teheran became Stalin's victory.
The only official documents to emerge frcm the conference were the
Declaration of Iran, the military agreement on the second front, to be
opened in May 1944, and the Declaration of the Three Powers, whose
final words read: "We came here with hope and determination. We leave
76here, friends in fact, in spirit and in purpose." Yet amidst the
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salutations and praise, the testimonial luncheons and dinners, a 
division of purpose among the Big Three had surfaced— Roosevelt, 
interested in the promulgation and establishment of his peace-making 
experiment; Churchill, still interested in reestablishing a semblance 
of power in Europe, the only world order in which he felt safe; and 
Stalin, dedicated to establishing a sphere of influence to protect his 
borders, unable or unwilling to understand the abstract principles of 
democracy which Roosevelt would soon impose upon him.
FDR addressed the nation soon after Teheran. His Fireside Chat of
24 December sowed the seed of illusion that all was right within the
coalition. Historian Norman Graebner discussed the speech: "...the
President described accurately the imposing military situation,
especially in the Far East, but ignored, in his description of the
postwar world, the clear warnings of Soviet amibition in Eastern Europe
which Stalin had made no effort to hide. In the utopianism of such
public statements Roosevelt laid the foundation for eventual
77disillusionment and conflict." During that fireside chat Roosevelt 
told the American people:
We did discuss international relationships frcm the 
point of view of big, broad objectives, rather then
details. But on the basis of what we did discuss, I can 
say even today that I do not think any insoluble 
differences will arise among Russia, Great Britain and the 
United States....The doctrine that the strong shall 
dominate the weak is the doctrine of our enemies — and we 
reject it.
Roosevelt, willing to make an exception in the case of Russia1 s 
relationship to Poland, failed to prepare the world for the eventuality 
of a Polish government "friendly" to the Soviet Union.
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The nature of this relationship became well-known at the Yalta 
Conference, held fourteen months later, February 4-11, 1945. Mild 
weather blessed the February conference; but Roosevelt's health was 
ailing and he felt put upon to travel halfway around the world to meet 
with his collaborators. Stalin, however, would not venture very far 
frcm his cwn well-protected sphere. So for the sake of peace and to 
quiet Churchill's clamorings for another peace conference to settle the 
Polish question onoe-and-for-all, Roosevelt agreed to meet the 
Generalissimo more than half way.
By the beginning of February, the Red Army had moved two hundred
miles through central Poland, past the German frontiers, into upper
Silesia. Soviet troops, less than fifty miles frcm Berlin, controlled
79all of East Prussia with the exception of Komgsberg. In Hungary, the 
Red Army moved toward Budapest. Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe had 
begun, in spite of the principles of the Atlantic Charter.
Since Teheran, Stalin had begun to insist on the Polish 
territories annexed in 1939, and on a pro-Soviet Polish government. 
Relations between the London Poles and Stalin had fallen beyond repair 
by February 1945, so much so that Stalin could claim at Yalta that 
these Poles not only exhibited hostility to his government and carried 
out sabotage acts against the Soviet rear, but were conspiring with the 
Germansr There was little Churchill or Roosevelt could say against 
these charges, short of calling Stalin a liar; such a charge would have 
endangered the coalition far too much.
The incident Stalin offered as proof of the disloyalty of the 
Polish govemment-in-exile began in 1941 when the government set about
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forming an army. Many of their top officers could not be located, and 
no explanation could be offered as to its whereabouts. On 13 April 
1943 the Nazi radio began to transmit reports that the Soviet 
government had murdered the Polish officers in the Katyn forest. The 
Polish govemment-in-exile chose to take the German reports seriously 
and ordered an investigation. Churchill saw the dangers such
allegations would have to Soviet-Polish relations, but he was unable to 
calm Stalin's furious redress. Stalin broke all relations with the 
London Poles denouncing the incident as proof of a hostile government 
under German influence.
The significance of the incident was its affect upon
negotiations. The Big Three agreed wholeheartedly that any Polish 
government must be composed of democratic, anti-fascist elements. The 
action of the London Poles had not demonstrated their love for 
democracy or their hatred for Germany, Stalin asserted during the 
plenary sessions at Yalta. On 5 January Stalin wrote to Roosevelt
concerning the matter:
I greatly regret that I have not been able to convince 
you of the correctness of the Soviet Government's attitude 
toward the Polish question. I nevertheless hope that 
events will convince you that the Polish National Committee 
has always rendered and will continue to render to the
Allies...considerable assistance in the struggle against 
Hitlerite Germany, whereas the emigre Government in London 
assists Germans by creating disorganization in this 
struggle.
The severing of Polish-Soviet relations prompted Churchill to write to
Roosevelt an 8 January 1945: "At the present time I think the end of
81this war may well prove to be more disappointing than was the last."
The Big Three discussed Poland in detail at the third plenary
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session on 6 February. The President said he wished to see Lwow and the
rich oil deposits of that area go to Poland even though they were
within the already agreed upon Curzan line. Roosevelt wished to appeal
to Stalin's magnanimity, still hoping Stalin would learn to bend to
Western public opinion. Roosevelt pleaded rather than demanded: "He
said that he was merely putting forth this suggestion for consideration
82and would not insist on it." Churchill said he was much more
interested in the "sovereignty and independence of Poland than in the
frontier line— he wanted to see the Poles have a heme where they could
83organize their lives as they wished." Churchill pleaded, going on and
on about hew, for Britain, the question was one of honor— "it had
84almost cost them their life in the world." Stalin, whose country had
suffered more than any other, who remembered with anger that neither
Great Britain nor the United States cared enough about the loss of
Soviet lives to open the second front before the war was practically
won, remained unconvinced by either plea. He also desired a strong,
independent Poland, for it had been a weak Poland that had made it
possible for Germany to invade Russia not once, but twice. For Russia,
hcwever, "It is not only a question of honor...but one of life and 
85death." Stalin would not recognize the London Poles as a legitimate 
government, and Churchill would not recognize the Warsaw, or Lublin 
Poles. Hie intense situation indicated the lack of progress that would 
be made at Yalta regarding the Polish problem.
Churchill continued to press for a written solution to the problem 
while Roosevelt made general statements that contributed little. He 
never wavered frcm his vow not to get directly involved. Churchill
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insisted the Lublin government did not represent the Polish people and
Stalin assured him it did. Churchill, of course, could offer no
proof. It had been impossible to get anyone into the country to
investigate up until this time, and now that the war had abated in the
area Stalin insisted that attempts to go in would be an insult to the
Polish people and the Provisional Government. Stalin said, after all,
the Lublin Government had stayed to fight Hitler and assist the Red
Army in liberation— it was to them that the Polish people had pledged
their loyalty and thanks. The President felt free elections to be the
most important consideration, the only real question being who would
govern in the interim. Stalin premised free elections, but insisted
the government be formed frcm the nucleus of the Lublin Poles who had
already proven their loyalty and adeptness to rule. Churchill and
Roosevelt proved powerless under the barrage of Stalin's steady and
faultless arguments. Churchill and Roosevelt finally agreed to a
"reorganization of the already acting Polish Provisional Government
with other Polish democratic leaders frcm within Poland and frcm 
86abroad." Stalin made it quite clear, however, that he did not 
consider the Polish government-in-exile to be democratic or even close 
to it.
To this day myths surrounding Yalta flourish. Among the most 
famous are that Stalin broke his premise to allow self-determination in 
Eastern Europe and Roosevelt sold Poland 'dewn the river'. In reality 
none of this happened. The most accurate comment concerning the truth 
about Yalta comes frcm Admiral William Leahy, who was present at the 
conference. The final agreement on Poland, he said, "is so elastic
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that the Russians can stretch it all the way frcm Yalta to Washington
without technically breaking it." Since the Red Army already occupied
Eastern Europe, however, Roosevelt wearily replied to Leahy, "I know
87Bill, I know...but it's the best I can do for Poland at this time."
Herbert Feis declared the Yalta Declaration an "ambiguous
88formula," destined to fail. George Kennan had this to say about the
Polish agreement:
The Yalta Declaration, with its references to the 
reorganization of the existing PolishHTcmnunist regime "on 
a broader democratic basis" and to the holding "of free and 
uunfettered elections...on the basis of universal suffrage 
and secret ballot," struck me as the shabbiest sort of 
equivocation, certainly not calculated to pull the wool
over thg^eyes of the Western public but bound to have this
effect.
Unfortunately, abstract ideals like the ones presented in the
Polish agreement abounded at Yalta. The Declaration on Liberated
Europe, another undefined document, emerged from the conference. Feis
called it "little more than another avcwal of devotion to ideals which
all three Allies had approved many times before...Its loose net of
90phrases allowed easy passage to any determined purpose." The 
Declaration, like the Polish document, makes use of words like 
"democratic elements," phrases which Stalin defined much differently 
than Churchill or Roosevelt.
Almost immediately following Yalta, as the Red Army continued its 
march through Eastern Europe and began to occupy the region, the 
Western world pointed to Moscow's actions as a breach of the 
Declaration on Liberated Europe, an intentional reneging of these 
highly cherished principles to which Stalin had pledged his support.
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But Stalin had made his policies clear to Churchill and FDR, and both
knew he had every intention of creating 'friendly" states in Eastern
Europe. According to Gaddis, the real failure had been not to honestly
prepare the American and British people for Stalin's intentions, and
not to inform the world that the Allies had no intention of opposing
Moscow if it meant jeopardizing the Grand Alliance, world peace or
91Roosevelt's United Nations.
Graebner maintains that what occurred in the eighteen months
following Yalta was very logical, considering the military and
92diplomatic history of the war. In 1943 William C. Bullitt obstinately
argued for sending American troops into the Baltic states, liberating
93the region before the Russians. The only way to prevent Moscow from
controlling the region, he argued, was to get there first. Roosevelt
refused to adopt this tactic, not wanting to upset Stalin and
determined to sacrifice as few American lives as possible. Withholding
the second front made the situation especially ironic, encouraging
Russia to "eventually occupy the vast areas of Slavic Europe which has
94comprised the historic territorial objectives of the Russian nation."
The truth of the matter is that Eastern Europe, historically, has
never been a part of America's interests or affairs. Graebner writes
how, for American officials, the Slavic states had always represented
political corruption, economic instability and strategic 
. . 95insignificance. Their significance to the Kremlin and the Tsars, 
however, has always been astronomical, and for the first time since
Napoleon Moscow had an opportunity to secure this buffer zone, de
96 . . .facto. Americans mistakenly assumed that Moscow's tradition in
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foreign relations could be supplanted by a new world order. Roosevelt 
ignored Stalin's quest for political security, convincing the American 
people and the rest of the world that Stalin had indeed abandoned 
Russia's traditional quest for a sphere of influence. This never 
happened, and Stalin never hid his intentions frcm his partners in
war. Soviet foreign policy remained orthodox throughout the war.
97Official Washington had simply premised too much. Leading the 
American people to believe Stalin had magnanimously changed because of 
the Grand Alliance and new adhered to the nebulous principles of the 
Atlantic Charter and the Declaration for Liberated Europe left FDR's 
successors little choice: abandon the Atlantic Charter and admit to 
Roosevelt's failed war startegy, or brand Stalin a liar, thus 
sacrificing the Grand Alliance and laying the seeds for the Cold War. 
The decision to take the latter route misled the world into believing 
Stalin had indeed broken the pledges made to his Allies.
Yet the document which bound both Churchill and Roosevelt to deny 
Stalin's territorial requests, The Atlantic Charter, the "guiding star" 
of the coalition, was one whose principles were easily bent. Such 
ideals calmed the American public, steeped as they were in the 
tradition of fighting wars for democracy and liberty for all. Yet 
Stalin had agreed to the Charter only with the qualification that the 
principles would secure support under certain circumstances, depending 
on the needs of the country. In spite of Stalin's clear intentions, or 
perhaps because of them, the agreements and communiques signed at the 
conferences were too broad to be binding, saying little in specific 
terms about what would transpire in Poland and Eastern Europe, leaving
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Roosevelt' s successors with no policy whatsoever in that part of the 
world. As the Red Army pushed Hitler's forces back, Eastern Europe and 
Germany became a huge military vacuum into which Soviet influence 
flowed. Left up to a group of men unprepared to follow FDR's unproven 
war diplomacy, United States policy makers proceeded to act in 
America's best interests; and this clearly excluded a socialistic 
economic system dominating part of Germany and all of Eastern Europe 
and the Balkans.
Seme contemporaries, like Walter Lippmann and Henry Wallace, spoke
out in favor of allowing the Soviet Union to have its traditional
sphere of influence. Lippmann argued that, after all, the U.S. had a
sphere in Central America, and would soon have one in Japan and 
98China. For Lippmann, the matter was one of limitations. "No nation,
99however strong, has universal power which reaches everywhere." 
Captain Thorneycroft, speaking to the British House of Cannons, viewed 
the Polish conflict with despair, seeing in it the seeds for another 
world war.
We could not ocsme back fron Yalta with a blue-print 
for a new Utopia. The fundamental error into which my hon. 
Friends have fallen is this. The rights of small nations 
are not safeguarded by signing documents like the Atlantic 
Charter and quarrelling with^^iyone who does not agree with 
your interpretation of them.
Before the advent of containment came the United States1 ' get
tough' policy with Russia— based on the democratic principles of the 
Atlantic Charter which Stalin had alledgedly violated.101 Even before 
the supposed violation took place, hewever, the Charter1s main design 
eliminated the Soviet Union's political and economic system frcm the
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post-war world and unequivocally put forth a new world order. Even 
Britain's pre-war colonial domain had to be abolished according to the 
precepts put forth in the document. Roosevelt had every intention of 
coaxing Stalin along, offering him attractive piecemeals like the 
second front, in order to gain his cooperation in a world totally 
different frcm the one in which he was used to operating. Roosevelt's 
strategy remained unfulfilled, and the Soviets became unfairly linked 
to the principles and vague words of a document which would, if given 
time, firmly entrench Westem-style democratic capitalism in all 
comers of the earth. This Roosevelt's successors were bound and 
determined to do, with or without Moscow's cooperation. Stalin, on the 
other hand, had suspected such motives all along; he therefore took 
precautions early in the war to assure that such a world would not cane 
to pass.
The seeds of America's containment policy, sewed in the years of
the Grand Alliance, germinated soon after Roosevelt's death. He had
left no legacy of foreign policy for dealing with the Soviets in either
Eastern Europe or the world. Hoping the United Nations would prove
viable in the face of future dilemmas, there is even evidence that
Roosevelt hoped to hand the bomb over to the peace-keeping organization
102and the world's four policemen. Harry Truman, however, did not share 
the President's vision. Left without a concrete policy for dealing 
with Stalin and the threat of Soviet expansion and world-wide 
socialism, he and his advisors had to devise a policy conducive to 
their goals and philosophies— the establishment of the American 
tradition in foreign policy.
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Chapter Three— The Creators, 1945-1946
Dean Acheson, assistant secretary of state in 1945, later to 
become Truman's Secretary of State, entitled his memoirs Present at the 
Creation. The 'creation' was that of an American foreign policy which 
clearly accepted the responsibility of a world power in the post-war 
world, and all the tenets such a duty entailed.
Every creation must have a creator, and in this case there were
several. Harry Truman, Dean Acheson, James Byrnes, Averell Harriman,
James Forrestal, and Senator Arthur Vandenberg ocme to mind as seme of
the prime movers of this creation. George Kennan, also one of the
creators, played a different role. He served to confirm convictions
already held, to provide the justification for official policy when it
finally emerged. Not everyone would agree with this assessment. John
Lewis Gaddis, foremost authority on America's containment policy, would
not.'*' Gaddis, however, does agree that "although [Kennan*s] role was by
no means decisive in shaping Truman's approach to the world, his ideas,
more than those of anyone else, did provide the intellectual rationale
2upon which that approach was based."
America's tradition in foreign affairs had, so far, been 
idealistic and self-righteous, with an intense dislike of European 
power politics. Furthermore, the quest for a thriving and stable 
economy had become fused with democracy, adding an element of 
contradiction to the creation of a foreign policy. No doubt America 
had endeavored to become an economic, and therefore a political world
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power. By 1945 it had achieved the status it desired; unfortunately,
it had little or no experience in the new role.
Acheson's memoirs say as much. The period of the creation of
America's foreign policy as a new world power is one which he called
obscure and ambiguous. "Not only was the future clouded, a cannon
3enough situation , but the present was equally clouded." Evidence 
shows this to be the case. Revisionists go to great lengths to prove 
that Washington' s creation of foreign policy in the years immediately 
following the war became maligned by those who intentionally wanted to
4sabotage Roosevelt's post-war plan for peace. Such a view, hcwever, is
far too simplistic for the complicated situation with which Washington
and the Kremlin had to deal in the post-war years.
Elliot Roosevelt's memoirs discussed the difference between PDR's
administration and the new State Department under Harry Truman. The one
difference, he wrote, "is that when Franklin Roosevelt died, the force
for progress in the modem world lost its most influential and most
5persuasvie advocate." As biased as that remark may be, the 
implications of it are accurate. FDR's devotion to a world 
peace-keeping organization belonged almost exclusively to him. An 
integral part of his personality, the attitude he held toward Stalin 
and the importance of the Russians in world affairs could have been 
upheld by only a few other statesmen.
Daniel Yergin, author of Shattered Peace, described Franklin 
Roosevelt's attitude tcward the Russians as the "Yalta Axicm." The 
axicm depended on finding a way to work with the Russians, even to the 
point of agreeing to the vague documents negotiated at Teheran and
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Yalta. Preserving the coalition for the post-war world remained the
primary goal of FDR until his death. Yet, "The Yalta axioms were very
much the personal possession of Roosevelt and a few powerful
independent agents, whose only loyalty was to him. Those axioms had no
institutional base in the government.. .Certainly, they were not popular
6in the state department." Even the United Nations, the one institution 
which may have assured the survival of seme of Roosevelt's attitudes, 
lacked any real power for keeping the peace.
For this reason, it is difficult to accuse Harry Truman, or anyone 
else, of deliberately infiltrating Roosevelt's "Grand Design" with one 
of his own. In actuality the largest part of FDR's policy involved an 
attitude, a certain mindset, and very few people shared it, Harry 
Truman the least of them. Roosevelt certainly knew this, but for 
political reasons of expediency FDR felt Truman had to be his running 
mate in the 1944 election. The 'creation' which started in 1945, 
following Roosevelt's death, quickly became saddled with an almost 
impossible task— trying to implement an "attitude" with no 
institutional or legal basis, a dead man's dream with which few had 
empathized. Ultimately, it may be safe to say that few had even 
understood FDR'S vision. Furthermore, neither Truman nor the creators 
knew what Stalin was going to do in 1945; Stalin himself did not know. 
Each nation knew what it wanted to achieve in the way of national 
interests; the difficulty or feasibility of realizing those goals 
remained to be seen.
Thus the ' creators1 were not of the same frame of mind as Franklin 
Roosevelt. When assessing their scramble to implement foreign policy in
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1945, it is prudent to remember this. At the time of Roosevelt's 
death, there were few concrete agreements regarding the post-war world 
and the territorial aquisitions which Stalin insisted upon having. 
Left only with the ambiguity of the Atlantic Charter and the 
Declaration on Liberated Europe, the creators of America's post-war 
foreign policy had the freedom to determine policy and the success or 
failure of the United Nations. Their attitudes determined the outcome, 
resulting in the political containment of Russia which was colored with 
the ideological fervor of the Cold War.
And what of the Kremlin? To what extent did Stalin bring upon 
himself the American decision to contain Russia? Issac Deutscher 
maintains that Stalin had no concrete plans, no designs, other than 
what he had put forth at Teheran and Yalta— "friendly states" on 
Russia's western border, especially Poland, and reparations from 
Germany and other Axis nations to help rebuild his war-torn economy. 
According to Deutscher, Stalin did not premeditate putting his Eastern 
European zone under exclusive communist control, and none of his
demands for reparations from Germany or any other country could be
7described "as a stepping stone for revolution.” "...even at the close
of the war," Deutscher wrote of Stalin, "his intentions were still
8extremely self-contradictory, to say the least."
If this was truly the case, and evidence shews it to be, the 
creators of containment, as well as Stalin, found themselves 
floundering at the war's end, searching for a policy which assured that 
each of their nation's self-interests would be met. In April 1945 the 
new creators of American policy had little faith the United Nations
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could assure this condition. Stalin of course never believed the UN
oould serve his country's security needs; but then Stalin had left
Yalta under the impression he would be allowed "friendly states" on his
western border. The agreement he made with Churchill in June 1944
9confirmed the Russian sphere of influence in the post-war world. The 
one factor which had held all the loose language and obscure ends 
together, FDR, was gone. He had believed in the United Nation's
ability to secure United States interests and modify Russian needs.
The time may have ccrne when even FDR would have modified his
expectations; that is something we cannot know.
One thing is certain. A definite change in attitude can be 
detected after FDR's death, rather than a change in any official policy 
which may have belonged to the former President or the Generalissimo. 
Although this change was not necessarily a result of the President's 
passing, the creators of American policy felt they oould no longer 
trust FDR's methods, what little they understood of them; and Stalin, 
perhaps remembering Truman's harsh words spoken as a senator in 1941, 
waited to see if the tenuous agreements drawn up at Teheran and Yalta 
would stand. With America's tradition in foreign policy steeped in 
open-door trade, it is not surprising that Stalin's emerging
socialistic sphere of influence would not be tolerated. Likewise, the 
Russian tradition believed in the necessity of "friendly governments" 
in order to secure borders, making it almost certain the Kremlin would 
view any attempt to establish liberal-based democratic governments an 
its western border as unacceptable.
There is a big difference, hcwever, between an unacceptable policy
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and cold war. The decision to contain Russia, although formally 
adopted in 1947 with the Truman Doctrine, actually began two years 
before, a gradual process resulting more from the necessities of 
Realpolitik than anything else. The attitudes of the creators became 
manifested in the Truman Doctrine, an ideological statement designating 
the virtuous United States as an ensign to the people, the protector of 
all nations against the evil and totalitarian Soviet Union. Such 
rhetoric, true to the American tradition in foreign policy, justified 
U.S. intervention into Greece and assured Congressional approval of 
such an action. Stalin also intimated to his people the belicose 
nature of their past-ally, and the hopelessness of working together to 
negotiate a post-war peace.^ What actually happened, however, was the 
formulation of the belief, on both sides, that future negotiations 
would prove futile in obtaining the interests both nations insisted 
upon having— a precept Roosevelt had refused to accept.
Truman; "...and the Russians can go to hell"
In the 1920's, after the State Department had decided to reject 
the new Bolshevik state, it set up an "observation post" in the Baltic 
port city of Riga.11 Having adopted a policy of nonrecognition, the 
State Department simply hoped the Bolsheviks would disappear. As 
DeWitt Clinton Poole, a State Department official at the time wrote,
there was a "breach between the Bolsheviks and the rest of the
12world."
The year 1933 brought a renewal of expectations to the
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relationship between Russia and America. William Bullitt, Roosevelt's
choice for the first U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, eagerly
anticipated working with the Russians. George Kennan was also in Moscow
during the 1930's. Called "Bullitt's bright boy," Kennan recalls in
his memoirs hew "Words would fail me if I were to try to convey in this
context the excitement, the enjoyment, the fascination.. .of this
13initial service in Moscow."
By 1935, however, the assassination of Sergei Kirov, a powerful 
Carrnunist leader and the most plausible man to succeed Stalin, had 
taken place, marking the beginning of Stalin's purges and the end of 
expectations for successful negotiations between the democratic 
Americans and the dictatorial Russians. Bullitt's reports to Roosevelt 
recoiled in bitterness and spoke of insurmountable difficulties, yet 
much to the ambassador's chagrin Roosevelt refused to be convinced to 
adept a "hard line." Kennan wrote of those years:
...the terrible cloud of suspicion and violence, of 
sinister, unidentifiable terror and 'sauve qui peut' 
denunciations, began to gather over Russia, only to unleash 
upon it seme months later the full horror of the purges, 
and to continue to darken it, in one degree or another 
until Stalin's death in 1953. With this event the 
atmosphere for the conduct of any sort of diplcjqptic work 
in Moscow, by anyone, deteriorated drastically...
According to Daniel Yergin, the pessimism of those years continued 
to exist in the State Department, only to resurface follcwing FDR's 
death. "If one had taken a snapshot of the career staff sometime 
during those first couple of years of relations, it would have shewn 
many of the men who were to became State Depatment experts on Soviet 
and camnunist affairs in the mid and late 1940's."^ Yergin adds: "As
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U.S. leaders attempted, after World War II, to analyze Soviet policy 
and select an appropriate American course, this group's position 
provided one end of the spectrum of the debate. Eventually its axioms 
triumphed."^
Harry Truman seemed to have been unduly influenced by this end of
the "spectrum," although he had the benefit of advice frcm the other
end as well. There were those like Henry Wallace and Secretary of War
Henry Stimson who warned against adopting a 'get tough' policy toward
the Russians.
There is much debate concerning Truman's attitude toward FDR's
policy and his intentions to carry it out. Evidence shows Truman did
have every intention of adhering to his predecessor's policies, but his
ignorance of FDR's war-time diplomacy saddled him with a lew
self-esteem. Understandably, Truman felt compelled to appear tough and
decisive to compensate for such a tremendous oversight. Even so,
Truman was characteristically prone to rashness as his 1941 remark
regarding Germany and the Russians proved. It was very important to
Truman that he be in control, leading him to make hasty decisions
before all the details had been examined. He exhibited a sensitivity
to knowing so little about current foreign affairs, and expressed
anxiety that Roosevelt had not taken the care to brief him on the most
17important issues of the day. Even though he had to rely on the advice 
of those closest to the situation, he clearly indicated he would make 
any changes he thought necessary. Truman wrote in his memoirs:
I always fully supported the Roosevelt program, but I 
knew that certain administrative weaknesses existed... I 
was well aware of this, and even on that first day I knew I 
would eventually have to make changes, both in the Cabinet
18and in administrative policy.
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Truman believed in FDR's program for peace, and probably believed he
carried it out the best he oould under the circumstances. He never did
possess Roosevelt's patience and subtleness, however, and this became
obvious in his dealings with the Soviets.
One of the people Truman sought the advice of in those early
months was Averell Harriman, the United States ambassador to Russia
between 1943 and 1946. William Appleman Williams described Harriman as
"one of the nany wealthy industrial banking leaders who supported 
19FDR." Although this is true, it was Harriman's earlier business
dealings with the Soviets in 1925 which led him to believe, initially/
that Stalin and the Russians oould be reasonable partners in both war
and peace. This convinction, in fact, influenced FDR's decision to
appoint Harriman, whcm he felt would prove an excellent negotiator,
determined to find resolutions for even the most difficult problems.
Roosevelt was correct in this judgment. Like FDR, Harriman at first
did not feel alarm at Stalin's intentions in Eastern Europe, content
that the dictator and the Kremlin "do not wish to foment revolution
along their borders or to cause disorder which would threaten
20international stability." Historian Deborah Larson points out that
neither FDR nor Harriman had any patience for the London Poles, feeling
them to be aristocratic landowners hostile to Stalin. Both statesmen
wanted to see a Polish government sympathetic to the Soviet Union and
21willing to call on it for any future security problems.
Gaddis believes no one did more to shape Truman's views than 
22Harriman, who began to advocate a quid pro quo treatment of Russia as
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early as September 1944, mostly in reaction to the Warsaw uprising of 
July 1944. Harriman became deeply disillusioned following the
uprising. As underground Poles desperately tried to liberate their 
capital before the Red Army arrived, Stalin maliciously halted his 
troops outside the city and let Warsaw be rampaged. This maneuver 
resulted in the destruction of most of the anti-Soviet political 
factions within the capital. Pleas from Churchill as well as Roosevelt 
would not move Stalin. "Under these circumstances," Harriman wrote in a
telegram which he never sent, "it is difficult for me to see hew a
peaceful or acceptable solution to the Polish problem can be found."
Shortly after the uprising, on 25 August, Harriman telegrammed
Roosevelt and Hull:
I have evidence that (the Russians) have
misinterpreted our generous attitude as a sign of weakness, 
and acceptance of their policies. Time has came when we 
must make clear what we expect of them as the price of our 
goodwill. Unless we take issue with the present policy 
there is every indication the Soviet Union will-become a 
world bully wherever their interests are involved.
24Roosevelt, however, would not heed Harriman's advice. Discussing 
Roosevelt's lack of discernment, the Ambassador wrote:
He has no conception of the determination of the 
Russians to settle matters in which they consider that they 
have a vital interest...The President still feels he can 
persuade Stalin to alter his point of view on ma^y matters 
that, I am satisfied, Stalin will never agree to.
It is not surprising, then, that Harriman warned Truman during 
their first meeting on 20 April 1945 of a "barbarian invasion of 
Europe." The Ambassador called for a reconsideration of present U.S. 
policy and "the abandonment of any illusion that the Soviet government
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was likely to act in accordance with the principles to Which the rest
26of the world held in international affairs."
Three days later Harry Truman called together a special conference
with his chief military and diplomatic advisors to get seme opinions on
the current status of the Polish situation. Molotov was in Washington,
and Truman had already net with him once. He had another meeting
scheduled later that afternoon. Present at the advisory council were
Secretary of State Edward Stettinius, Henry Stimson, Secretary of the
Navy James Forrestal, Admiral William Leahy, General George Marshall,
Admiral Ernest King, Ambassador Averell Harriman, General John Deane,
and Charles Bohlen. This landmark meeting clearly illustrated the
difference between Truman's and Roosevelt's approach to the Russians.
Truman began by stating how, up until now, the "Yalta agreements
had so far been a one way street and that oould not continue. He would
go ahead with the plans for San Francisco, and if the Russians did not
27care to join, they oould 'go to hell."' "It may well be that
Roosevelt would have resisted the acceptance of the Lublin Government
in Poland...," wrote revisionist D.F. Fleming, "but without telling the
28Russians to go to hell."
Truman then moved around the roan, asking each one present to 
state his opinion. Stimson went first. He favored "caution." In the 
big military matters the Soviets had always kept their word, he said, 
and had often gone even one better. Concerning the border countries, 
it was important to find out what Soviet intentions were. Much of 
Poland, after all, had been part of the Soviet Union prior to World War 
I, and the Russians took the Polish question very serioulsy. Later,
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Stimson would point out that aside fran the United States and Great
Britain, very few countries understood free elections.
Ambassador Harriman believed the real issue to be whether the
United States was to be a "party to a program of Soviet domination of 
29Poland." Stimson interjected at this point that perhaps the Russians
were being a bit more realistic than the United States regarding their
own security. Leahy then spoke up with seme additional pragmatic
reasoning. Directly following Yalta, the Admiral had been the one to
tell FDR that the Crimea declaration was "so elastic that the Russians
can stretch it all the way from Yalta to Washington without technically 
30breaking it." He now repeated the concept, explaining how he had left
Yalta with the impression that the Kremlin had no intention of
permitting a free government to operate in Poland. "In his opinion
31Yalta was susceptible of two interpretations." In the same breath,
though, Leahy voiced the contradiction that the United States should
tell Russia it stood for a free, independent Poland.
Secretary Stettinius voiced his opinion that Stalin had broken the
Yalta agreement. Forrestal agreed with this. "He had felt for seme
tine...that the Soviets believed we would not object if they took over
32all of Eastern Europe. Better to have a showdown new than later."
After hearing all the opinions, Truman dismissed the conclave, 
keeping with him Stettinius, Harriman, Dunn and Bohlen to help work out 
an agenda for the meeting scheduled later that afternoon. When Molotov 
entered the roan, the President came right to the point. He told the 
Russian the United States had made all the concessions it intended to 
make regarding the Polish situation, that Stalin simply had not lived
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up to the Yalta agreement, and it was most doubtful if Congress would 
appropriate any money for post-war economic assistance unless the 
Polish problem was solved in accordance with the decision reached at 
the Crimea.
"I have never been talked to like that in my life," 
Molotov retaliated in protest.
"Carry out your agreements," ^ruman shot back, " and 
you won't get talked to like that."
Even Harriman reacted with dismay at the President's rough language.
"The years of labor by Roosevelt and Hull.. .were cancelled out on April
23, 1945," Fleming wrote regarding the tongue-lashing Molotov received
34at the hand of Truman.
If the meeting between Truman and his advisors proved anything, 
however, it was that Washington lacked any post-war policy for dealing 
with the Russians. The men present were uncertain of exactly what 
course to follow. They only knew their own personal 
feelings— regarding the present situation, the Russians themselves and 
what it had been like to deal with them in the past. Stimson 
criticized both Harriman and Deane for their attempts to convince 
Truman to pursue a "tougher policy" at that April meeting, citing past 
experiences as a reason for their attitude.
They (Harriman and Deane) have been suffering 
personally frcm the Russians' behavior on minor matters for 
a long time, and they have been urging firmness in dealing 
on these smaller matter & we have been backing them up, but 
now they were evidently influenced by their past bad 
treatment & they it^ed for strong words by the President on 
a strong position.
The "Riga Axiom" was triumphing.
Molotov left Washington angrily. The peace conference of the Big
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Three loaned ahead, its date unknown; and still an agreement regarding
Poland had not been reached. Truman decided to send Harry Hopkins to
Moscow to try to patch things up, to smooth over the rough spots he
himself had created. Gaddis contends this attempt by Truman symbolized
his earnestness to carry out Roosevelt's program, to work with the
36Russians in the best 'Rooseveltian' fashion. This was Truman's
intention, regardless of his tone, which Gaddis called "belligerent 
37rhetoric." He purposely sent Hopkins to Moscow, knowing the secretary
of oomterce represented a close link between Stalin and Roosevelt.
Hopkins managed to negotiate a ocmprcmise for the Polish conflict,
and Truman felt the results had at least accomplished a return to
normality in negotiations between the two powers. It was Stalin's
suggestion to allow four representatives from the London Poles-in-exile
to be on the current Polish Provisional Government. Hopkins urged
Truman to accept the oarprcmise, and he did— with reservations. "This
did not settle the Polish problem," Truman wrote. "All that was
accomplished was to break the deadlock between ourselves and the 
38Russians..." Hopkins managed to successfully negotiate the problem
because he assured Stalin, as had Roosevelt, that the United States
39wanted to have "friendly countries all along the Soviet borders." And
Truman, also like Roosevelt, felt compelled to gloss over this
40concession and hide it frcen the American public.
Gaddis maintains that the Polish camprcmise left the question of 
German war reparations the major issue facing Potsdam. This is 
partially accurate, but Poland was still very much a part of the German 
question. Poland currently occupied a portion of Germany, west of the
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Neisse and Oder rivers, an area rich in food production. Stalin wanted 
the western border of Poland to include this portion of Germany, 
believing it should be compensation for Polish sufferings. In reality, 
he wanted a larger, "friendly" Poland on Russia's western border. 
Churchill, understandably, voiced the most concern about this. Once 
American troops pulled out of Europe, it would be left to Britain and 
France to meet the needs of the German people. With a large area of 
their food source under Polish control, Germany would be difficult to 
feed. The rest of Western Europe as well would not have the benefit of 
this area's food source.
At first, Roosevelt had agreed with Stalin's desire to see Germany 
economically ruined after the war. The initial terms for unconditional 
surrender, proposed in the Morgantheu Plan, would have starved the 
Germans to death. More rational thinking prevailed as the war wore on, 
however, and Washington came to realize that social and political chaos 
would be the only result if the Germans were not fed and employed. 
More important, it would be impossible to establish a democratic, and 
therefore capitalistic government in such an economically weak 
atmosphere.
The question of war reparations frcm Germany opened up a real 
pandora's box. Even though Britain and America were not prepared to 
restorer Germany to a high degree of prosperity, the Big Three, prior to 
Potsdam, oould not came to terms on just how much Germany should pay 
for its crime. Truman had threatened Molotov, during that decisive 
April confrontation, with Congress' reluctance to appropriate funds to 
any nation that disregarded the American principles manifested in the
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Declaration on Liberated Europe or the Atlantic Charter. This left 
Stalin in a dilenma. If pro-Western governments on Russia's western 
borders proved to be the only way he could get post-war aid for his 
country, he would simply have to find other alternatives. No doubt the 
gravity of the economic situation facing the Big Three permeated the 
Potsdam conference; the fact that only America was in an adequate 
financial position to assure the survival of Russia and Europe put both 
Stalin and Churchill on edge.
The truth is, the creators of American policy feared a post-war 
depression. They also feared the survival of democratic capitalism in 
a war-torn Europe that politically tended to move toward the 
socialistic left. A depression in America almost assured the economic 
ruin of Europe, and American policy makers feared the triumph of 
socialism under such circumstances, waiter LeFeber, writing on the 
Cold War, contends that American foreign policy grows directly from 
domestic considerations, the most important of these being economic. 
Discussing the post-war policy makers, he wrote: "The ghosts of
Depression Past and Depression Future led officials to a second 
assumption.":
The post-1929 quagmire had been prolonged and partly 
caused by high tariff walls and regional trading blocs 
which had dammed up the natural flow^jf trade...Free flew 
of exports and imports was essential."
The new Secretary of State Janes Byrnes, wham Truman appointed to
replace Settinius in July 1945, agreed that "Our international policies
and our domestic policies are inseparable...a durable peace cannot be
built on an economic foundation of exclusive blocs...and economic 
42warfare." On 21 August 1945 Byrnes submitted a statement to the
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Senate Canmittee can Banking and Currency:
The United States is today a bastion of democracy and 
private enterprise. In many countries throughout the world 
our political and economic creed is in conflict with 
ideologies which reject both of these principles. To the 
extent that we are able to manage our domestic affairs 
successfully, we shall win converts to our creed in every 
land.'
A more accurate definition of the American tradition in foreign policy
oould not be found anywhere.
Most of the creators shared this 'Universa list' view. The ironic
exception was George Kennan, the man usually credited with formulating
the containment policy. Arthur Schlesinger Jr. maintains that post-war
policy boiled down to a debate between the uni versa lists and the sphere
44of influence supporters. Harriman, Byrnes, Acheson and Forrestal
were all universalists, upholding Open Door trade and the promulgation
of Westem-style democracy worldwide. Capitalistic democracy, they
believed, was the only insurance against the spread of socialism, a
system which threatened the kind of world conducive to America's free
enterprise system. Universalists feared spheres of influence and
European pcwer politics because such policies closed off markets and
induced tariffs an exports and raw materials. Furthermore, if the
American Congress felt a sphere of influence approach was being used to
solve the world's post-war problems, rather than the United Nations,
Washington's political atmosphere would once again embrace
isolationism, limiting America to intervene only in the Western 
45hemisphere. Without American intervention into European and Asian 
affairs, "closed trade areas and discriminatory systems would 
flourish," and the dream of the Open Door policy would go dcwn in a sea
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of socialism and European labor parties. Schlesinger pointed out that
this dream belonged to Cordell Hull as well, who managed to pull
Franklin Roosevelt back into its folds everytime he strayed from its 
46precepts. Letting Stalin have the war reparations frcm Germany that
he wanted threatened Europe's eoonany as well as its political systems,
the danger being that Stalin would succeed in establishing a sphere of
influence in Germany and other parts of Western Europe, thereby
assuring an economy based on socialism in those regions. Stalin's
determination to receive monetary compensation for his financially
war-ruined country, and the West's reluctance to give it to him, badly
strained the relationship of the Big Three.
Just hew much these economic fears influenced the origins of
containment is not so clear. Stalin wanted a sphere of influence in
both Eastern Europe and Manchuria; and although Roosevelt had given it 
47to him this was unknown to Truman and viewed with alarm by Harriman.
On 14 May 1945 Harriman wrote to Forrestal that Russian conduct "would
be based upon the principles of power politics in its crudest and most
primitive form. He said we must face our diplomatic decisions frcm
here on with the consciousness that half and maybe all of Europe might
48be communist by the end of next winter..." Harriman wrote of a
conversation he had with Stalin in April 1945, when the dictator told
him he expected communism to "flourish in the 'cesspools of
capitalism.'" Advocating a containment policy in 1945, Harriman wrote:
The CCmmtunist party and its advocates everywhere are 
using economic difficulties in areas under our 
responsibility to promote Soviet concepts and policies and 
to undermine the influence of the Western allies. The only 
hope of stopping Soviet penetration is the development of 
sound economic conditions.
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In the same month, Harriman recommended against giving the Soviet
Union preferential loan treatment over Western Europe. He also
criticized the Treasury Department's study on a $10 billion dollar
credit requested by Russia. According to Harriman, the study overlooked
"the determination of the Soviet Government not only to reestablish its
capital investment destroyed by the war, but to embark an an ambitious
50program of expanding her industrial machine." It is hard to conceive
of any industrial nation, however, not wanting to reestablish its
industrial capacity in the years following a major world war. Later,
51Byrnes would 'misplace1 a Russian request for a $6 billion loan.
At the Potsdam conference, one of Truman's most important goals
advocated establishing international control of the Black Sea Straits.
Such a requisition ensured Western control of a very politically and
economically strategic area. Although his proposal called for
"internationalwaterways," the paper specifically named only the Black
52Sea straits to be under the jurisdiction of the Big Three powers. 
Stalin would have none of it. He wanted to control the straits and 
negotiate a treaty with Turkey allowing him to do so, much like Britain 
had a treaty with Egypt for control of the Suez canal. Truman had a 
difficult time understanding Stalin's reluctance to allow the straits 
to be controlled by the United Nations Security Council. Calling his 
proposal a “war-preventative measure," Truman wrote:
The persistent way in which Stalin blocked one of 
the.. .measures I had proposed shewed hew his mind worked 
and what he was after. I had proposed the 
internationalization of all the principle waterways.
Stalin did not want this. What Stalin wanted was control 
of the Black Sea Strait$jgand the Danube. The Russians were 
planning world conquest.
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The chance that this strategic area would fall exclusively under
Soviet domination alarmed Washington. It was clear by the simmer of
1945 that Poland would be under communism's thumb; and the Rumanian
government as well had a Soviet-inspired premier in ocmnand, put there
by the Rumanian King at the Kemlin's insistence in March 1945.
Roosevelt, by the way, remained complacent over this development,
feeling Rumania to be an improper place to test the Declaration on 
54Liberated Europe.
Truman and Byrnes, however, did not share this view. Negotiations
had broken down during the final meeting of the Big Three at Potsdam
concerning the recognition of several Eastern European states by
Britain and the United States. The president asked for the
reorganization of the satellite governments along the "democratic"
55lines as had been agreed upon at Yalta. Stalin replied that the 
governments in those countries were more democratic than the one in 
Italy, which had been recognized. Churchill and Truman would not 
believe this. Certain words irked Stalin, words like "responsible" and 
"democratic"— "If a government is not fascist, a government is 
democratic," Stalin hotly told his cammrades.56 Truman told Stalin he 
had no way of knowing whether the governments were democratic or not. 
No one was allowed in, and the reports coming frcm within the countries 
were disheartening. "An iron fence had come down around them," 
Churchill blatantly told Stalin. "All fairy tales," Stalin retaliated. 
Nonetheless, Truman would not recognize the satellites until their 
governments had been reorganized according to the Yalta agreements. 
Churchill agreed and that was the way it stood. As a result, Russia
106
stood little chance of receiving any kind of economic assistance from 
the U.S.
Following Potsdam and Stalin' s refusal to allow democratic 
elections in his sphere or the internationalization of the Black Sea 
straits, Truman's fear of Soviet expansion intensified. On 13 October 
1945, Truman wrote to Byrnes:
My position on the Dardanelles has never changed. I 
think it is a waterway link with the Black Sea, the Rhine 
and the Danube...I am of the opinion if seme means isn't 
found to prevent it, Russia will undoubtedly take steps ̂ y  
direct action to obtain control of the Black Sea Straits.
Furthermore, the Soviets were beginning to show signs of their
ambitions in Iran. In 1941, both British and Soviet troops entered Iran
and divided it into a northern and southern sphere to keep the Germans
out. Plans for evacuation had been negotiated at Yalta, and it was
agreed all parties should pull out nine months after V-E Day. That was
not until March 1946. New, however, the U.S. ambassador in Iran warned
Vfeshington that Soviet troops were intervening in Iranian affairs,
attempting to incite Azerbaijanis, Kurds and Armenians to unite with
58their ethnic brethem along the Russian southern border.
Truman, like Roosevelt, had paid lip service to the concept of 
"friendly" governments along Russia's western border. At Yalta, then 
later at Potsdam, the American government would insist it only desired 
friendly governments; yet in the same breath it called for 
self-determined governments representative of all elements of the 
population. The two concepts were incompatible, something which 
Roosevelt and Hopkins oould not face at the time of their 
negotiations. At the end of 1945, however, Truman had to face it;
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Stalin had a sphere of influence which Washington oould not allow to 
grow any larger. He had acquired this sphere with American approval, 
all because of the word "friendly," which Roosevelt, Churchill and 
Truman had tacitly agreed to. The only way to publicly admonish the 
Soviets was to claim that they had broken the Yalta Declaration on 
Liberated Europe. In the minds of the creators, Russia was carving out 
a sphere of influence which Washington simply did not want it to have.
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Stalin: "...and the United States...would have to accept 
world-wide interests whether it liked it or not..."
The May 1945 meeting between Hopkins and Stalin showed the 
Generalissimo to be patient and conciliatory toward what he considered 
stubborn and infantile behavior. The refusal of Truman and the State 
Department to accept the Polish Provisional Government, a body 
"friendly" to the Soviet Union, could only be interpreted as hostile by 
the Russian dictator.
Harriman saw the harm in using such equivocal language. The 
following carment, made just after Yalta, shows this:
I believe at the time that Stalin meant to keep his 
word, at least within his cwn interpretation of 'free 
elections', although I had always expected we would have 
trouble over those words. He did not, in my judgqâ nt, sign 
the declaration with the intention of breaking it.
According to Harriman, Stalin was confident at the time of the 
Yalta conference that most of Eastern Europe would vote caxmunist, and 
free elections would prove "friendly" after all. George Kennan, 
present at the Moscow embassy along with Harriman, could not agree. 
Harriman recalls hew
Kennan argued that instead of trying to negotiate 
issues that were not negotiable, the rational course was to 
divide Europe frankly into two spheres of influence and 
accept no responsiblity for whatever the Russians did in 
their sphere, becauseghhe United States and Britain were 
too weak to affect it.
A more accurate assessment would be that the United States chose not to 
affect it, opting instead to let the Red Army liberate Eastern Europe 
rather than sacrifice its cwn armed forces to get there first.
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Harriman, rejecting the concept of spheres of influence, insisted on
the principles of the Charter and the Declaration even though he
admitted the wording of the documents to be "trouble."
Stalin admonished the creators of America's foreign policy during
Hopkins' Moscow visit, telling the statesman, in essence, that America
needed to grew up and accept the fact it could not have its cwn way in
all parts of the world. Other powers' interests needed to be
considered, Stalin told Hopkins, and the recognition of this fact is
all part of being a superpower.
He said that whether the United States wished it or 
not it was a world pcwer and would have to accept 
world-wide interests.. .In fact the United StateSgJhad more 
reason to be a world power that any other state...
The fact that Stalin recognized the power of his ally and the 
weakness of his cwn state is well-documented. Truman's memoirs recount
how
Stalin agreed with America's 'open door' policy and
went out of his way to indicate that the United States was
the only pcwer with the resources to aid China economically 
after the war. He observed that Russia would have all it 
could do to provide for the ^temal economy of the Soviet 
Union for many years to came.
In April 1945, Stalin admitted to Milovan Djilas, a Yugoslavian
ocrrrnunist, that it would be ten to fifteen years before the Russians 
63would recover. In the same breath Stalin added, "...and then we'll 
have another go at it." The remark, made at a dinner party after the 
consumption of several bottles of vodka, sounded like Stalin
anticipated another war; there is no telling frcm this statement if he 
intended to start it.
Whether or not the Soviet Union was on the offensive,
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contemplating, even wanting, world deamination, preoccupied the minds of
the State Department. Russia's perceived desire to forcefully subjugate
the world to totalitarianism and communism had become, by the end of
1945, integral to Washington's 'get tough' attitude toward the Kremlin.
Certainly, if Stalin was not on the offensive, the get tough policy the
creators advocated would not be quite as necessary. Evidence points to
the weakness of Washington's argument that Stalin wanted world
conquest, as well as to the Soviet ability to wage such action. The
very term "world conquest" is meaningless, anyway, unless defined in
more precise language. Certainly Stalin would have liked the widest
possible base to support the Soviet Union, to consolidate his cwn power
and help rebuild the economy to its pre-war level of production. The
dictator, however, had to be keenly aware of what he could practically
accomplish and what was simply beyond his grasp. Harriman himself told
the State Department in April 1945 how important it was not to
overestimate Soviet strength. "The country is still fantastically
backward.. .Mr. Harriman said he was therefore not much worried about
64the Soviet Union taking the offensive in the near future." 
Apparently, Harriman neglected to convey this observation to the 
President.
By the time Stalin and Hopkins met in May 1945, the Georgian felt 
convinced United States policy makers no longer shared the same 
attitude which had guided Roosevelt during the war. The Generalissimo 
told Hopkins hew the Kremlin felt:
It was their impression that the American attitude 
towards the Soviet Union had perceptibly cooled once it 
became obvious that Germany was defeated, and that it was 
as though the Americans were saying that the Russians were
Ill
no longer needed.65
Stalin cited examples confirming his impression, one being the Polish 
question. At Yalta, Stalin said, the decision had been made that the 
existing Provisional Government was to be reconstructed, and "anyone 
with cannon sense could see that this meant that the present government 
was to form the basis of the new."
He said no other understanding of the Yalta agreement 
was possible. Despite the fact that they were a simple 
people the Russians should not be regarded as fools, which 
was a mistake the West frequently made, nor were they blind 
and c^uld quite well see what was going on before their 
eyes.
Another example Stalin offered as proof concerned the manner in 
which Lend Lease aid had been abruptly cut off. Truman had mistakenly 
signed a paper terminating the final period of Lend Lease. Not only 
were all ships prevented frcm departing, but those ships already sent 
out were turned back, making Stalin furious. In spite of a reversal of 
the order and Truman's apology, Stalin called the manner in which the 
incident had occurred, "brutal."
The incident took place in early May one month after Truman had 
lashed out at Molotov, warning him that economic sanctions could not be 
appropriated unless the Yalta agreement, as he interpreted it, was 
adhered to. In lieu of this incident, it is not surprising Stalin 
regarded the abrupt termination of lend-lease as economic diplomacy of 
the basest kind.
If the refusal to continue Lend Lease was designed as 
pressure on the Russians in order to soften them up, then 
it was a fundamental mistake. He said...that if the 
Russians were approached frankly on a friendly basis much 
oould be done but that reprisal^ in any form would bring 
about the exact opposite effect.
112
The Soviet Union never was offered any reconstructive aid in the
post-war period. After the final protocol for Lend Lease ran out, the
Soviets were on their own. Philip Mosley, author of The Kremlin and
World Politics, believes the witholding of loans or grants to Russia at
the war's end greatly affected the ability of the coalition to remain
intact in the post-war years. Mosley wrote: "To make the cooperation
stick, much more should have been done to assure [Stalin] of assistance
in rebuilding the Soviet economy; as it turned out, Stalin and the
Soviet people soon felt that their vast sacrifices were forgotten by
68less war-damaged Allies as socn as the fighting was over." Stalin
thought so as well, as his conversation with Hopkins proved.
Historian Norman Graebner agrees with Mosley. The absence of
reconstructive aid, and the refusal to discuss it to any degree, simply
gave the Soviets too few alternatives. Faced with American
intransigence, the Kremlin's only recourse was to create a sphere of
influence in Eastern Europe, Manchuria or anywhere it oould find
insurance for the survival of its war-torn nation.^
Whether or not Stalin had a legitimate ccmplaint is difficult to
assess. Roosevelt had gone out of his way to give the Soviets maximum
lend-lease during the war with no quid pro quo attached, even to the
point of waiving the requirement of recording expenditures. Other
nations had to account for every penny, but FDR did not want to offend 
• 70Stalm. of course, Roosevelt too had refused to discuss a post-war 
loan with the Soviets, although he intimated there would be one. 
Furthermore, he left all negotiations for reparations to the final 
peace conference. At Yalta, he did settle on a figure of $20 billion
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to be the "base figure" upon which negotiations should proceed.71
Stalin took the figure literally, and became quite upset when Truman
and Churchill refused to set any definite figure for reparations to be
extracted frcm Germany. Mosley contends Roosevelt refused to negotiate
a post-war settlement because of the American public, which wanted very
72limited involvement in European affairs at the war’s end. Any sign
that American involvement in European affairs included post-war
economic and military aid threatened American entrance into the United
Nations. Roosevelt did not want another repeat of 1919, when Congress
had refused to join the League of Nations, so he proceeded with extreme
caution— even to the point of misleading the public of Stalin's true
ambitions and expectations for the post-war world.
Unfortunately the United Nations, the one institution upon which
Roosevelt had founded his policy, disappointed Stalin even before the
Potsdam conference had cormenoed. The United Nations Conference opened
in San Francisco in April 1945. The fact that Argentina, a Nazi
sympathizer during the war, had received an invitation to join, and
Poland was still being excluded frcm the organization, upset Stalin.
Stalin told Hopkins in May that this action raised the question of the
value of agreements between the three major pcwers if their decisions
oould be overturned by the votes of such countries as Honduras and 
73Puerto Rico.
Gaddis sympathized with the Soviet point of view regarding the
74admittance of Argentina. Even Harriman criticized the UN descision to 
seat the Argentines. The Yalta agreement stated that only those nations 
who had declared war on Germany by 1 March should be allowed entrance
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to the UN. Argentina clearly did not apply.
Gaddis cites several journal and newspaper articles written at the
time, all of the opinion that the United States was forming an
anti-Soviet bloc of South American countries. Thomas Reynolds of the
New Republic denounced an "anti-Soviet bloc" within the State
Department and "called for Truman to remove these officials frcm 
75office." The most influential member of the American delegation to
the UN was Senator Arthur Vandenberg, chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. Secretary of State Settinius and he backed each
other on most decisions made at the UN conference. Settinius voted to
76admit Argentina, and Vandenberg welcomed his support.
Vandenberg viewed the conference more as a contest between the two
superpowers than a workable peace organization. "The net of all this
battle," he wrote in his memoirs, "is that Molotov won only at those
points where he had a committment frcm the dead hands of F.D.R.
77Otherwise, he would have wan nothing. He lost every other battle."
On 26 April 1945, while the conference was in session, Vandenberg
recorded the following in his diary:
It was the concensus of Delegation opinion that we 
must "stand by our guns" at whatever point we are sure of 
votes enough to win....I continue to believe that this is 
the point at which we line up our votes...and win anq^end 
this appeasement of the Reds now before it is too late.
Harriman had a meeting with the delegates the day the conference
opened, "making everyone understand that the Soviets were not going to
79live up to their post-war agreements." Harriman's comment started a 
debate within the public sector which had been steadily building since 
Yalta. Were the Russians reneging on past promises, and were they going
115
to prove detrimental to the establishment of Roosevelt's Grand Design
for world peace— the United Nations?
Most people mistakenly assume the main tenet responsible for the
failure of the United Nations to produce a secure post-war world is the
power of the veto— and blame the Soviets for their insistence on this.
Yet America insisted on it as well, and in fact would have it no other
way. Hull's memoirs recall hew "we were no less resolute than the
80Russians in adhering to this principle."
The real inadequacy of the United Nations proved to be the lack of
confidence both Washington and the Kremlin had in its ability to solve
world problems to their liking. World War II involved more than
twenty-five nations, all demanding their right to sovereignty and
participation in world-wide decisions. "Snail nations had been
responsible for seme of the world's troubles," Stalin told Hopkins that
spring in Moscow. "He expressed emphatically his unwillingness to allow
81the Soviet Union's interests to be affected by such countries." 
America's insistence on admitting Argentina confirmed Stalin's 
reasoning. Henry Stimson called the conference situation "'unreal', 
with the delegates 'babbling on as if there were no...great issues 
pending.'"
The San Francisco Conference as well as Potsdam convinced Stalin 
he would not have the kind of cooperation he envisaged having with FDR. 
Whether or not Roosevelt led Stalin to believe he could do whatever 
proved necessary to maintain friendly states on his western border was, 
by the end of 1945, a moot point. Washington insisted on 
self-determination in Eastern Europe; Stalin insisted America leave his
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sphere of influence alone.
He had, after all, stayed out of Greece when British troops
marched in to repress the resistance forces attempting to overthrew the
monarchist party on 12 February 1945. As part of a bargain he had made
with Churchill in June 1944, Stalin agreed to let England retain its
sphere of influence in Greece, Yugoslavia and Hungary in exchange for a
Russian sphere in Rumania and Bulgaria. The official agreement called
for a ninety per cent Russian predominance in Rumania, a ninety per
cent British predominance in Greece, and a fifty-fifty split in
Yugoslavia. The Russians were to have a 75-25 predominance in Bulgaria.
Officially, Roosevelt acquiesced in this arrangement as long as it
could be cancelled after the war, therefore dealing only with armistice
and liberation procedures. However, FDR unofficially accepted Russian
82dominance in Eastern Europe as fact by October 1944.
Issac Deutscher agrees with Feis' assesment in his article, "Myths
of the Cold War." Churchill and FDR had to yield Eastern Europe to
83Stalin in what Deutscher calls a "grotesque gentleman's agreement." 
The necessity of the war-time alliance dictated that Stalin be given 
his sphere of influence. "After the war, they had second thoughts; 
after the war, they wanted it back. That was the idea of containment," 
Deutscher wrote. What Deutscher left out of his analysis, however, was
Truman's unawareness of Roosevelt's ambiguous agreement to a Russian
84sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. Harriman as
well never became aware of Roosevelt's true attitude regarding the
85Churchill-Stalin agreement of October 1944. The Ambassador only 
objected to Roosevelt's complacency regarding Eastern Europe, a
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situation he futilely tried to change.
Harriman's memoirs reflect an ignorance that would eventually 
infect all of Washington following FDR's death:
I don't understand now, and I do not believe I 
understood at the tine, just what Churchill was
accomplishing by these percentages. I know that he wanted
a free hand in Greece, with the support of the United
States...Churchill certainly knew that President Roosevelt 
insisted on keeping a free hand and wanted any decisions 
deferred until the three could meet together. The
interesting thing is that when they did ggset at Yalta, the 
question of percentages was never raised.
By Yalta, however, the issue had already been settled, at least in 
Stalin's mind, and Roosevelt was not about to jeopardize the San 
Francisco Conference with a public debate regarding Russia's sphere of 
influence. He had been prepared to let it go since 1943, and by 1945 
it was gone: the Red Army occupied most of Eastern Europe, which it had 
liberated. Truman and the creators had to deal with this occupation, 
whereas Roosevelt did not.
According to Deutscher and Horowitz, Stalin upheld his end of the
1944 bargain. He yielded Western Europe to the capitalists, saving it
from communism, sitting still while British troops moved into Greece in
July 1945, crushing the leftist rebel forces of the National Liberation
Front (EAM). Furthermore, Stalin supported the Chinese Nationalists,
led by Chaing Kai-shek and in Yugoslavia he did all he could to
87prevent Tito's communist revolution.
Stalin did not pursue the above policies out of respect for his 
allies. Such a notion carried meaning only if it suited Soviet 
national interests. In this case it did, or at least the dictator 
believed it would. Stalin wanted the establishment of friendly buffer
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states on his western border, as well as an influence in the strategic
areas which had always been instrumental to Russian security and
power. Roosevelt had done his best to accommodate Russia's security
88requirements to "lay a basis for long- term cooperation."
Unfortunately, he did not live long enough to carry through his
conciliatory policy.
Stalin, who had already gone to great lengths throughout the
1930's to consolidate his power, was not about to yield what he had
gained through a long and costly war. Strictly a sphere of influence
person, he understood nothing about Westem-style democracy, believing
it to be a farce. Because he only understood power, the creators of
American foreign policy mistakenly believed they could deal with Stalin
if they exhibited a power which matched his own. But Stalin reacted
furiously to Truman's tongue lashing of Molotov, the first real action
of the new administration's change in attitude. Stalin redressed
Truman by reminding him that the Russians had accepted Britain's right
to establish ideologically compatible governments in Belgium and
Greece, because these countries were vital to British security. Why
89were the Americans giving the Soviets such a hard time in Poland? 
Stalin also resented Washington's objections to the Groza regime in
Rumania— he and Churchill had agreed to Soviet hegemony there as well. 
"Truman had unintentionally reversed FDR's policy of conceding a sphere 
of influence in Poland, and refused to accept special Soviet
prerogatives based on geography and proximity," historian Larson 
90wrote. Stalin, no doubt, would have agreed with her.
By the end of 1945, both Washington and the Kremlin were convinced
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negoitations between them would fail to yield what the other one 
wanted. In early February 1946, Stalin delivered his famous speech to 
an election oaimittee in Mosccw. He blamed capitalism for World War II, 
much as Lenin had blamed the Western world for World War I. He called 
for strenuous five-year plans to step up production, intimating that 
such plans were necessary to ward off future capitalistic forces, just 
as the five-year plans of the 1930's had saved the Mother Country frcm 
Hitler. He extolled the virtues of carmtunism and the Soviet system, 
maintaining that the Red Army's strength during World War II had proved 
their worth.
91Washington dubbed the speech a declaration of war. It came at a
time when Washington had publicly voiced concern over Stalin's recent
moves in Iran. Gaddis maintains the discovery of a spy-ring in Canada
92just before the speech also influenced its impact. On 28 February, in
response to Stalin's speech and the other disturbing incidents, Byrnes
called for an about-face in American policy, declaring that the U.S.
should end the appeasement of Russia once-and-for-all. He also called
upon America to take its rightful place as the preserver of the world's
status quo against force and tyranny— Soviet force and tyranny to be
sure. "If we are to be a great power we must act as a great power, not
only in order to ensure our own security but in order to preserve the
93peace of the world." Senator Vandenberg, just the day before, had 
delivered a speech before the Senate strongly attacking America's 
current foreign policy and calling for the end of appeasement.
The change in American policy, however, had already taken place. 
In Stalin's mind, it took place the day Molotov received Truman's
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scolding. And although Washington may have been unaware of it, their 
change in policy began ten months before when Harriman began
influencing Truman to adopt a quid pro quo approach to Soviet ambitions 
in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. He had tried in vain to convince
Roosevelt to adopt the same approach. Byrnes' speech on 28 February
officially voiced Washington's decision to recognize the quest for 
expansion, coupled with tyranny, in Soviet policy. Stalin's speech of 
9 February voiced his official recognition of the change in
Washington's policy, and his own avowal to combat it.
It was at precisely this time that George Kennan, holed up in the 
Moscow embassy, fuming over America's policy toward the Soviet Union, 
received a request frcm the State Department asking for a detailed 
explanation of why the Soviets behave as they do. Kennan recalled the 
request in his memoirs, emphasizing the importance of timing in his 
answer, simply called "The Long Telegram."
It was one of those moments when official Washington, 
whose states of receptivity or the opposite are determined 
by subjective emotional currents as intricately imbedded in 
the subconcious as those of the most complicated of Sigmund 
Freud's erstwhile patients, was ready to recieve a given 
message.
Kennan later questioned the capability of a State Department prone to
such emotionalism. "Increasingly, with the years, my answer would tend
95to be in the negative."
121
Kennan: "Never— neither then [1933] nor at a later
date— did I consider the Soviet Union a fit ally for this country."
The author of Washington's containment policy/ George Kennan, 
favored a "particularlist" approach to settling conflicts in 
international affairs, not a "universalist" approach. The 
particularlist approach considers that "the thirst for power is still
dominant among so many peoples that it cannot be assauged or controlled
96by anything but counter-force." Kennan sensed a deep foreboding about
Roosevelt's policy to entice Russia into the United Nations by offering
it concessions. "An international organization for preservation of the
peace and security," Kennan recorded in his memoirs, "cannot take the
place of a well-conceived and realistic foreign policy."
The more we ignore politics in our absorption with the 
erection of a legalistic system for the preservation of the 
status quo, the sooner and the more violently that system 
will be broken to pieces under the realities of 
international life.
Particularism did not reject the idea of working with other nations to 
preserve the peace, but it did recognize "a real ccnmunity of interest 
and outlook, which is to be found only among limited groups of 
governments and not upon the abstract formalism of universal 
international law..." ̂
It might be safe to say that Kennan belonged more to a past age 
than to the one in which he lived, to the time when a handful of 
European diplomats determined whether or not to wage war and what would 
be the fate of peace. Kennan had a great deal of respect for men like 
Prince von Mettemich, Viscount Castlereagh and Otto von Bismark, the
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accomplished plenipotentiaries of Europe's great nineteenth-century 
empires. Following the defeat of Napoleon in 1815, these men managed 
to keep Europe out of a world war for over 80 years. Kennan admired 
these leaders because of their recognition of one of the world' s 
foremost realities— the quest for national self interests among great 
nations— and their determination to deal pragmatically with that 
reality.
The diplomats of the 1800's avoided war by keeping a balance of 
power among their nations; war waged by any one against the others 
would prove to be self-defeating. Kennan believed the "balance of 
power was and would continue to be the only glue binding any 
international structure." 9%he ambitions of sovereign states could not 
be contained by any international peace organization, Kennan argued.
Stalin, after all, laid no value on peace per se. He 
was interested in a world where the interests of his own 
personal power would prosper. If "peace" would cause them 
to prosper better than "war," he would be for peace...if 
the day were to ocme when violence.. .would serve his 
purposes better than Deace, no international organization 
would restrain him...' ̂
For this reason, Kennan disliked Roosevelt's second-front
diplomacy and made no secret of the fact. Kennan returned to Moscow in 
1944, after a seven-year absence, to find Washington engaged in what he 
considered a deplorable policy— trying to convince Stalin to
participate in America's peace-making endeavor.
I found this persuasion to be unwise and regretable 
because it helped to feed the impression.. .that it was we 
who were anxious for their collaboration and friendship, we 
who wanted something from them, we who, for seme reason, 
could not face the problems of the postwar era without
dangling before our public opinion at least the facade of
Big Three collaboration.
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Frustrated, Kennan found himself working on the problem of which 
nonKkxrmunist Poles to invite to the dicussions to formulate a
coalition government, never doubting all the while that it was a "lost
102cause." Kennan's own feelings on the subject were ignored by the State 
Department. Upon his return to Russia, he made the Garment "that none
of these reflections had merit, at that tine, in the eyes of my
1 03superiors in Washington."
The above observation is true of Kennan's entire career prior to
1946, when Washington finally read The Long Telegram. A pensive and
sensitive man, Kennan remained obscure in the State Department
throughout the 1920's and 30's. Kennan pointed out in his memoirs that
the Foreign Service had been established in 1924, just two years before
he entered. He decided to enter into the Foreign Service, as he tells
104it, because "I did not know what else to do." He left Princeton 
University in 1924 as "obscurely as I had entered it" and considered
himself, at that time, "an ordinary youth, assailed by very ordinary
10*1weaknesses and passions." He thoroughly enjoyed the study of 
international relations in college, however, and had flourished at it. 
Even so, he did not want to pursue the field academically, believing it
would throw him into an "occupational rut." He chose the Foreign
106Service instead, a career decision he never regretted.
His decision to serve in Russia, however, was a bit more pragmatic 
and a little romantic, both characteristics of this statesman and 
historian. He knew America presently had no relations with the 
Russians, but that they would be forthcoming. Furthermore, he 
remembered with fondness his grandfather's cousin and his namesake,
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George Kennan, who devoted his life to the study of Russia, especially 
the penal system which sent so many of Russia's revolutionaries into 
exile. Calling it "a family tradition," Kennan embraced the study of 
Russia, its language, its people, and its foreign policy tradition.
Kennan felt a certain affinity for the Russians and their late 
entrance into the Industrial Revolution. Raised in a pioneering farm 
family frcm the South, Kennan admits that the eighteenth century lasted 
fifty years longer for him— just as it did in Russia. His father found
the new twentieth century that was dawning a bit "disturbing.. .and
incomprehensible."
It is, I suppose, to this shallowness of grounding in 
the nineteenth century, and this inherited partiality for 
the eighteenth, that I must attribute the discomfort I 
experience in my cwn status as a contemporary of the 
twentieth.
Kennan also felt uncomfortable with the Russian Revolution, which 
so clearly pitted socialism against capitalism. He confessed that his 
own agrarian background provided him with little exposure to the 
reality of capitalism's expolited and expoliter. He admitted there 
must be seme truth to Marx's theory, that the class struggle had to be 
a "real phenomenon," but he "retained the privilege of viewing it as 
the product of a tragic 'misunderstanding' (to use Chekov's charitable
term) in the early development of industrial society, not as a dramatic
109encounter between demons and angels."
One gets the feeling that Kennan belongs, in part, to the Lost 
Generation, the Fitzgeralds and Jungs and Hemingways who had such a 
difficult time dealing with the global effects of World War I. In the 
introduction of The Decline of Bismarck's European Order, Kennan wrote:
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I was a young and rather lonely young man, living in 
Germany and the Baltic states, consuming...seme of the 
great German and other war literature of the Weimar period: 
Remarque, Hemingway, Bulgakov, and others. The initial 
effect of this confrontation through the printed page with 
a reality— namely the holocaust of 1914-1918— which lay 
scarcely in a decade past was to force me to ponder the 
immense and, .^pparent injustice the recent war had 
represented.
Kennan went to Russia in 1931, to Riga. In 1934, after Roosevelt 
and Litvinov had made the agreements for formal recognition of the 
Soviet Union, Kennan went to Moscow as part of the official American 
embassy. There, he would be a witness to the Kirov assassination and 
Stalin's purges, becoming part of the disillusioned delegation 
stationed in the Soviet capital at that time.
Regardless of the purges, however, Kennan had not been pleased 
with the Roosevelt-Litvinov agreements, accusing FDR of using weak 
language during the negotiations and in the subsequent treaty, 
"verbiage that had failed to be effective in protecting the interests 
of other countries dealing with the Soviet Union." This would be the 
beginning of Kennan's displeasure with the way Washington dealt with 
the Kremlin.
This episode has remained in my mind as the first of 
many lessons I was destined to receive...on one of the most 
consistent and incurable traits of American 
statesmanship— namely, its neurotic self-consciousness and 
introversion, the tendency to make statements and take 
actions with regard not to their effect on the 
international scene...but rather to their effect an those 
echelons of American opinion, congressional opinion first 
and foremost...'1‘
In addition to FDR, Kennan accused John Hay of doing this in the Open 
Door Notes, as well as Harry Truman "when he gave the Truman 
Doctrine."1^
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Kennan remained in Moscow until 1938, then he went to various
places in Europe until 1944, when he was called back to Moscow in
Averell Harriman's absence. He had been in Moscow only a short time
when the Treasury Department wrote to the embassy, requesting an
explanation of why the Soviets behave as they do. According to Kennan,
what prompted the request was Stalin's refusal to join the World Bank
and Monetary Fund. The query excited Kennan, who had longed for a
chance to tell what he knew, what all his years of study and experience
had taught him about the Russians. "They had asked for it," Kennan
113wrote. "New, by God, they would have it."
Kennan's main thesis of The Long Telegram, written 22 February 
1946, would be repeated one year later in the controversial "Sources of 
Soviet Conduct." It discussed the intricacies of Russian diplomatic 
behavior. Kennan believed the behavior to be influenced by the 
internal workings of the Soviet totalitarian system. Because the 
regime had to maintain absolute power, it was imperative to invent a 
hostile world environment from which the people had to be protected. 
This would allow the maximum amount of control. Not only would the 
population be willing to succumb to tyrannical police methods "for 
their own protection" frcm outside malevolent forces, but the Soviet 
Union could erect an "Iron Fence" to keep the people walled off from 
outside influences attempting to cause dislocation. Propaganda 
denouncing the capitalistic world as imperialistic and war-bound helped 
to maintain the illusion of the necessity of the Iron Fence. For these 
reasons, Kennan theorized, negotiations with the Kremlin would always 
prove futile. The Politburo had to maintain an adversarial position
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vis-a-vis the Western world and especially the United States, or its 
main reason for assuming absolute power over its people would 
disintegrate.
Kennan looked to Russia's history for an explanation of its 
inability to deal with the Western world, and the Russian Revolution 
itself, whose outcome Kennan had such trouble accepting.
It was no coincidence that Marxism, which had 
smoldered ineffectively for half a century in Western 
Europe, caught hold and blazed for the first time in 
Russia. Only in this land which had never kncwn a friendly 
neighbor or indeed any tolerant equlibrium of separate 
powers, could a doctrine thrive which viewed eoancmic 
conflicts of society as insoluble by peaceful means. 114
The State Department found Kennan's telegraphic message
fascinating. Forrestal distributed copies to hundreds of naval and
115army officers, making it "required reading." Acheson was given a 
copy, and of course Byrnes read it. Clark Clifford prepared his 
September 1946 report on United States-Soviet relations based upon its 
contents, a report which the President read. Schlesinger wrote that 
"much of American policy during those years can best be understood 
within the policy assumptions outlined in the paper " ° Clifford
directly quoted Kennan's telegram in several places of his report.
In the telegram, Kennan's attitude toward Russia was 
debilitating. He waited a long time for the opportunity to write the 
dispatch for the State Department. Now, the statesman felt a surge of 
relief at his chance to reveal the motives behind Soviet policy; and to 
put to rest once and for all the notion that the Kremlin would respond 
reasonably to negotiations. Although Kennan was well aware of national 
interests and the part they played in determining policy, he seemed to
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forget that America had ambitions, too. Perhaps everyone in Washington 
did, conveniently.
Kennan warned that Russia would try to influence Turkey and Iran, 
and that it desired access to the Persian Gulf. The telegram's most 
important contribution, however, that the Soviet Onion would be willing 
to consort with the ocmmunity of nations if it was offered "large-scale 
long term credits" seems to have been overlooked by Washington, 
especially Byrnes. If Russia is not offered aid, Kennan wrote, "it is 
possible that Soviet foreign trade would be restricted largely to 
Soviet's own security sphere...and a cold shoulder turned to the 
principle of general economic collaboration among nations." ^ T h i s  
fact, that collaboration was even possible, is contradicted by Kennan 
toward the end of the telegram:
In summary, we have here a political force committed 
fanatically to the belief that with US there can be no 
permanent modus vivendi, that it is desirable and necessary 
that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our 
traditional way of life be destroyed, the international 
authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be 
secure. 118
The purpose of this paper is not to determine the accuracy of 
Kennan's analysis. Certainly there is a great deal of truth in the 
overall assessment— any totalitarian regime must have ways of 
maintaining control over its people. Whether or not Kennan figured out 
Stalin's main method of control is hardly the point. Washington's 
inability to negotiate a lasting peace settlement with Stalin could now 
be justified with Kennan*s analysis— the Soviets were simply impossible 
to deal with, and always would be. No external offering, regardless of 
its efficacy, would move the Russians.
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Washington could not admit to such allegations in the late months 
of 1945 and the beginning of 1946; public opinion still placed faith in 
the Russians, America's ally. The time would cone when Kennan's 
analysis would be converted into policy, but for new Truman continued 
to negotiate with Stalin, hoping all the while he would not have to 
abandon FDR's Grand Design. James Byrnes continued to press for a peace 
settlement in the Eastern European satellites, but the September Peace 
Conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers, held in London, proved 
to be a fiasco. The American Secretary of State met privately with 
Molotov, before the British foreign minister arrived, hoping that such 
preferential treatment would convince the Kremlin that the United 
States was not forming an Anglo-American bloc against the coimunist 
state.
Regardless of the efforts to negotiate, hcwever, relations between 
the two remained cool. Byrnes insisted the Rumanian and Bulgarian
governments be reorganized according to the Polish precedent, allowing 
elements from other political factions to participate in a coalition 
government. Molotov insisted that Poland was different, that Bulgaria 
and Rumania were just as democratic as Italy, whom the United States 
and Britain had recognized with no hesitation. Molotov refused to
allow any factions with Western interests into the Bulgarian and 
Rumanian governments, wishing these areas to remain explicitly under 
Soviet influence:
If the United States had been invaded by Mexico and
the Mexicans had occupied a part of the United States as
the Soviets had suffered at the hands of Rumania, the
American government would not tolerate a hostile government in Mexico. 11y
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The failure to arrive at a peace settlement in September prompted 
Byrnes to try one more tine, in December. He called for the Peace 
Conference to be held in Moscow, hoping the Soviets would prove more 
yielding in their hcire court. Byrnes managed to negotiate a settlement 
allowing for U.S. and British recognition of Bulgaria and Rumania, but 
the terms were so disagreeable to Truman that they led to the 
secretary's demise. This time Bymes did business directly with Stalin 
instead of Molotov, whan he considered stubborn and dishonest. Stalin 
agreed almost immediately to allow a few other political factions to
enter the Rumanian government. Furthermore, he would "advise" the
1 P C IBulgarian government to broaden its political base. ' u
Truman angrily criticized the December conference for several 
reasons, the least of them being Soviet dominance in Rumania and 
Bulgaria. He was furious with Bymes, mainly for political reasons. 
The Secretary of State had been, of late, failing to issue satisfactory 
briefings back to the President. Truman learned about the Stalin/Byrnes 
negotiations from the press; and even after Bymes issued his report to 
Washington, there had been just as many details in the newspaper 
account. Truman disliked his Secretary of State's nonchalant attitude, 
the failure to keep him well-abreast of all proceedings. He began 
thinking about a new secretary, his first choice being General 
Marshall.
The main reason for Truman's disagreement with the December 
settlement went deeper than an insubordinate employee and Soviet 
hegemony in Rumania and Bulgaria. This is obvious from the angry letter 
the President wrote to Bymes immediately following the incident.
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Truman saw the threat of a chain reaction, not unlike the 'dcmino 
theory', in current Soviet policy if allowed to continue. In the 
letter, Truman voiced the most concern over the current situation in 
Iran. Truman canpared the Kremlin's program in Iran to its takeover in 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. New, it was clear if the Soviet Union
was not stopped it would invade Turkey and take over the Black Sea
121straits to the Mediterranean.
Truman thought Rumania and Bulgaria should be the stopping point 
for Soviet expansion, a symbol to the Russians that America would not
tolerate any more "incidents" that resembled expansion. "I do not
122think we should play compromise any longer," Truman wrote to Bymes.
We should refuse to recognize Rumania and Bulgaria
until they comply with our requirements; we should let our 
position in Iran be known in no uncertain terms and we 
should continue to insist on the internationalization of 
the Kiel Canal, the Rhine-Danube waterway and the Black Sea 
Straits and we should maintain complete control of Japan 
and the Pacific.
Truman was not finished yet, however. "We should rehabilitate China 
and create a strong central government there. We should do the same 
for Korea....I'm tired of babying the Soviets." The letter was written 
5 January 1946.
Obviously Truman felt Turkey and Iran to be of more strategic 
importance to the United States than Eastern Europe. Like Roosevelt 
before him, President Truman never considered going to war over the 
fate of Poland or any other state which held so little strategic 
interest to the United States. The Balkans, hcwever, particularly 
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, provided a close channel into the 
Mediterranean and the oil-rich countries of the Middle East. ^^Truman
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refused to recognize these states unless their governments were formed 
according to the principle of self-determination. Even so, Truman
brushed aside the problems of self-determination and recognition,
124referring them to the Council of Ministers, to meet at a later date.
A more urgent concern at Potsdam was internationalizing the Black Sea
Straits; nonrecognition of the Balkans was simply a method of staying
Soviet hegemony in the region.
Iran, too, caused concern. Strategically it held oil and a
gateway to the Persian Gulf, the means to transport the oil. President
Roosevelt began thinking of this critical area and its importance to
the waging of modem industrial war early in the war. He placed
General Patrick Hurley in Iran and other Mid-Eastern countries in 1943
as his "personal representative," to study the region for possible
economic and political infiltration of the American way.
Hurley issued his Iranian "report" to Roosevelt on 23 December
1943. It outlined the economic and political shape of the country,
making recommendations on hew best to influence the nation to became a
Western, liberal democratic state. "The policy of the United States
toward Iran, therefore, is to assist in the creation in Iran of a
government based upon the consent of the governed and of a system of
free enterprise..." the report began.
By this program... of self-help Iran can achieve for 
herself the fulfillment of the principles of justice, 
freedom of conscience, freedom of the press, freedom of 
speech, freedom frcm want, equality of opportunity, and to 
a degree freedom frcm fear.
And, one could also add, freedom to trade oil with the United States. 
Hurley recommended that the American government assist the Iranians
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"concerning the character and other qualifications of every applicant
125for a[n oil] concession."
1 7RRoosevelt found the letter "very interesting." "I was rather 
thrilled," he wrote to Secretary of State Stettinius, "with the idea of 
of using Iran as an example of what we could do by an unselfish 
-American policy. We could not take on a more difficult nation than 
Iran. I would like, however, to have a try at it." Hurley defined the
program outlined in his report as a simple plan "to promote the
1 27building of free nations." The report also discussed the imperialism
of Great Britain and the socialism of the Soviet Union, both obstacles
which must be overcome if the plan to turn Iran into a "free nation"
was to work. Hurley had faith in the ability of FDR's "world
1diplomacy" to take care of these little problems.
As the Soviet Union began to encroach upon Turkey and Iran, 
throughout 1945 and into 1946, Truman's foreign policy was bound to 
change; those areas dictated it, whereas Eastern Europe did not. His 
anger that Russian troops were still moving into Iran in late 1945, as 
the deadline for Soviet troop withdrawl drew closer, was manifested in
the letter he sent to Bymes. At the same time, Stalin was pushing
Turkey to negotiate bilateral control of the Dardanelles, ignoring 
completely Truman's proposal for the "internationalization" of those 
waterways.
As Stalin correctly reasoned, internationalization meant that 
Russia would lose sovereign control over the straits, a goal of every 
Russian Tsar since Peter the Great. The Soviet dictator did not want to 
share control, and Truman was not about to hand the straits over to
134
him; their geopolitical position made them too important. Making that 
part of the world a United States sphere seemed the only recourse, and 
the creators of America's foreign policy had started thinking in these 
terms by early 1946. A report frcm the U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, 
Edwin Wilson, to Bymes, dated 11 March, stated that "Soviet troop 
movement in Iran toward the Turkish frontier would indicate that USSR 
may shortly be in position to strike at Turkey if and when this should 
appear advisable frcm viewpoint Soviet interests." The report cited 
Soviet objectives as the installation of a friendly government in 
Turkey so it could secure control of the straits and "putting an end to 
Western influence in Turkey." ^^En early 1946, Byrnes' memoirs also 
anticipated Soviet domination of Greece and Turkey:
Greece is apparently their first objective. They are 
likely to seek next the usual infiltration methods, control 
of the Italian government. This would be because of the 
military effect it would have on Greece and Trukey. I do
1 is to dominate, in one
The Soviet Union, though, eventually backed down in both Turkey
Department report on the status of northwestern Iran, issued 23 January
1946, had this to say:
Although oil has not been mentioned during the current 
dispute, seme observers believe the Iranian government1s 
refusal to grant broad concessions in northern Iran to the 
USSR in 1944 is the cause of the present difficulty.^ 32
By 6 April an agreement had been reached between the Iranian government
and the Soviets, the main tenet being "An agreement for joint
133Irano-Soviet Oil Ccmpany" to be submitted within seven months.
and Iran. Troop build-up in Iran continued until March 1946
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Russia was not the only country wanting Iranian oil. In addition 
to Roosevelt's experiment to make Iran a "free nation," American 
businessmen were in carmunication with the State Department for control 
of Iranian oil fields. A dispatch dated 4 August 1944, sent fran the 
Charge in Iran to the Secretary of State, urged "upon the Department 
utmost necessity of prevailing upon ccmpanies to get their men to 
Tehran without delay...that American companies send representatives 
fran highest executive level to canplete presentation of bids, if an 
American firm is to get concession... .to gain this rich prize for 
American interests will require quick action..." ^ ^
The Russian delegation, also on its way to bargain for the oil,
135did not arrive in Teheran until 21 September. It apparently lost out,
as the bid was accepted 1 September. The proposed Irano-Soviet Oil
Company, negotiated two years later, did not succeed either.
The Shah of Iran did not want the Soviet Union involved in Iranian
oil concessions, or in any other facet of his nation. On 5 March 1946,
the Iranian government officially asked the United States to assist it
1in obtaining the "unconditional evacuation of Iran by Soviet forces."
Turkey as well wanted the Soviet Union to quit its harrassment for a
1 37bilateral treaty to control the straits. On 7 June 1945 the Soviet
Union officially announced to Turkey that it wanted a base on the 
straits. Turkey realized it would need help frcm more than just the 
British, who were overextended in the area and "tiring fast... .The 
Turkish objective, therefore, became one of securing peacetime U.S.
military and diplomatic support for Turkish territorial integrity and
138the maintenance of the status quo in the straits."
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The United States complied with that policy. On 28 February 1946, 
Forrestal asked Bymes what he thought of a "task force" in the 
Mediterranean as a sign of support for the region. Bymes liked the 
idea. He sent the USS Missouri to Turkey as a "shew of flag." More 
ships were sent in the course of the year, and Forrestal announced that 
the American government would maintain a permanent naval presence in 
the Mediterranean. ̂ % y  the end of 1946, Soviet pressure on Turkey had 
abated. With the Soviets retreating in both Iran and Turkey, it would 
seem reasonable to expect Washington to soften its attitude toward 
Moscow. The Greek civil war, however, going on at the same time, 
revealed a new dimension to the contest for hegemony in that region of 
the world.
World War II brought real trouble to Greece, unleashing the forces 
which sent the old order crumbling and gave rise to a broadly-based 
leftist resistance movement. ̂ ̂ Starvation and unemployment were rampant 
in the country by 1944, and the left-wing liberals would no longer 
trust their fate to a monarchy. Great Britain had always kept the 
status quo in the Mediterrenean intact, shouldering the responsibility 
for Greece's defense and liberation during the war. England harbored 
the Greek king, George II, during the war, well aware of the opposition 
growing against him within his own country.
Britain's job became more difficult with the formation of the 
National Liberation Front in September 1941, known as EAM. Although 
organized by the Greek Communist Party, the EAM was
predominantly a non-Camrnmist organization, with a 
membership by 1944 of perhaps 1 1/2 million people (out of 
Greece's 7 1/2 million) and armed forces (ELAS) of about 
50,000 guerilla fighters. Thousands of republican
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officers, large numbers of women and peasants, virtually 
the entire labour movement, and a surprising array of 
clergymen and intellectuals took up the resistance cause.
After the liberation of Greece in 1944, Churchill favored 
restoration of the Greek king, George II, to the throne. The starving 
and war-torn population, under the guidance of EAM leaders, fought 
against this. Churchill installed a coalition government under George 
Papandreou. Although it contained seven communist ministers, it 
primarily consisted of political factions to the right and center. The 
people rebelled in December 1944, with EAM forces controlling the 
countryside. Greece's communist neighbors, Bulgaria, Albania and 
Yugoslavia, offered support. Moscow stayed away from the conflict, as
Stalin premised Churchill it would. Churchill himself praised Stalin
142for upholding his end of the June 1944 sphere of influence agreement.
There is doubt as to hew much influence the Soviets ever had over the
143EAM, even in 1947, at the time of America's intervention.
The bloody civil war in Greece would continue until 1949. The 
dilemma for American policy makers was whcm to support— the right-wing 
conservative politicians, clearly not the people's choice, or the 
left-wing resistance movement. It was impossible to support the EAM, 
which would threw the strategic Mediterranean into the hands of the 
communistic Balkans, too close to Moscow's influence. On the other 
hand, the ideals of the National Charter promulgated self-determination
and free elections. Roosevelt had favored an election as soon as 
144possible , but the election continued to be postponed at Churchill's
insistence. After FDR's death, reports frcm Lincoln MacVeagh, the 
American ambassador in Greece, to Secretary Stettinius confirmed the
138
need for an election but feared the result would be a government too
145far to the left.
American officials tried to push for a moderate government. 
Britain had maintained troops in Greece since its 1944 invasion, hoping 
to quiet the region enough to hold negotiations between the EAM and the 
British inposed government. Negotiations brought about several 
agreements, but neither side could suppress its hostility and anger. 
Reports coming from the EAM spoke of the coalition government 
repressing the resistance movement's freedom of speech and supporting
terrorist raids thorughout the countryside, trying to flush out
146well-known EAM leaders. In March 1946 elections were held, with the
monarchist right winning. Only 49% of the population registered to
147vote, however, and the left boycotted the elections. Seven months
later King George' s restoration to the throne sent the nation into
bloody civil war again as leftist factions rose up in protest against
what they considered an oppressive unjust regime.
On the eve of the March elections, Kennan sent a dispatch to
Washington relating the Kermlin1 s account of the coming Greek
elections. Quoting from the Moscow publication, Red Fleet:
It is plain to all honest and impartial observers that
elections new being prepared are an attempt to provoke
Monarchist-Fascist coup d' etat under mask of "legality" 
and thereby deceive world public opinion. As Eleutheria 
stated, Greek people will hardly accept authority imposed 
upon it without resistance. 148
They did not. Because of the right-wing electoral victory, the nation
continued to be convulsed by civil war. The only thing keeping the
monarchist government afloat was Britain's assistance, and that could
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not go on much longer. As early as fall, 1945 London asked Washington 
for assistance in raintaining Greek independence against "what Western 
officials believed was a Soviet instigated threat." Throughout 1946, 
in spite of protests caning from the left, exposing the repression of 
King George's regime, Washington knew it had to support the 
undemocratic right or face the alternative: a communistic government in 
Greece, bordering on the Mediterannean and the already oomrunized 
Balkan states. The Greek government asked the United States for 
assistance, knowing their only salvation lay in continued support from 
the Anglo-American bloc. When the British officially pulled out on 21 
February 1947, America readily stepped in.
The decision to intervene in Greece, assuring the continuance of a 
right-wing regime counter to the will of the people and the downfall of 
the leftist resistance movement, was the beginning of America's policy 
to support the government most likely to enhance the interests of the 
United States. The creators of this policy did not like the 
implications of supporting an unjust regime. On 3 January 1947, after 
the Greek monarchist government had already asked for U.S. economic 
assistance, Byrnes expressed the need for the government to change, to 
become more representative of the people.
Although US recognizes importance of Greek 
independence and territorial integrity, our views on 
desirable character and policies of Greek Govt have not 
changed...all loyal political jparties should unite to form 
most broadly based govt possible dedicated to 
moderation.. .now is the time to subordinate unessential 
differences and cooperate in policies that will remove, as 
far as possible, legitimate criticism of Greek Govt and 
causes of internal dissension. 1 50
But MacVeagh assured the Secretary in the summer of 1946 that "No
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'terrorism' can possibly exist in a country under Anglo-Saxon hegemony
which can be equated with that which accompanies Russian-supported
151Communism wherever it goes." The State Department had to believe such 
equivocations to justify its own polices.
This is where George Kennan's role as a creator becomes so 
instrumental, for Kennan's Long Telegram provided such justicfication. 
Kennan himself admitted the timing of the telegram was perfect. "Six 
months earlier," Kennan reasoned, "this message probably would have 
been received in the Department of State with raised eyebrows and lips 
pursed in disapproval." ̂ ^Gaddis wrote the following regarding the role 
Kennan played:
To insist that Kennan's thinking either shaped or 
reflected that of the administration would be to 
oversimplify, for in fact it did both. Kennan himself 
acknowledges having played a decisive role in certain 
areas...But Kennan's overall strategic concept...did not 
emerge fully formed in 1947; it was as much a 
rationalization for (and at times, a critique of) what the 
administration did during the next three years as it was an 
impetus to those actions. 153
The State Department needed to ideologically assess the Kremlin's 
diplomatic behavior and relate it to its own. Losing Greece to a 
comnunistic-oriented regime in an area already under communistic 
control would not be sound policy. It was a question of power politics
and the balance of power. "Containment," wrote Gaddis, "is just
154another way of restoring a balance of power in the world." Britain , 
unable to maintain its traditional role in the Near East, had to be 
replaced by America. Churchill knew it, and set the stage for such a 
takeover on 9 March 1946, with his famous speech delivered in Fulton 
Missouri. Be called for an Anglo-American alliance, now that an "iron
141
curtain" had been drawn all around Eastern Europe and the Balkans. 18  ̂
Anticipating the future, knowing full well his nation faced grave 
economic danger, Churchill used ideological fervor to turn the conflict 
of power politics into a clash between good and evil. He painted a 
grim picture for his idealistic American audience.
So did Kennan, although it was clearly not his intention. It was, 
however, exactly what Washington had wanted to hear. After the famous 
long Telegram circulated throughout Washington, Forrestal brought 
Kennan heme to head the newly established National War College in
Washington, "dedicated to the study of political-military affairs at
156the highest level." His success in that position attracted the 
attention of Secretary of State Marshall. He appointed him director to 
the newly formed Policy Planning Staff in May 1947, organized to
formulate and develop "...longterm programs for the achievement of U.S.
1 R7foreign policy objectives."
It was actually Forrestal's request that prompted Kennan to write 
the famous "X Article," as "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" became 
known. The Secretary of the Navy was so taken by Kennan's viewpoints 
on Russia that he sent him a paper on Marxism and Soviet power, asking 
for Kennan's Garments. Kennan replied that he would rather write his 
own views on the subject and Forrestal readily agreed. Forrestal liked 
the paper Kennan wrote so much that he gave it to the Secretary to 
read. 158
Early in January 1947, Kennan spoke on the subject of Soviet
objectives to the Council of Foreign Relations, using the paper he had 
written for Forrestal as a guideline for his lecture. The editor of
142
the council's magazine, Hamilton Armstrong, was present. He asked 
Kennan to sufcmit in writing the topic of the presentation. The result 
was "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," signed with an anonymous "X." The 
article appeared at the end of June in the July issue of Foreign
Affairs. As it coincided with the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine 
and the Marshall Plan, and as it penned the word "containment," it
correctly assumed the status as rationale for Washington's supposedly
159newly-formed policy.
Kennan, in the article, explained that the Kremlin must be
contained because "there can never be on Moscow's side any sincere 
assumption of a connunity of aims between the Soviet Union and powers 
which are regarded as capitalists."^ Its ultimate goal was to "make 
sure that it has filled every nook and cranny available to it in the 
basin of world power." It had all the time in the world, because it 
believed in "the basic badness of capitalism, in the inevitability of 
its destruction...." Kennan cited the hostility between capitalism and
socialism as an inherent part of the Soviet tradition which could not
161be modified. "In these circumstances," Kennan wrote in the article, 
"it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward
the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and
162vigilant containment of Russian expansion tendencies."
Kennan called for containing the Soviet Union at a "series of 
constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to
1 C Othe shifts and manoeuvers of Soviet policy...." He did not, however, 
consider all points on the globe to be of the sane importance. This 
was the 'particularlist' in Kennan. The United States needed to restore
143
the balance of power, not try to make the world over in its image. 164 
Those areas which held the key to natural resources, raw materials and 
industrial capability were instrumental to U.S. security. Of course, 
Greece and Turkey applied and Kennan approved of the policy of sending 
aid to those areas. He did not apporve of the reasons Truman told the 
American piblic it had to be done. "The internal organization of other 
states was not a proper matter of concern for American foreign 
policy." ̂ 5
For the creators of American foreign policy, hcwever, it would not 
do to publicly create a sphere of influence in the Mediterranean and 
the Near East, an area vital to the Persian Gulf and the rich oil 
passing through it. Roosevelt recognized the growing importance of 
this area, and began making early plans to create a sphere there by 
developing a "free nation" in the truest sense of America's superior 
values and institutions. No doubt he believed in his own value 
judements, as did MacVeagh when he wrote that no sphere under American 
hegemony could be as harsh as one under the Soviets, regardless of 
oppressive, right-wing tactics. Truman knew at Potsdam how vital the 
area was— he wanted to 'internationalize' the straits for this reason.
Stalin wanted the area too, and would not cooperate in allowing
American interests to cut him off fron it. He knew the limitations of 
his weakened nation, hcwever, and backed down. Given this 
circumstance, it seems poor judgment on Washington's part to have 
created a Soviet monster and use it for an excuse to send economic aid 
to Greece in order to prevent a left-wing communist party from gaining 
control. Throughout 1944 and most of 1945, Stalin contentedly let the
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British roll troops through Greece, stabilizing the country under its 
sphere. He did this in order to keep the West out of his 
sphere— Poland and Eastern Europe; and specifically Rumania and 
Bulgaria, the areas which he and Churchill had agreed would be under 
Russian dominance.
It soon became obvious to Stalin, though, that Truman and the 
creators of America's foreign policy had little respect for the deals 
which he, Churchill, and Roosevelt had made. There is no guarantee 
that Stalin would have stepped trying to gain influence in Iran and the 
Balkans even if Truman had cooperated by recognizing the nations in the 
Soviet sphere. Perhaps a large loan would have helped to convince 
Stalin that Washington desired an economically healthy and productive 
post-war Russia. In truth, neither Washington nor London wanted this in 
the post-war world; the power of the Bear was too great.
Roosevelt would have ocme up against the same problem. Cordell 
Hull's memoirs note a change in Stalin's behavior in the fall of 1944, 
right after Stalin and Churchill negotiated their little deal. Hull 
wrote that "we were beginning to get indications that the Russians were
about to drive hard bargains in their armistice agreements with
1Hungary, Bulgaria and Rumania..." Even though Roosevelt approved the 
agreement, he made it conditional for three months only; then it would 
have to be discussed. Roosevelt postponed many discussions until a 
later date. Although he died before the later date arrived, he would 
have had to deal with the problems eventually. No one, Roosevelt 
included, knew what Stalin was going to do in the years following the 
war. Within the State Department, opposition was also growing against
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Roosevelt's methods, particularly frcm Averell Harriman. FDR, had he 
lived, would have had to deal with those objections as well.
Most evidence points to the "Yalta Axiom," more than anything 
else, making the difference. Even after Hull noted the change in 
Stalin's behavior, he advocated treating the Soviets with friendship.
He totally sympathized with Russia's history, their fear of the
. . 167antagonistic and hostile West, their xenophobia and suspicions. ' 
Roosevelt used this approach— it was his contribution to the war 
effort. Yet he knew the power politics of the world were about to 
undergo a great change, with America and Russia sharing the lead and 
Western Europe going down. He sought to control the ambitions of 
Russia by convincing it to cooperate in ruling the world instead of 
seeking to do it unilaterally. His efforts are to be ccnmended, but 
they fell short of what was needed at the tine.
The creators of America's foreign policy did not inherit 
Roosevelt's disposition toward Russia. They chose instead the "Riga 
Axicm," feeling it would get far better results in "taming the bear" 
and establishing a post-war world molded in the American tradition of 
foreign policy— Open Door, lew tariffs and nations wishing to cooperate 
with such a system. In retrospect it is easy to ascertain the failure
of their policy. It is not so easy to determine if Roosevelt's 'axiom' 
would have done a better job once the Soviets starting making their 
demands known.
George Kennan wrote in his memoirs that "Never— neither then
[1933] not at any later date— did I consider the Soviet Union a fit 
ally...for this oountry." ̂ ^This attitude showed in the Long Telegram
146
and in "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," penning the word 'containment', 
officially making it part of U.S. policy. Yet Truman knew, like 
Roosevelt before him, that the post-war world had to freely supply, in 
the political sense, the raw materials and resources needed to keep 
America great. It came down to a matter of methods and attitudes only 
because Roosevelt failed to publicly address the issues when he was 
alive. The Soviet Union was never a fit ally for the goals of 
America's creators of foreign policy— Roosevelt simply hoped it would 
be someday, and that he and his "Grand Design" would be instrumental in 
bringing such a transformation about. The Grand Design, hcwever, the 
united Nations, was not a viable organization for solving the problems 
caused by power politics in the post-war world, leaving the Kremlin and 
Washington face to face in cold war combat, each wanting what the other 
did not want it to have.
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Chapter Four— Conclusion: "If you want war, nourish a doctrine."
On 27 February 1947, Dean Acheson delivered a persuasive speech to
a select group of Congressional leaders,1 hoping to convince them to
support the President's forthcoming request for military and economic
aid to Greece and Turkey. The meeting, by invitation only, came just
seven days after Britain had issued two papers to Washington, formally
announcing England's troop withdrawal fron Greece in six weeks and the
end of all economic aid in the area. Britain asked America to step
into the newly-created power vacuum, taking its place and thereby
2assuring the continuation of Anglo-American interests.
Acheson, the under secretary of state at the time, did remarkably 
well convincing those present of the urgency of the situation. At the 
President's request, he and the new Secretary of State, General 
Marshall, had been busy drawing up the necessary paperwork to give to 
Congress ever since the British made their announcement one week 
before. Acheson threw himself into the task, which he considered "his
3crisis." General Marshall started to explain the situation to his 
colleagues during the Congressional meeting, but his commentary was 
going "very badly," alarming the Congressmen to the possiblility of 
seme useless and expensive American intervention abroad, undertaken
4simply to pull "British chestnuts out of the fire." It was up to 
Acheson to take over the meeting and, in his own words, "scare hell of 
out 'em."^ He did this.
Acheson described the pressures Moscow had been putting on Turkey 
in the last year in order to obtain access to the Straits. He also
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emphasized the amount of Soviet propaganda which had been filtering
into the oonnunist forces in Greece. The move against Iran, Acheson
said, "for the time being had failed." Acheson painted a picture of
limitless Soviet expansion if the U.S. allowed Greece to fall to the
communists, the so-called 'domino theory.' "If they controlled Greece,
Turkey would sooner or later succumb, with or without war, and then
Iran...Fran there the possibilities of penetration of South Asia and
Africa were limitless."*’
Acheson told the Congressional leaders that the issue was
freedom— America's and the world's— versus Soviet totalitarianism.
Only two great powers remained in the world, Acheson 
continued, the United States and the Soviet Union. Not 
since Rcme and Carthage had there been such a polarization 
of power on this earth. Moreover the two great powers were 
divided by an unbridgeable ideological chasm. For us, 
democracy and individual liberty wspre basic; for them,
dictatorship and absolute conformity.
Senator Vandenburg, present at the meeting, spoke first and with
gravity. "Mr. President," he solemnly told the entire roam, "if you
will say that to Congress and the country, I will support you and I
8believe that most of its members will do the same." Vandenberg wanted
to be sure Congress understood the situation in the global terms
Acheson had described. "It was Vandenberg's 'condition'," wrote Arthur
Schlesinger, "that made it possible, even necessary, to launch the
global policy that broke through the remaining barriers of American 
9isolationism."
A few weeks later, on 12 March 1947, Truman made his formal
request for funds to Congress. The statement became known as the Truman 
Doctrine. More than just a request for funds, his discourse announced
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to the American people a new threat to their security, and hence the 
need for a new policy governing the relationship between America and 
the rest of the world. Without this threat, Washington feared 
Americans might have difficulty grasping the severity of the situation, 
insisting instead that intervention into European affairs had nothing 
to do with the security of their hemisphere. So Truman told the people 
of all nations that
At the present moment in world history nearly every 
nation must choose between two alternative ways of life.
The choice is not always a free one.
One way of life is based upon the will of the 
majority, and is distinguished by free institutions, 
representative government, free elections, guarantees of 
individual liberty, freedom of speech and religion, and 
freedom from political oppression.
The second way of life is based upon the will of the 
minority forcibly imposed upon the majority. It relies 
upon terror and oppression, a controlled pres^Q fixed 
elections, and the suppression of personal freedom.
Both Acheson and Truman ignored the reality of the situation in Greece 
when they turned the internal struggle of that country into a necessary 
crusade against the evil forces of Soviet oomtunism. The decision to 
contain Moscow's sphere of influence where it presently stood in 1947 
was based on sound pragmatic thinking, an acknowledgement of the 
strategic importance of Greece and Turkey to the national interests of 
America— the need for economic and natural resources which could not be 
provided by the United States alone. Furthermore, Washington had been 
concerned with the region for years; its interest in the area was not 
new, nor was the threat U.S. policy makers now emphasized to Congress. 
It was only when Britain could no longer maintain the status quo in 
Greece that the situation became urgent.
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The tradition in American foreign policy had been, since the 
nation's beginning, to shroud its ambitions in democratic rhetoric and 
the task of promoting freedom and justice for all. The Truman Doctrine 
offered no exception, and it is quite likely that the creators of 
America's post-war foreign policy believed in the illusion, promoted 
over the years, that nothing mattered quite so much as aiding other 
nations to adopt America's ways, means and institutions. Capitalism, 
of course, was the backbone institution. Creating "friendly" states 
assured its survival, but Washington could not separate its ambition 
that America be a rich and powerful nation from the Kremlin's ambition 
that the U.S.S.R. be the same. The failure to do so resulted in cold 
war, an arms race which could still erupt into a global catastrophe, 
and a containment policy which has extracted from the American people 
exhorbitant costs— in both human lives and revenue. Would it have been 
in America's best interests to allow the civil war to continue in
Greece, inviting Moscow's eventual participation? Of course not. But 
what was the point of turning the power struggle there into an
ideological battle between the American way and Soviet 
totalitarianism?
A study in the tradition of America's foreign policy clearly 
foreshadows this outcome. Ever since George Washington's farewell 
address, the ethnocentric concept that America must shoulder the 
responsibility to provide an example of democracy and justice to the 
world denied the possibility than any motive the United States might
have was not wholesome and pure. Its people came to believe in both
the creed and their nation's motives. As a result, the creed's very
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existence has forced America, over the years, to strive for justice and 
equity. Even though its failures have been pronounced, the 
tenaciousness of its efforts, usually by a handful of determined
citizens, is ocmnendable. The concepts of justice and sovereignty, 
b om out of the Age of Enlightenment, have set a standard for human 
conduct the world over. All nations are expected, to sane extent, to 
adhere to this morality. Human beings as well as governments have 
created their own systems of chastisement for those who ignore such 
ethics. The credit goes more to Thcmas Jefferson, who penned the
immortal words that all men are created equal, than to the United
States as a nation. It was an idea whose time had ocme, and someone 
had to say it.
It is not surprising that America, forged on this idea, has had to 
struggle with it ever since. Domestically and internationally, the
United States has continued in its self-inposed policy to be unique and 
above reproach, feeling strongly that there never has been any other 
reasonable method of government than that of its Constitution and 
democratic republic. Regardless of the shortcomings, it was the best 
the world had to offer— so far. From time to tine, the argument would 
crop up that Americans should first establish their morality at home 
before trying to push it abroad. Once the need for foreign markets 
became obvious, hcwever, and intervention into foreign affairs a 
necessity for assuring those markets, the American tradition was too 
firmly entrenched; the American people would not approve Washington's 
intervention for any other reason than to save the dcwn-trodden fran 
the evil of corrupt governments.
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If that sounds too sinplistic for the realities of this world, its 
political systems and power struggles to date, it is. Moreover, it was 
when Woodrow Wilson went to war to end all wars? and it was when 
Roosevelt and Churchill signed the Atlantic Charter, the "guiding star" 
of the coalition, the "expression of fundamental objectives toward 
which we and our Allies are directing our policies.
The tradition of America's foreign relations, hcwever, cannot
serve as a good excuse for the eventual disintegration of World War
II's Grand Alliance, the failure of Roosevelt's Grand Design, and the
emergence of Washington' s containment policy. Roosevelt was quite
aware of the shortcomings of self-determination and the Atlantic
Charter, principles he used to satisfy the American people. Throughout
the war years he had to walk a tightrope, appeasing Stalin's war aims
while allowing the American people to believe he did not have any. The
pressure must have been tremendous; and there are those who argue that
Roosevelt did the best he could given the mindset of the American
people. For this reason, George Kennan has always resented the
interference of public opinion into foreign affairs, believing
diplomacy to be a chore for a few knowledgeable people who can
determine the best way to negotiate a settlement without the fear of
12offending voters.
Roosevelt did have this fear, as his handling of the Polish 
situation bore out. He knew he would never go to war over Poland, yet 
the concerns of Polish-American voters did not allow him the freedom to 
publicly negotiate a Polish settlement with Stalin. After Roosevelt's 
death, the creators in Washington used Poland as an example of Moscow's
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breach with the Atlantic Charter, a reneging which never took place. 
Roosevelt's initial agreement with Stalin, which took place at Teheran 
in 1943, assured Poland's existence as a state "friendly" to the Soviet 
Union in the post-war world. Yet Roosevelt made this agreement in 
secret, resorting to the use of innuendos and obscure language.11 No 
doubt Stalin recognized the agreement as tenuous, at best. Even so, 
Roosevelt had accepted Stalin's definition of 'friendly', knowing full 
well he intended to establish hegemony in Poland, one way or another.
Nowhere is the use of vague wording and meaningless rhetoric more
pronounced than in the Atlantic Charter and The Declaration on
Liberated Europe. Issac Deutscher wrote that the "pledges of the
allies, had, anyhow, been so vague and contained so many loopholes that
14by reference to the text each side could justify its conduct."
15Several historians agreed with him, George Kennan among them. It is 
hard to believe Churchill or Roosevelt were naive enough to think 
Stalin's concept of social democracy would ever change to Westem-style 
liberal democracy, yet this is the impression they conveyed at the 
conferences when the Big Three met. Stalin had made it clear at 
Teheran that he equated democratic parties with parties that were 
friendly, that would cooperate, with the Soviet regime. The West's 
disregard for Stalin's war aims cannot be excused by naivete or 
ignorance. It is certain the West knew of Stalin's war aims and the 
problems they posed to America's concept of the post-war world.16 It is 
not as clear if Roosevelt realized the problems the obscure language of 
the Atlantic Charter would eventually cause.
Poland was the one issue where definition and clarity was needed,
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the one issue which damaged the coherence of the coalition more than 
any other. It set the precedent for future negotiations between the 
Big Three. The unsettling of issues with ambiguous language and 
meaningless agreements became the norm. In spite of Stalin's clear 
intentions, or because of them, the agreements and cartnuniques signed 
at the conferences became too broad to be binding, saying little in 
specific terms about what would be done in Poland and Eastern Europe at 
the war's end.
Stalin was determined to return his borders to the configuration 
of 1941, to create a protective barrier along western Russia. This was 
but one of his war aims. He made his intentions clear early in the war 
when he sent Molotov to London and Washington to push for recognition 
of the 1941 border. Molotov was refused recognition and premised a 
second front by his Western partners instead. The front was never 
delivered when first pledged, and thus became the first broken premise 
of the coalition, a fact Stalin never forgot.
The document which bound both Churchill and Roosevelt to
officially deny Stalin's territorial requests was The Atlantic Charter,
whose principles were so easily bent. Such ideals may have calmed the
American public, but Stalin agreed to the charter conditionally, with
the qualification that the principles would secure support only under
certain circumstances, depending on the needs of the specific 
17country. Roosevelt chose to publicly ignore these important words.
The interpretation of the Polish agreements hinged on the words 
"democratic" and "anti-fascist," two words which, in Stalin's eyes, 
were not manifested by the London Poles or any other existing Polish
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party except his cwn puppet party. The West knew this, yet it
proceeded to follow a policy of contradiction, agreeing with Stalin
that Poland's government should be friendly but insisting that it
include unfriendly elements. America's ambitions of an open door in
Europe and the rest of the post-war world conflicted profoundly with
Stalin's war aims, yet instead of confronting the conflict openly
Roosevelt chose to stall for time, putting off discussions until a
18final peace conference which he would never attend. Simultaneously, 
he was misleading the public with tales of the coalition's new-found 
oneness and unity.
One possible explanation for such a debacle is the tremendous 
pressure Roosevelt felt to balance public expectations with reality. 
Another is Roosevelt's dream of a United Nations, a vision in which he 
obviously placed too much confidence, hoping that it would solve 
deep-seated and ocrrplex problems. Russia1 s quest for secure borders 
and spheres of influence in the Balkans, Iran and Asia was part of its 
tradition in foreign relations long before Stalin ever made it the 
basis for his foreign policy. It was rooted in Bismarck's diplomacy, 
European power politics and the balance of power. It was also rooted 
in the desire for power for its cwn sake, the nationalistic goal of the 
modem, industrial world. Churchill, a product of Europe, understood 
this. The American people did not. Roosevelt may have, but for 
domestic political reasons he could not base policy on the existence of 
such a world; it denied the American tradition.
Woodrcw Wilson had dreams of overcoming the archaic system of 
balancing the power to preserve the peace, but he could not put these
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dreams into motion at Paris in 1918. The Treaty of Versailles, 
hammered out at the end of World War I, destroyed the status quo so 
completely that Hitler gathered the support of the demoralized German 
people, rallying to the cry that their nation would rise again. 
Stalin, combining a fierce xenophobic nationalism with 
anti-capitalistic principles of Marxism-Leninism was determined, 
politically, militarily and economically, to survive with a hostile 
Western world. He would do what he could to assure such survival. 
This determination became heightened by historical events as Hitler 
rose to power— mainly the isolation and non-recognition of the Soviet 
Union by the West, and the policy of appeasement. This legacy of the 
past was too strong to overcome with broad terms, and Stalin was not 
about to depend cm Western institutions to secure his borders or to 
prevent Germany from rising still a third time. He wanted real 
assurance, not America's unfulfilled dream of Manifest Destiny to 
remake the entire world over in its image.
Yet Roosevelt cannot be faulted for wanting a functional world 
body. The fault lies in letting this nominal agency, still in its 
embryonic form, serve as a substitute for diplomacy and negotiations 
over territorial disputes. Stalin's demands were pushed aside with 
vague language, giving Roosevelt time to pursue his Grand Design, 
hoping all the while that Stalin's war aims would dissolve into a 
new-found enthusiasm for a world peace-keeping organization. One 
cannot help but think Roosevelt knew the failure of his reasoning as 
the war's end drew closer, but the seeds of the future had been sown. 
He could not go back to 1943, to Teheran, which had been the time for
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negotiations. Then, Stalin had a desperate need for his Allies and 
lend-lease, and would have been willing to make concessions. This 
would have required a frank admission to the American public on 
Roosevelt's part of the need to negotiate, an honest admission that 
Stalin harbored the traditional war aims of territorial 
aggrandizement. Roosevelt obviously felt such an admission would not 
have been tolerated. More faith in the ability of the American people 
to handle reality could have made the difference, or perhaps an 
insistence that they do. Procrastination only hindered an already 
difficult situation. Theorizing what could have been, however, is not 
a luxury historians can afford to engage in.
Problems beseiged the Grand Alliance, scme rooted in the past, 
others arising as the war wore on. The tragedy of the coalition was 
not an unawareness of the problems, but a failure to confront them head 
on by negotiating in concrete language about definitive borders. That 
each was suspicious of the other was realized by all; that each had 
different war aims was known by all. It is prudent to remember that 
Churchill's war aims also received Roosevelt's disapproval. It is 
doubtful that Poland or Eastern Europe could have been saved from 
Moscow, but it was certainly possible for the coalition to reach a more 
equitable status, giving the United Nations a chance to fulfill its 
true purpose. As it turned out, past suspicions were confirmed and 
past hostilities intensified, threatening national security as it never 
had been before. The coaltion surely had the power to overcame the 
past and secure the future, at least more than it did. Refusal to 
address the issues gave FDR's successors cause to brand Stalin a liar,
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precipitating the policy of containment.
FDR's successors became the creators of America's containment
policy as it was eventually penned. Roosevelt knew the Soviet Union
would have to be contained, but his Grand Design was far removed from
the ideological fervor of the Truman Doctrine which carmitted America's
resources anywhere that "free peoples" needed help to "maintain their
free institutitons and their national integrity against aggressive
19movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes." In
1950 the National Security Council (NSC) drew up paper #68, which
declared that "the assault an free institutions is worldwide now, and
in the context of the present polarization of power a defeat of free
20institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere." NSC 68 locked 
America's decision to contain Russia into a global phenomenon,
perceived as a struggle between good and evil by the American people.
FDR's worst fears had become a reality: all efforts to negotiate a
post-war peace settlement ceased, supplanted by a cold war.
George Kennan did not approve of the Truman Doctrine, which he 
felt masked America' s true motives in the same rhetoric as the Atlantic 
Charter. Kennan wrote that "We like to.. .attribute a universal
significance to decisions we have already found it necessary, for 
limited and parochial reasons, to take."
It was not enough for us, when circumstances forced us 
into World War I.. .our war effort had to be clothed in the 
form of an effort to make the world (nothing less) "safe 
for democracy." It was not enough for us, in World War II, 
that the Japanese attacked us at Pearl Harbor.. .we did not 
feel comfortable until we had wrapped our military efforts 
in the wholly universalistic— and largely
meaningless— generalities of the Atlantic Charter. 
Something of this same compulsion became apparent in the 
postwar period in the tendency of many Americans to divide
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the world neatly into Communistic and "free world" 
components, to avgjd recognition of specific differences 
among countries...
Kennan complained that the "heart" of the Truman Doctrine, "to support 
free peoples who are resisting subjugation," "placed our aid to Greece
in the framework of a universal policy rather than in that of a
. . . .  22specific decision addressed to a specific set of cirsumstanoes."
It seems odd, then, that Kennan's article, "The Sources of Soviet
Conduct," provided the rationale for Washington's containment policy.
As Kennan himself remarked, however, it was more a matter of timing
than anything else. Irregardless of anything Kennan had written or
would write in the future, the decision to support the right-wing
monarchist regime in Greece, thereby assuring the survival of the
status quo in the region, was never in dispute.
Kennan admits that he did not make his objectives clear enough in
the article. The gap between ends and means became too large, and his
intention of political containment soon came to mean military
involvement. "Soegregious were these errors," Kennan wrote in his
memoirs, "that I must confess to responsibility for the greatest and
most unfortunate of the misunderstandings to which they led." He
called the language of the "X Article" "careless and indiscriminate,"
and the recognition of the article's shortcomings a "painful 
23experience."
In spite of Kennan's realizations, one cannot help but wander why 
the wording of both The Lang Telegram and the "X Article" led 
Washington so far away frcm Kennan's intentions and his particular list 
philosophy. One answer must be the American tradition in foreign
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policy— the creators had to account for their decision to intervene
in Greece in such a way that the American public— and Congress— would
support it. Kennan's writings contained truths, yes; but the overall
tone reeked with the "Riga Axian." Kennan overlooked the fact that the
Soviet Union may have had sane legitimate reasons to suspect the West,
that the West was indeed guilty of seme inimical acts against it.
Kennan's explanation of the historical circumstances surrounding the
Kremlin's hostility tcward the West ignored both the West's
intervention into Russia's civil war of 1918-1920, and its refusal to
24align with Russia against Hitler in the 1930's.
In the "X Article," Kennan attributed Soviet animosity to ideology 
alone: "For ideology, as we have seen, taught them that the outside was 
hostile and that it was their duty eventually to overthrow the 
political forces beyond their border." Furthermore,
The real facts concerning it have been confused by the 
existence abroad of genuine resentment provoked by Soviet 
philosophy and tactics and occasionally by the existence of 
great centers of military power, notably the Nazi regime in 
Germany...which did indeed have aggressive designs against 
the Soviet Union. But there is ample evidence that the 
stress laid in Moscow an the menace confronting Soviet 
society frcm the world outside its borders is founded not 
in the realities of foreign antagonism tut in the necessity 
of explaining away the maintenance of dictatorial authority 
at hone.
The existence of such an attitude, present in Kennan's "Long 
Telegram" as well, made it all too easy for the creators of America's 
post-war foreign policy to ignore the ambiguity of the agreements made 
at Teheran and Yalta and insist the Soviets follow than unequivocally, 
right dewn to the last obscure letter. It gave the policy makers an 
excuse to disregard the interests of the Kremlin, which were termed
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destructive and detrimental to the freedom of the world. The tone of 
Kennan's writings fit the mindset of Washington's creators, who were 
tired of dealing with Moscow's intransigence and its refusal to adopt 
America's version of the post-war world. Regardless of whose political 
system was the most desirable, Moscow's or Washington's, both were here 
to stay. Roosevelt's awareness of this was keen; as a result, he 
viewed antagonism and hostility toward Russia as futile.
Unfortunately, Roosevelt's legacy to Truman did not include his 
attitude toward Russia. FDR led America's creators to believe Moscow 
would adopt his Grand Design in the post-war world. When Stalin began 
insisting that Poland, Eastern Europe, and the Balkans be instilled 
with 'friendly' regimes, the creators insisted in turn on a stricter 
observance of the Declaration of Liberated Europe and the Atlantic 
Charter. Averell Harriman especially went out of his way to convince 
Truman that Stalin had to be stopped— via the use of a ' get-tough' 
policy. This turned out to be a fundamental mistake, simply because 
such demands were not negotiable with Stalin. Although it would have 
been difficult, the creators had it in their power to correct this 
error by admitting that the Yalta agreement was tenuous and the 
Atlantic Charter nothing more than a "guiding star." Soviet expansion 
could still have been contained, but minus the universal fanfare of 
saving the entire world fran the evils of Soviet totalitarianism. 
Russia had already backed down in both Iran and Trukey by the end of 
1946, By treating Greece as an individual incident instead of a global 
precedent, as Kennan advocated, Stalin would have realized Washington's 
intolerance toward Soviet expansion, political, ideological or
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otherwise. This would have kept negotiation channels open and the 
United Nations may have proven a viable instrument, averting the 
ideological conflict of cold war and the concept of a struggle between 
evil and good.
Kennan contributed to universal crusade, even though he deplored 
the implications of such motives. His writings, however, did nothing 
to promulgate the notion that the Soviet Union should be dealt with as 
any other nation seeking power directly in conflict with United States 
interests; instead, he turned that country into a menace which could 
only be dealt with using extraordinary measures, such as coming to the 
aid of any nation whose freedom was threatened, whatever that means. 
The EAM in Greece felt its freedom threatened by the Monarchist right, 
which held power. Conversely, the right's political sovereignty was in 
danger of being destroyed by leftist rebel forces. Who was right?
Moscow called the creators of America's foreign policy
prejudiced, "...according to the authoritative evidence of a man who
was 'present at the creation'," Sivachev wrote, "...Washington was
26guided not by facts but by prejudices." During these years, the 
Soviet historian continued, the "totalitarian model" prevailed among 
the thinkers in Washington, influencing waiter Bedell Smith, George 
Kennan and other members of the State Department. Stalin replied 
scathingly to the Truman Doctrine within twenty-four hours. He used 
America's own opposition to the Doctrine to make his points:
waiter Lippnann, for example, frankly points 
out...that an American alliance with Turkey would give the 
U.S.A. a strategic position, incomparably more advantageous 
than any other, from which power could be wielded over the 
Middle East.
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Stalin next quoted the New York Times, which proclaimed the advent of
"the age of American responsibility."
Yet what is this responsibility but a smokescreen for 
expansion?.. .New that they want to take Greece and Turkey 
under their control, they raise a din about "totalitarian 
states."
Stalin raised a good point, but there was no double standard
involved. Each nation wanted to secure that part of the world for its
own interests. Clearly, neither nation was mature or insightful enough
to lay aside its ambitions for the sake of peace. In that respect,
Roosevelt's vision was not fit for the world as it then existed; it
still is not. Kennan knew this. Although left weak economically,
Russia emerged as an undisputed world power, as did the United States.
Toqueville' s prophecy of so long ago had cone to pass. This
instantaneous two-power world was most unfortunate when viewed in terms
of America's and Russia's already existent ideologies and the realities
of the past. Deutscher wrote that a struggle between socialism and
capitalism all too often misrepresented a conflict between democracy 
28and ccrtirtunism. His analysis is well taken. It is important to
realize that Roosevelt's motives, like Truman's, Stalin's and all the
creators of containment, can be questioned. To what extent are
governments, all governments, sincere, and to what extent do they use
their ideology as a mask to cover up quests for political and economic
power? There is evidence to support either side of this question and
no clear answers emerge.
William Graham Sumner warned Americans, "If you want war, nourish 
29a doctrine." Nourishing doctrines has been part of the American
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tradition in foreign relations, and the Soviet Union has its doctrine 
as well. Both nations claim their doctrines speak of true democracy, 
and both have tried to base their foreign policies on the supremacy of 
their ideas, each accusing the other's corrupt political system of 
seeking world domination. Geopolitically, hcwever, both Russia and the 
United States are rich in land, natural resources and manpower; this 
reality was the basis of Toqueville's prophecy, and it had nothing to 
do with republicanism or communism. He foresaw a power struggle, and 
astutely guessed it would encompass the globe. It was not in the name 
of these ambitions, however, that the Grand Alliance broke down and 
the containment policy formed. Without the doctrines, waging a cold 
war would have proven sanewhat more difficult.
In truth, neither the political system of the Soviet Union nor the 
United States has yet proven to be superior to the other; neither has 
achieved world peace, an end to starvation, disease or economic 
exploitation, or an abolition of racial and religious prejudice. Of 
course the American system has never, fortunately, produced a menace 
like Stalin. Stalin had to be dealt with in the post-war years, but the 
methods adopted by the creators of America1 s containment policy did 
little to change the nature of the dictator1s policies. Roosevelt 
hoped to do this, but his strategy failed as well. Both Stalin and 
Roosevelt were too bound by the traditions in their own foreign 
relations—  Stalin to acheive national interests by the use of orthodox 
European pcwer politics; Roosevelt to secure his interests by promoting 
a universal system based on America's already existing system of 
capita listic-democracy.
173
The seeds of America's containment policy were sewn in FDR's war 
diplomacy, which refused to negotiate a territorial settlement with 
Stalin in the post-war world. This left Truman and his advisors with 
nothing but the Atlantic Charter, the Yalta agreement, and their cwn 
concept of the post-war world and Stalin's place in it. The origins of 
containment, hcwever, lay dormant throughout the war, and even before, 
in the traditions of both Washington's and Moscow's foreign relations. 
Both harbored ambitions which excluded the other; both wished to 
'contain' the other's ambitions in order to fully promote their cwn. 
There could be no winners and no losers, only face-off after face-off. 
This has happened throughout the years since World War II ended; and 
many times the absurdity of the policy has been proven. It is left to 
the future to decide its outcome, and leaders of all nations will make 
the final choices.
It is fitting to recall seme of Roosevelt's last words, spoken in 
his 1945 State of the Union Address, the final time he addressed 
Congress. The words foreshadowed the danger he knew was caning. Sadly, 
they also spoke to the failure of the Grand Alliance to acheive a 
lasting peace. The time would core again, Roosevelt seemed to 
indicate, when the world would have to cane up with a better plan for 
establishing the peace.
The nearer we came to vanquishing our enemies the more 
we inevitably be cane conscious of differences among the 
victors.
We must not let those differences divide us and blind 
us to our more important common and continuing interests in 
winning the war and building the peaoe.
International cooperation on which enduring peace must 
be based is not a one-way street.
Nations like individuals do not always think alike, 
and international cooperation and progress are not helped
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by any Nation assuming that it has a monopoly of wisdan or 
virtue....
Perfectionism, no less than isolationism or 
imperialism or power politics, may obstruct the paths to 
international peace. Let us not forget that the retreat to 
isolationism a quarter of a century ago was started not by 
a direct attack against international cooperation but 
against alleged inperfections of the peace.
In our disillusionment after the last war we preferred 
international anarchy to international cooperation with 
Nations which did not see and think exactly as we did....
We must not let that happen again, or we shall follow 
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